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1967

PROPOSALS FOR MONARCHY IN MEXICO: 1823-1860

by

Frank Joseph Sanders

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I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my
direction by Frank Joseph Sanders
entitled PROPOSALS FOR MONARCHY IN MEXICO: 1823-1860

be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the
degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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SIGNED: Frank Joseph Sanders

PREFACE

In the instructions provided Angel Calderón de la Barca, Spain's first Minister Plenipotentiary to Mexico, the First Secretary of State observed that doubtless the new minister was aware that in America, as well as in Spain, there existed a faction that would like to restore a monarchical form of government in America, and he instructed Calderón to provide him with detailed reports concerning whatever happened in that respect.

Here is an indication that between the First Empire of Agustín de Iturbide and the Second Empire of Maximilian, the idea of the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico never ceased to exist, not only among Europeans, but among Mexicans as well.

Manifestations of monarchical proposals continued to crop up from the beginning of 1820 when the Mexican deputies to the Spanish Cortes proposed the division of America into three kingdoms, each to be governed by a Spanish prince.

The Plan of Iguala, which proclaimed the Independence of Mexico, called for a monarchical form of government. Furthermore, the Treaty of Córdoba between Mexico and Spain incorporated the provisions of the Plan of Iguala which stipulated that Ferdinand VII or a member of the royal family was to occupy the throne and, were this not possible, some

person designated by the Mexican Cortes.

Although Spain rejected the Treaty of Córdoba, the idea of a monarchy in America was not abandoned. On the contrary, Mexicans adopted it and placed Iturbide on the throne.

The fall of Iturbide in 1823 put a temporary damper on monarchical proposals, although in that same year French influence was brought to bear in Spain to create a monarchy in Mexico. This plan was frustrated by the opposition of Ferdinand VII, who refused to countenance any thought of lost colonies, and by British continental policy. In 1827 a project to place the Infante Don Francisco de Paula on a Mexican throne came to nought for much the same reasons.

The famous pamphlet of José María Gutiérrez Estrada, published in 1840, wherein he openly advocated a monarchy as the solution to the problems of Mexico, caused no end of sensation and repercussion. Although the opposition stirred up by Gutiérrez forced him to leave the country, the concept of a monarchy for Mexico not only persisted, but was fostered by the newspaper El Tiempo, first published in 1846.

As a consequence of the war between Mexico and the United States, monarchist proposals again came to the fore, and in 1853 some consideration was given to the idea of placing Santa Anna on a throne in Mexico. But in the following year Santa Anna authorized Gutiérrez Estrada to seek a European candidate, and, in 1856, A. De Radepont went to France and offered the crown to the Duke D'Aumale.

By 1860 the proposal to erect a monarchy in Mexico gained stronger support, became more definitive, and led to the eventual choice of Archduke Maximilian. His death in 1867 terminated the theretofore persistent intentions to form a monarchy in Mexico.

The present study is an analysis of the monarchical proposals for Mexico between 1823 and 1860. As European proposals were made within a certain context of opinion regarding Mexico, an effort will be made to present the view of Mexico as seen by foreign representatives, particularly those of France and Spain. In addition, an examination is undertaken of the polemic engaged in by monarchists and their opponents.

Unfortunately, personal files of many of the leading characters involved, existing in the archives of either the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations or the Secretary of Defense, were not available at this time; nor could research be undertaken in such depositories and collections as the Archivo Secreto de Fernando VII, the Archivo del Palacio Nacional, Madrid, or the Archivo de la Misión Diplomática de Mexico en Francia.

For their cooperation and for the many courtesies extended, the author wishes to express his appreciation to the staff of the Hispanic Foundation and that of the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. ; to the staff of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California; to the staff of the Sutro Branch of the California State Library at San Francisco; to Ernesto de la Torre Villar, Director of the Biblioteca

Nacional, Mexico, D.F., and his staff; and to Dr. María Teresa Chavez Campomanes, Director of the Biblioteca de Mexicana, Mexico, D.F., and her staff.

A particular note of gratitude is due the faculty and staff of El Colegio de México, Mexico, D.F., especially Berta Ulloa Ortiz and Luis F. Muro Arias, not only for making available materials needed, but also for their many kindnesses. Dr. Wigiberto Jimenez Moreno, Head of the Departamento de Investigaciones Historias, Instituto Nacional de Antropología y Historia, Mexico, D.F., was also most kind and helpful.

