Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/106275
Title:
Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation
Author:
Fallis, Don
Citation:
Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation 2005, 2(1) Episteme
Publisher:
University of Edinburgh
Journal:
Episteme
Issue Date:
2005
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/106275
Submitted date:
2006-10-20
Abstract:
The doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. The epistemic value of maintaining consistency does not always outweigh the epistemic value of making true judgments.
Type:
Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)
Language:
en
Keywords:
Philosophy; Social Epistemology
Local subject classification:
epistemic value theory; epistemology; judgment aggregation; doctrinal paradox; probability; consistency

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorFallis, Donen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-20T00:00:01Z-
dc.date.available2010-06-18T23:43:39Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.date.submitted2006-10-20en_US
dc.identifier.citationEpistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation 2005, 2(1) Epistemeen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/106275-
dc.description.abstractThe doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. The epistemic value of maintaining consistency does not always outweigh the epistemic value of making true judgments.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Edinburghen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectSocial Epistemologyen_US
dc.subject.otherepistemic value theoryen_US
dc.subject.otherepistemologyen_US
dc.subject.otherjudgment aggregationen_US
dc.subject.otherdoctrinal paradoxen_US
dc.subject.otherprobabilityen_US
dc.subject.otherconsistencyen_US
dc.titleEpistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregationen_US
dc.typeJournal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)en_US
dc.identifier.journalEpistemeen_US
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