Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105761
Title:
Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments
Author:
Fallis, Don
Editors:
Fitelson, Branden
Citation:
Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments 2007, 86(2) Studia Logica
Publisher:
Springer
Journal:
Studia Logica
Issue Date:
2007
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105761
Submitted date:
2007-08-01
Abstract:
Several different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (e.g., Levi 1962, Horwich 1982, Maher 1990, Oddie 1997) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model--suggested independently by Patrick Maher (1990) and Graham Oddie (1997)--that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehensive explanation. This is because this proper scoring rule (PSR) model captures a wider range of scientifically acceptable attitudes toward epistemic risk than the other Bayesian models that have been proposed. I also argue, however, that even the PSR model places unreasonably tight restrictions on a scientist's attitude toward epistemic risk. As a result, such Bayesian models of epistemic utilities fail as normative accounts--not just as descriptive accounts (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1972, Giere 1988)--of scientific inquiry.
Type:
Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)
Language:
en
Keywords:
Philosophy; Epistemology; Social Epistemology
Local subject classification:
Bayesianism; categorical belief; degree of belief; epistemic risk; epistemic utility; epistemic value; logarithmic rule; proper scoring rule; scientific experiment

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorFallis, Donen_US
dc.contributor.editorFitelson, Brandenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-01T00:00:01Z-
dc.date.available2010-06-18T23:33:57Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.date.submitted2007-08-01en_US
dc.identifier.citationAttitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments 2007, 86(2) Studia Logicaen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/105761-
dc.description.abstractSeveral different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (e.g., Levi 1962, Horwich 1982, Maher 1990, Oddie 1997) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model--suggested independently by Patrick Maher (1990) and Graham Oddie (1997)--that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehensive explanation. This is because this proper scoring rule (PSR) model captures a wider range of scientifically acceptable attitudes toward epistemic risk than the other Bayesian models that have been proposed. I also argue, however, that even the PSR model places unreasonably tight restrictions on a scientist's attitude toward epistemic risk. As a result, such Bayesian models of epistemic utilities fail as normative accounts--not just as descriptive accounts (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1972, Giere 1988)--of scientific inquiry.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.subjectSocial Epistemologyen_US
dc.subject.otherBayesianismen_US
dc.subject.othercategorical beliefen_US
dc.subject.otherdegree of beliefen_US
dc.subject.otherepistemic risken_US
dc.subject.otherepistemic utilityen_US
dc.subject.otherepistemic valueen_US
dc.subject.otherlogarithmic ruleen_US
dc.subject.otherproper scoring ruleen_US
dc.subject.otherscientific experimenten_US
dc.titleAttitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experimentsen_US
dc.typeJournal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)en_US
dc.identifier.journalStudia Logicaen_US
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