To the faculty of the Department of History of the University of Arizona, the author is especially grateful: Dr. Russell C. Ewing, Professor of History and Chairman of the Department, who as faculty advisor and director of this dissertation, gave unstintingly of his time and wide knowledge of Mexican history; Dr. Herman E. Bateman, Professor of History and Associate Dean of the Graduate College, who gave wise counsel during various crises; Dr. James A. Beatson, always ready with some new insight; Dr. Thomas E. Parker, who never failed to give sound advice; and Dr. Mario Rodríguez, Professor of History, George Washington University, friend, mentor, and enthusiastic Latin American scholar. In the Department of Philosophy, Dr. Charles F. Wallraff, Professor of Philosophy and Chairman of the Department, and Dr.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AHDM	Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano.
BAN	Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California.
CDHM	Ernesto de la Torre Villar (ed.). <u>Correspondencia Diplomática franco-mexicana, 1808-1839</u> (México: El Colegio de México, 1957).
CM	El Colegio de México, México, D.F. Microfilm and Typescript Collection of Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Mexico.
Diaz	Lilia Diaz (ed.). <u>Versión Francesa de México, Informes Diplomáticos</u> (3 vols.; México: El Colegio de México, 1963-1966).
HAHR	Hispanic American Historical Review.
LAF-BNM	LaFragua Collection, Biblioteca Nacional de México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, D.F.
NA, RG 59	National Archives, Record Group 59.
RDHM	Javier Malagón Barceló, Enriqueta Lopézlira, and José María Miquel i Vergés (eds.,). <u>Relaciones diplomáticas hispano-mexicanas, Documentos procedentes del Archivo de la Embajada de España en México: Despachos generales</u> (3 vols.; México: El Colegio de México, 1949-1966).
SUTRO	Mexican Pamphlet Collection, Sutro Branch, California State Library, San Francisco, California.

ABSTRACT

Between the First Empire of Agustín de Iturbide and the Second Empire of Maximilian, the idea of the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico never ceased to exist, not only among Europeans, but among Mexicans as well. This dissertation is an examination of the various proposals to erect a monarchy in Mexico between 1823 and 1860.

Chapter One examines the First Empire and the events leading to it, with respect to monarchy. The Plan of Iguala, the Treaty of Córdoba, and reactions to Spain's refusal to accept them, are considered. Spain was convinced a strong monarchist party existed in Mexico and that, therefore, her former colony was not yet lost to her; an opinion not shared by England and the United States.

In Chapter Two a study is made of various intrigues on the part of England, France, and Spain from 1804 to 1829; several apparently private intrigues are also considered, and analyses are made of the Padre Arenas conspiracy in Mexico during 1827, the project to install Don Francisco de Paula, brother of Ferdinand VII as King of Mexico, and various memorias to the Spanish Government.

An important part of the subject under consideration is the study, in Chapter Three, of the version of Mexico presented in the correspondence of Spanish and French diplomats during the period. Virtually all

these representatives to Mexico were royalists and their reports reflect their viewpoint. The themes discussed by these diplomats are studied, such as: the deplorable state of Mexican society; the pronounced dislike of republican institutions; the bias against the United States; the necessity to preserve the Latin race and culture; and so forth. That these themes helped to fashion the picture Europe had of Mexico, is reflected in various instructions emanating from Europe, and in various Consultas and Memorias to the Spanish sovereigns. In addition, views of the press are set forth in this chapter, particularly those of La Hesperia during 1840.

Chapter Four is a consideration of the career and ideas of José María Gutiérrez Estrada, whose pamphlet, published in 1840, aroused monarchist and republican alike, and who was to play an important role in monarchist intrigue in Europe from then until the advent of Maximilian.

The polemic engaged in by the press upon the announcement by El Tiempo on February 12, 1846, that it advocated a constitutional monarchy, is the subject of analysis in Chapter Five. The protagonist's historical interpretation of Mexican history and society is examined. A study is also made of intrigues carried on in Europe and Mexico during the period 1845-1850, and the effect of the war between Mexico and the United States on monarchist plans.

Chapter Six is a survey of proposals for monarchy between 1850 and 1860, and the efforts of the principal Mexican exiles in this behalf. Attention is given the efforts to initiate European intervention by conspirators in Mexico, such as Alexis de Gabriac, the French Minister to Mexico, and his royalist fellow-traveller, A. de Radepont; also additional scrutiny is made of the strength of monarchist support.

