Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105269
Title:
Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology
Author:
Fallis, Don
Citation:
Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology 2006, 2(3) Episteme
Publisher:
University of Edinburgh
Journal:
Episteme
Issue Date:
2006
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105269
Submitted date:
2006-10-20
Abstract:
In order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldmanâ s theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one outcome is epistemically better than another partly depends on our non-epistemic interests. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic value theory that serves the purposes of social epistemology must incorporate non-epistemic interests in much the way that Goldmanâ s theory does. In fact, I argue that Goldmanâ s theory does not go far enough in this direction. In particular, the epistemic value of having a particular true belief should actually be weighted by how interested we are in the topic.
Type:
Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)
Language:
en
Keywords:
Philosophy; Social Epistemology
Local subject classification:
epistemic value theory; epistemology; preference change

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorFallis, Donen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-20T00:00:01Z-
dc.date.available2010-06-18T23:22:46Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.date.submitted2006-10-20en_US
dc.identifier.citationEpistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology 2006, 2(3) Epistemeen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10150/105269-
dc.description.abstractIn order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldmanâ s theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one outcome is epistemically better than another partly depends on our non-epistemic interests. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic value theory that serves the purposes of social epistemology must incorporate non-epistemic interests in much the way that Goldmanâ s theory does. In fact, I argue that Goldmanâ s theory does not go far enough in this direction. In particular, the epistemic value of having a particular true belief should actually be weighted by how interested we are in the topic.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Edinburghen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectSocial Epistemologyen_US
dc.subject.otherepistemic value theoryen_US
dc.subject.otherepistemologyen_US
dc.subject.otherpreference changeen_US
dc.titleEpistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemologyen_US
dc.typeJournal Article (On-line/Unpaginated)en_US
dc.identifier.journalEpistemeen_US
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