Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145277
Title:
CEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance
Author:
Gaertner, Fabio B.
Issue Date:
2011
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear.
Type:
Electronic Dissertation; text
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Accounting
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Dhaliwal, Dan S.
Committee Chair:
Dhaliwal, Dan S.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleCEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidanceen_US
dc.creatorGaertner, Fabio B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGaertner, Fabio B.en_US
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractI examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear.en_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.typetexten_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorDhaliwal, Dan S.en_US
dc.contributor.chairDhaliwal, Dan S.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberEldenburg, Leslie G.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberBens, Daniel A.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberCook, Kirsten A.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest11489-
dc.identifier.oclc752261359-
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