Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/106126
Title:
What is Lying?
Author:
Fallis, Don
Citation:
What is Lying? 2008,
Issue Date:
2008
Description:
Paper presented at the 2008 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pasadena, California.
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/106126
Submitted date:
2007-12-04
Abstract:
In order to lie, you have to say something that you believe to be false. But lying is not simply saying what you believe to be false. Philosophers have made several suggestions for what the additional condition might be. For example, it has been suggested that the liar has to intend to deceive (Augustine 395, Bok 1978, Mahon 2006), that she has to believe that she will deceive (Chisholm and Feehan 1977), or that she has to warrant the truth of what she says (Carson 2006). In this paper, I argue that none of the existing definitions of lying identify a necessary condition on lying. I claim that lying is saying what you believe to be false when you believe that the following norm of conversation is in effect: "Do not say what you believe to be false" (Grice 1989, 27). And I argue that this definition handles all of the counter-examples to the existing definitions.
Type:
presentation
Language:
en
Keywords:
Philosophy; Epistemology
Local subject classification:
Asserting; definition; deceiving; Gricean Maxim; lie; lying; norm of conversation; warranting the truth

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorFallis, Donen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-04T00:00:01Z-
dc.date.available2010-06-18T23:41:15Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.date.submitted2007-12-04en_US
dc.identifier.citationWhat is Lying? 2008,en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/106126-
dc.descriptionPaper presented at the 2008 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pasadena, California.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn order to lie, you have to say something that you believe to be false. But lying is not simply saying what you believe to be false. Philosophers have made several suggestions for what the additional condition might be. For example, it has been suggested that the liar has to intend to deceive (Augustine 395, Bok 1978, Mahon 2006), that she has to believe that she will deceive (Chisholm and Feehan 1977), or that she has to warrant the truth of what she says (Carson 2006). In this paper, I argue that none of the existing definitions of lying identify a necessary condition on lying. I claim that lying is saying what you believe to be false when you believe that the following norm of conversation is in effect: "Do not say what you believe to be false" (Grice 1989, 27). And I argue that this definition handles all of the counter-examples to the existing definitions.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.subject.otherAssertingen_US
dc.subject.otherdefinitionen_US
dc.subject.otherdeceivingen_US
dc.subject.otherGricean Maximen_US
dc.subject.otherlieen_US
dc.subject.otherlyingen_US
dc.subject.othernorm of conversationen_US
dc.subject.otherwarranting the truthen_US
dc.titleWhat is Lying?en_US
dc.typepresentationen_US
All Items in UA Campus Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.