INCENTIVE EFFECTS AND MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF PERFORMANCE PLAN ADOPTIONS.

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184001
Title:
INCENTIVE EFFECTS AND MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF PERFORMANCE PLAN ADOPTIONS.
Author:
GAVER, JENNIFER JANE.
Issue Date:
1987
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This study provides evidence concerning the endogenous determination of managerial compensation contracts. To avoid the confounding effect of tax considerations, we limit our attention to the choice among long-term nonqualified incentive plans. Specifically, we consider a two-part decision faced by the firm: (1) whether to add an accounting-based "performance plan" to the existing portfolio of compensation contracts and (2) if the firm adopts a plan, the choice between a "relative" or an "absolute" performance measure. Based on some behavioral implications of performance plans which distinguish them from alternative contracts, we develop hypotheses which relate the adoption and design of a performance plan to the firm's general incentive contracting environment. We test these hypotheses using a choice-based sample, evenly divided between performance plan adopters and nonadopters. For the purposes of parameter estimation, we use the multinomial logit model to reflect the qualitative, hierarchical nature of the decision setting. Our results indicate that variables which proxy for the incentive environment can explain which firms will adopt a performance plan, and also the type of performance measure used by the adopting firms.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Executives -- Salaries, etc.; Executives -- Pensions.; Incentives in industry.; Management -- Mathematical models.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Business Administration; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Dhaliwal, Dan

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleINCENTIVE EFFECTS AND MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF PERFORMANCE PLAN ADOPTIONS.en_US
dc.creatorGAVER, JENNIFER JANE.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGAVER, JENNIFER JANE.en_US
dc.date.issued1987en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis study provides evidence concerning the endogenous determination of managerial compensation contracts. To avoid the confounding effect of tax considerations, we limit our attention to the choice among long-term nonqualified incentive plans. Specifically, we consider a two-part decision faced by the firm: (1) whether to add an accounting-based "performance plan" to the existing portfolio of compensation contracts and (2) if the firm adopts a plan, the choice between a "relative" or an "absolute" performance measure. Based on some behavioral implications of performance plans which distinguish them from alternative contracts, we develop hypotheses which relate the adoption and design of a performance plan to the firm's general incentive contracting environment. We test these hypotheses using a choice-based sample, evenly divided between performance plan adopters and nonadopters. For the purposes of parameter estimation, we use the multinomial logit model to reflect the qualitative, hierarchical nature of the decision setting. Our results indicate that variables which proxy for the incentive environment can explain which firms will adopt a performance plan, and also the type of performance measure used by the adopting firms.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectExecutives -- Salaries, etc.en_US
dc.subjectExecutives -- Pensions.en_US
dc.subjectIncentives in industry.en_US
dc.subjectManagement -- Mathematical models.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineBusiness Administrationen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorDhaliwal, Danen_US
dc.identifier.proquest8709891en_US
dc.identifier.oclc698259813en_US
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