The study of monarchist proposals in Mexico leads to the conclusion that support, in Mexico, for projects to erect a monarchy, was minimal and ineffective; despite the constant affirmation by diplomats, travellers, and Mexican expatriates that there was strong sentiment for such action. European support was required; and the arguments of Mexican exiles for such aid, although important, carried no more weight in the cabinets of Europe than did those presented by the representatives of France and Spain.

THE FIRST MEXICAN EMPIRE

The present century is not for kings in America. The motives of its independence, its distance from the thrones of Europe, the struggle between absolute kings and the people, current ideas against monarchs, the example of a consolidated and flourishing republic--all these and other reasons make impossible the establishment of kings in the American Republics.

José María Luis Mora

One of the constants in the relations between Mexico and Spain was the idea of establishing a monarchy in Mexico headed by a Spanish Bourbon prince. At times, plans to erect a monarchy were little more than rumors, and at other times took on all the aura of official negotiations.¹ In 1783, after Spanish recognition of United States' independence, Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, Conde de Aranda, then Ambassador to France and later President of the Council of Castile, proposed the establishment of three monarchies in Mexico, Peru, and New Granada, each headed by an Infante from the Spanish royal house. The King of Spain was to be emperor, and the four monarchies were to be tied

1. Jaime Delgado, España y México en en siglo XIX (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1953), II. p. 138.

together by suitable arrangements.² This was proposed as the only remedy to secure advantages to Spain in her New World possessions and the only form of government able to resist the growing power of the United States. This Memoria is alluded to by all Mexican monarchists as representative of the monarchist ideal, as well as the justification for putting a stop to republican regimes;³ and, perhaps, the notion of the "yankee colossus" had its origin here. "This republic [the United States] was born a Pygmy. . . . There will come a day when it will be

2. A copy of the Memoria entitled, Memoria secreta presentada al rey Carlos III por S. E. el Conde de Aranda, sobre la independencia de las colonias inglesas, despues de haber firmado el Tratado de Paris de 1783, may be found in José Manuel Hidalgo, Proyectos de Monarquía en México (México: Editorial Jus, 1962), pp. 173-177.

There is some controversy as to the authenticity of the Aranda Memorial. Arthur Whitaker is convinced that the Memoria, the original of which has never been seen or known to exist, was probably a forgery of Manuel de Godoy in 1794 in order to discredit Aranda. (Arthur Whitaker, "The Pseudo-Aranda Memoir of 1783," Hispanic American Historical Review, XVII (1937), pp. 287-313). On the other hand, Almon R. Wright believes there is not sufficient evidence to brand it a forgery. (Almon R. Wright, "The Aranda Memorial; genuine or forged?" HAHR, XVIII (1938), pp. 444-460). For the purposes of this study the controversy is of little importance. For, authentic Aranda or not, it points up the hatred and fear of republican forms of government by the Spanish oligarchy and the politicians at the court of Charles III and their adhesion to monarchical forms of government.

3. Francisco Arellano Belloc, "La Monarquía y los monarquistas mexicanos," La Reforma y la Guerra de Intervencion, Vol. XXVI: Colección del Congreso Nacional de Historia para el estudio de la Guerra de Intervención, (México: Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística, 1962), p. 73.

a giant, a fearful colossus in those regions. . .and will not consider anything other than its own enlargement."⁴

At the first session of the Spanish Cortes of 1821, a similar plan was discussed. In mid-May of that year, a commission of Spanish and American deputies, presided over by the Minister of Overseas Governments, assisted by former Viceroy, Captains-General, and Inspectors, met to consider solutions to the problem of America. This commission concluded that America should be divided into three empires which Ferdinand VII would govern through three infantes according to a constitutional system. Should princes be lacking for this purpose, each empire was to be governed by a regency of three persons. Mexico offered to assume part of the Spanish debt if the plan were adopted.⁵

When this preliminary study was presented to the Cortes, none of the Spanish members of the commission supported it, for, prior to its presentation to the Cortes, it had been submitted to Ferdinand VII, who rejected it outright. He would not consent to send infantes to America, because he was convinced that the plan for independence of the

