Market accessibility and the entry decision: A theoretical and experimental examination.

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184619
Title:
Market accessibility and the entry decision: A theoretical and experimental examination.
Author:
Kruse, Jamie Lynette Brown.
Issue Date:
1988
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
The role of market accessibility and entry is the central theme of this dissertation. Two theoretical models of oligopoly theory are examined in a controlled laboratory market setting. Experimental testing of Contestability Theory is extended beyond the natural monopoly case and a "safe haven" provides subjects with a viable alternative to the "contestable" market. Evidence reported supports the conclusion that the contestable market is robust to the introduction of the alternate market. The theory of Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly is explored from a game theoretic perspective with special attention to buyer queuing rule assumptions. Experimental evidence underscores sensitivity of market outcomes to the queuing rule adopted. The presence of excess capacity relative to market demand tends to push theoretical Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria toward competitive levels. This result is substantiated by experimental evidence and is independent of the queuing rule assumed. The similarity between the Bertrand-Edgeworth excess capacity case and a contestable natural monopoly market is investigated. The presence of excess capacity/potential entrants is shown to exert more downward pressure on observed laboratory market prices than the presence of additional competitors alone. This result is at odds with the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. A herfindahl index calculated from experimental results has almost no power to predict market outcome.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Competition.; Oligopolies.; Barriers to entry (Industrial organization)
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Economics; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Smith, V. L.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleMarket accessibility and the entry decision: A theoretical and experimental examination.en_US
dc.creatorKruse, Jamie Lynette Brown.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKruse, Jamie Lynette Brown.en_US
dc.date.issued1988en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe role of market accessibility and entry is the central theme of this dissertation. Two theoretical models of oligopoly theory are examined in a controlled laboratory market setting. Experimental testing of Contestability Theory is extended beyond the natural monopoly case and a "safe haven" provides subjects with a viable alternative to the "contestable" market. Evidence reported supports the conclusion that the contestable market is robust to the introduction of the alternate market. The theory of Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly is explored from a game theoretic perspective with special attention to buyer queuing rule assumptions. Experimental evidence underscores sensitivity of market outcomes to the queuing rule adopted. The presence of excess capacity relative to market demand tends to push theoretical Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria toward competitive levels. This result is substantiated by experimental evidence and is independent of the queuing rule assumed. The similarity between the Bertrand-Edgeworth excess capacity case and a contestable natural monopoly market is investigated. The presence of excess capacity/potential entrants is shown to exert more downward pressure on observed laboratory market prices than the presence of additional competitors alone. This result is at odds with the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. A herfindahl index calculated from experimental results has almost no power to predict market outcome.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectCompetition.en_US
dc.subjectOligopolies.en_US
dc.subjectBarriers to entry (Industrial organization)en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorSmith, V. L.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest8907963en_US
dc.identifier.oclc701900357en_US
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