Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105286
Title:
Goldman on Probabilistic Inference
Author:
Fallis, Don
Citation:
Goldman on Probabilistic Inference 2002, 109(3) Philosophical Studies
Publisher:
Springer
Journal:
Philosophical Studies
Issue Date:
2002
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105286
Submitted date:
2006-10-20
Abstract:
In his latest book, Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman claims to have established that if a reasoner starts with accurate estimates of the reliability of new evidence and conditionalizes on this evidence, then this reasoner is objectively likely to end up closer to the truth. In this paper, I argue that Goldmanâ s result is not nearly as philosophically significant as he would have us believe. First, accurately estimating the reliability of evidenceâ in the sense that Goldman requiresâ is not quite as easy as it might sound. Second, being objectively likely to end up closer to the truthâ in the sense that Goldman establishesâ is not quite as valuable as it might sound.
Type:
Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)
Language:
en
Keywords:
Philosophy; Social Epistemology
Local subject classification:
epistemic risk; epistemic value theory; epistemology; probability

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorFallis, Donen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-20T00:00:01Z-
dc.date.available2010-06-18T23:23:08Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.date.submitted2006-10-20en_US
dc.identifier.citationGoldman on Probabilistic Inference 2002, 109(3) Philosophical Studiesen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/105286-
dc.description.abstractIn his latest book, Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman claims to have established that if a reasoner starts with accurate estimates of the reliability of new evidence and conditionalizes on this evidence, then this reasoner is objectively likely to end up closer to the truth. In this paper, I argue that Goldmanâ s result is not nearly as philosophically significant as he would have us believe. First, accurately estimating the reliability of evidenceâ in the sense that Goldman requiresâ is not quite as easy as it might sound. Second, being objectively likely to end up closer to the truthâ in the sense that Goldman establishesâ is not quite as valuable as it might sound.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectSocial Epistemologyen_US
dc.subject.otherepistemic risken_US
dc.subject.otherepistemic value theoryen_US
dc.subject.otherepistemologyen_US
dc.subject.otherprobabilityen_US
dc.titleGoldman on Probabilistic Inferenceen_US
dc.typeJournal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)en_US
dc.identifier.journalPhilosophical Studiesen_US
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