4. Memoria secreta, in Hidalgo, Proyectos, p. 174.

5. Lucas Alamán, Historia de Méjico desde los primeros movimientos que preparon su independencica, en el año 1808 hasta la epoca presente (México: Impr. de S. M. Lara, 1852), V, p. 510; Carlos A. Villanueva, La Monarquía en America; Fernando VII y las nuevas estados (Paris: C. Ollendorf, 1912), II, 70; Delgado, España y México, I, p. 103.

colonies was an English intrigue reached in deliberation in Paris with Señor Eusebio Bardaxi y Azara, Spanish Minister to France.⁶

Meanwhile, significant events were occurring in Mexico. The restoration of the Spanish Constitution of 1812 after the revolt of Colonel Rafael Riego at Cadiz in 1820 produced notable reactions in Mexico. For example, the Spanish partisans of Ferdinand VII and many criollos who had remained loyal to him, hoped that Ferdinand would leave Spain and come to rule in Mexico, a plan which allegedly had been proposed to the Court at Madrid by the Viceroy to Mexico, Juan Ruiz de Apodaca.⁷ The mass of great proprietors and officials--both civil and military--which formed the criollo aristocracy, had looked with horror on the excesses committed by the followers of Miguel Hidalgo y Costillo, the parish priest of Dolores who had raised the grito, and joined the Spanish, lest a repetition of such an insurrection deprive them of their power and influence. The abolition by the Spanish constitution of the privileges enjoyed by the church also brought some of the clergy to the side of the independence movement. They reasoned they would be better off in an independent Mexico, where they already exercised

6. Villanueva, La Monarquía en America, II, pp. 84-85, cited in Delgado, España y México, I, pp. 103-104.

7. Villanueva, La Monarquía en America, II, p. 56, cited in William Spence Robertson, Iturbide of Mexico (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1952), p. 77.

considerable control, than under a liberalized Spanish rule. Undoubtedly the prospect of being freed from the patronato of Madrid also had some influence.⁸ These interests believed that an independent Mexico ruled by Ferdinand VII would provide numerous advantages to private as well as public ambitions.

Amidst the confusion there arose Agustín Iturbide, a criollo of a wealthy and distinguished family who had risen to the rank of Colonel in the Provisional Battalion of Valladolid. On February 24, 1821, Iturbide proclaimed the Plan of Iguala, the forerunner of many plans in nineteenth century Mexico.⁹ It was a simple military pronouncement which laid the foundation for a transitional type of government, and, in this particular case, also contained the basis for many of the programs of Mexican conservatism.

The Plan of Iguala offered something for everyone.¹⁰ It called for the absolute independence of Mexico from Spain or any other nation

8. Robertson, Iturbide, pp. 150-151, p. 82.

9. Robertson, Iturbide, pp. 69-70. Robertson discusses various problems of documentation of the Plan of Iguala. Date used here is from the plan signed at Iguala by Iturbide. Robertson does not believe Iturbide and the insurgent leader Vincente Guerrero embraced before the plan was proclaimed.

10. Isidro Antonio Montiel y Duarte (Ed.) Derecho Público Mexicano (México: Imprenta del Gobierno, en Palacio, 1871-1882), I, 220-223. Texts of the Plan of Iguala and the Treaty of Córdoba used in this study are those found in above.

and the establishment of Catholicism as the sole religion of the country. It appealed to the European born, the Criollo, and the Indian to unite in order to prevent a recurrence of the disastrous events of 1810. Independence, Religion, and Union were to be guaranteed by the army-- appropriately named in Article 9 of the plan as the Army of the Three Guarantees.¹¹ Articles 3, 4, and 8 of the plan were concerned with monarchy. Article 3 stated the government was to be a moderate monarchy tempered by a constitution suited to the country. In accordance with Article 4, Ferdinand VII was to be emperor. Next in line, if Ferdinand were unavailable, were Don Carlos, Don Francisco de Paula, the Archduke Carlos, or other member of the ruling house to be chosen by the Mexican congress. Article 8 provided that, if Ferdinand would not come to Mexico, a junta or regency would govern until it could be decided who was to be crowned.¹²

On August 24, 1821, Juan O'Donojú, the new viceroy appointed by the Spanish Cortes to succeed don Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, who had

11. Some historians have referred to the three guarantees of Iguala as Independence, Religion, and Monarchy. [cf. Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (3rd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 170.] The more correct would be Independence, Religion, and Union. These three are mentioned in the opening and closing paragraphs of the plan. Furthermore, Iturbide named them in this way in a letter addressed to the Ayuntamiento of Acapulco, Feb. 23, 1821, cf. Robertson, Iturbide, p. 69.

12. Plan of Iguala, in Montiel y Duarte, loc. cit.

resigned, entered into negotiations with Iturbide which resulted in the Treaty of Córdoba. O'Donojú was nominated for his post through the instigation or recommendation of the deputies to the Cortes from New Spain.¹³ Although the liberal government of Spain sent O'Donojú to assure the liberalism and constitutional government of Mexico, it had no idea its representative would admit the recognition of independence by signing a treaty, for Spanish liberals were not disposed to grant autonomy and recognize independence; certainly this is shown by their later rejection of the treaty. In effect the Treaty of Córdoba accepted the Plan of Iguala. Mexico was to be sovereign and independent, and in the future was to be called the Mexican Empire, the government of which was to be a moderate constitutional monarchy. Where Article Four of the Plan of Iguala called Ferdinand VII or a member of his family to the throne of Mexico, the Treaty of Córdoba, in Article Three, further amplified and delineated this provision. It stated that Ferdinand VII was to be called to the throne and that in the event of his renunciation or non-acceptance the throne was then to pass to the Infante, Don Carlos. If he refused, the Infante, Francisco de Paula, was to be king. In the event he declined, the throne would then devolve upon the Infante, Carlos Luis, formerly heir of Etruria and then of

13. Robertson, Iturbide, p. 107; Delgado, España y México, I, pp. 43-46.

Lucca. Should this last candidate refuse the throne, it was then to go to such person as the Cortes of the Mexican Empire might designate.¹⁴

Etienne-Denis, Baron Pasquier, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Conde de la Garde, the representative of France in Madrid, that the idea of placing an Infante on the throne of Mexico was a question which not only interested Spain, but in no small measure affected all the states of Europe for whom the extension of republicanism throughout the American continent was not at all suitable. This motive, said Pasquier, was so strong that if the House of Bourbon neglected to secure a throne which it could legitimately occupy, it would not be strange to see other pretenders arise to usurp the position under the pretext of preserving the general interest of Europe. Considered in this light, Pasquier believed it a duty to his country and to the House of Bourbon to insist that Spain adopt the only method which could secure the relations of Spain with the most important member of her overseas empire.¹⁵

Britain also recognized that Mexico might very well offer the throne to a prince of some other European royal family in the event the candidates mentioned did not, or could not, accept. Spain too had

14. Treaty of Córdoba, in Montiel y Duarte, loc. cit.

15. Baron Pasquier to Conde de la Garde, November, 1821, quoted in Delgado, España y México, I, p. 70; cf. Villanueva, La Monarquía, II, p. 107.

considered this possibility, and pointed out to Britain that it was in her interest to prevent such an occurrence, and to aid Spain in the recovery of her influence in America. Bardaxi, the Spanish minister, did not want to send a Spanish prince to Mexico, for he was convinced that, were this to happen, both Mexico and the prince would be forever lost to Spain.¹⁶ To send a Spanish prince to occupy the throne would constitute de facto recognition of Mexico's independence and autonomy, which Ferdinand VII unshakably opposed. This facet of Spanish policy was correctly understood by Britain and France. Lionel Hervey, the British Minister at Madrid, noted that the policy of sending a Spanish prince to Mexico was most favorable to British interests and "best calculated to relieve my Government from all embarrassment upon the question of the Recognition of the Independence of that Empire."¹⁷ Britain and France wanted Mexico independent in order to further their own commercial interests. Because Spain knew this, she did not want Mexico independent, and hence would not consider the question of sending a Spanish prince to Mexico.

16. Lionel Hervey to the Marquis of Londonderry, Madrid, December 16, 1821, and May 27, 1822, in Charles Kingsley Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin American, 1812-1830, Select Documents from Foreign Office Archives (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), II, pp. 384-386. Cited hereafter as Webster, Documents.

17. Hervey to Londonderry, Madrid, April 4, 1822, in Webster, Documents, II, pp. 385-386.

Spain was firmly convinced that since a strong Spanish party existed in Mexico, her former colony was in no way irretrievably lost.¹⁸ She believed that the extent of her moral influence on Mexico was imperfectly understood by Britain and France. To be sure, there were disorders in Mexico, but this was due to the attempt to introduce forms of government which were not applicable to that country, which Spain maintained was decidedly royalist. "There was a powerful clergy, a luxurious nobility, and a number of rich proprietors, . . . such people could not be friends of anarchy." Such was the gist of observations made by Narciso de Heredia, Conde de Ofalia, the Spanish First Secretary of State, to Sir William A. Court, British Minister to Spain, in 1824.¹⁹

The notion of the existence of a strong Spanish party in Mexico was not shared by Hervey, the British minister at Madrid. He believed that the extent of Spanish influence and the strength of the Spanish party was overrated, and that Spain was deceived by the reports which came from America.²⁰ Joel Poinsett, United States' Minister to Mexico,

18. Hervey to Londonderry, December 16, 1821 and May 27, 1822, in Webster, Documents, II, pp. 384-386.

19. Sir William a Court to George Canning, February 17, 1824, in Webster, Documents, II, pp. 417-419.

20. Hervey to Londonderry, Madrid, May 27, 1822, in Webster, Documents, II, p. 386.

concurred with the British estimate of monarchist strength in Mexico when he wrote to Rufus King, United States' Minister to Great Britain: "Of one thing you may be assured, that the Europeans, Bourbonists, and Centralists taken together, if they could be united, would form but a feeble party in the state."²¹

The actual state of affairs in Mexico was somewhat different from all these views. William Spence Robertson, in his study on Iturbide, has noted that unedited documents, collected by the Mexican scholar, Genaro García, reveal that opinion favoring the invitation of a foreign prince was not strong, but that there did exist considerable sentiment in favor of a limited monarchy.²²

One of the early monarchist apologists in Mexico was José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, the foremost of Mexico's pamphleteers, as well as one of her greatest novelists. In 1822 he published a pamphlet entitled, Which Government is the Best, A Republic or a

21. Poinsett to Rufus King, London. Mexico, October 14, 1825, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Mexico, Records of the Department of State, National Archives, Record Group 59. (Hereafter, records in the National Archives are indicated by the symbol NA followed by the record group (RG) number.)

22. Robertson, Iturbide, p. 156.

Monarchy?²³ Lizardi, who sometimes wrote under the nom de plume, El Pensador Mexicano (The Mexican Thinker), supported Iturbide, but later became disenchanted. He was aware that the question of the most suitable form of government was widely discussed in Europe and in America, and that there were as many opinions on the subject as there were men who discussed it. Monarchists hated Republicans and vice versa, declared Lizardi.²⁴ Furthermore, there were no end of varieties within each group; absolute monarchists, moderate monarchists, republicans who sought a division and balance between legislative, judicial, and executive powers, and others who would join these powers in one individual.²⁵

For Lizardi, the question of where sovereignty lay was a metaphysical problem. It was his conviction that disputes over the form of government were foolish. Any government was good, he declared, which had just laws, which assured the liberty of its citizens, which punished crime without consideration of privilege, and which enabled

23. J. F. L. (José Joaquín Fernández Lizardi) Que Gobierno es el mejor, República o Monarquía? (México: Imprenta de D. J. F. L., 1822) Copy used here is from the excellent collection of Mexican pamphlets at the Sutro Branch of the California State Library at San Francisco. (Hereafter referred to as the Sutro Collection).

24. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

25. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

men to obtain the fruits of their labor, honor, and virtue.²⁶ "We have chosen the moderate monarchy, and if its laws have these qualities, it will be better than the republican which does not have them. Ultimately, it is the one which suits us, and is best for us."²⁷ However, within a year Lizardi called upon Iturbide to give up the throne. "To support crimes by maintaining a throne is common: to trample on a crown is heroic, . . . let the world see that Agustín need not be king in order to be great."²⁸

The support given by Lizardi, at least during 1822, would seem to bear out the contention of William Spence Robertson that considerable sentiment in favor of a limited monarchy existed at that time. Actually, when the constituent congress authorized by the Plan of Iguala convened on February 27, 1822, there were three main factions or parties; the Bourbonists or Royalists, some of whom held to all the articles of the Plan of Iguala, while others, especially after the rejection of the Treaty of Córdoba, favored colonial status; the Iturbidists,

26. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

27. Ibid., p. 4.

28. El Pensador [José Joaquín Fernández Lizardi] Por la salud de la patria Se Desprecia una corona México, (Imprenta del Autor, Marzo 7 de 1823), p. 6. Copy used is from the LaFragua Collection of the Biblioteca Nacional de México, Universidad Autónoma Nacional de México. (Cited hereafter as LAF-BNM.) #106.

who also wanted a constitutional monarchy, but with Iturbide on the throne; and the republicans, who favored the establishment of a federal republic similar to that of the United States.²⁹

The Spanish government was blind to the advantage which the Treaty of Córdoba would have gained for them. Had Spain taken advantage of the offer which was made to crown a prince of the royal blood, a monarchy under the Bourbon family would have been established in Mexico.³⁰ This was the conviction of Lorenzo de Zavala, a contemporary Mexican publicist and historian. He declared that the nation had been bound to the Plan of Iguala, and that the leaders of the revolution, whatever their intentions and designs, hardly could have turned back in view of the principles established by the plan. "Iturbide would have been content to be one of the Grand Dukes of the Empire, and the republican virtues of the Guerreros, Bravos, and Victorias would have yielded to the desires of the new court."³¹ The government at Madrid, observed Zavala, was obstinate, and the Spanish Cortes, which had made a solemn and public profession of the principles of national

29. Robertson, Iturbide, pp. 161-162.

30. Lorenzo de Zavala, Ensayo Histórico de las revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830. (New York: Elliot and Palmer, 1832), I, p. 140 ff.

31. Ibid., p. 110.

sovereignty by its rejection of the Treaty of Córdoba, had denied this vital principle which served as the basis of its own existence.³²

In an attempt to have the treaty adopted, Iturbide had written to some of his friends. Although he did not publicly charge the Mexican deputies to the Spanish Cortes with this task, he notified some privately to this effect. Aware of Ferdinand's opposition to the treaty, the deputies became acquainted with the Infantes, who, fascinated with the prospect of the Imperial crown of Mexico, disputed among themselves for the title. From this came the agreeable notions communicated by the deputies published in the imperial gazette. But, as Don Carlos was the heir apparent to the throne of Spain, the deputies selected Don Francisco de Paula, and even discussed with him plans to leave Madrid for Lisbon, from where he would embark secretly for Mexico. The King became aware of all this and forbade the Mexican deputies entry to the quarters of the Infantes.³³ Frederick Lamb, the British Minister to Spain, reported the dissension within the royal family to his

32. Ibid. Later, in 1840, Angel Calderón de la Barca, the first Spanish Minister to Mexico, was to report that every Mexican of "any education" with whom he had spoken deplored the fact that Spain had not accepted the Plan of Iguala, and believed Mexico could not prosper without a monarchy. (Angel Calderón de la Barca to First Secretary of State, February 29, 1840, in Delgado, España y México, III, p. 444.)

33. Alamán, Historia, V, 518-519.; cf also Robertson, Iturbide, 33-156.

government. He noted that to his certain knowledge, on one occasion, Don Carlos had said he would rather lose South America than see his younger brother on a throne there, "and the King, as I am assured, extending the same amiable feeling to both his brothers."³⁴ Ferdinand VII, observed Lamb, felt he was bound by an ancient oath of Charles the Fifth not to alienate any part of the Spanish territories.³⁵

Further complications arose later when Ferdinand, who was childless, lost his third wife, a princess of the House of Saxony, and within seven months married again--this time to the Neapolitan princess, Maria Christina. This was a great blow to the supporters of Don Carlos for, as heir presumptive, he was the hope of the absolutists and clericals of Spain, who therefore looked with disfavor on this fourth marriage of Ferdinand. Carlos was a man of even more absolutist views than Ferdinand, who, while he had fiercely opposed and even

34. Lamb to Canning, June 20, 1825, in Webster, Documents, II, pp. 442-447.

35. Ibid. II, p. 444.

persecuted the liberals, had not done so on any consistent principle.³⁶

Maria Christina, the new Queen, finding herself opposed by the absolutists joined the liberal elements in Spain in order to find a group on which she might depend for support. When, upon the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833, Maria Christina's daughter, Maria Isabella was crowned Queen, the Carlist Wars began--with Maria Christina and the constitutionalists opposed by Don Carlos and the absolutists.³⁷

Historians have advanced many reasons why Spain should have ratified the Treaty of Córdoba, such as to conserve old possessions or to maintain commercial advantages. Jaime Delgado points out that

36. Adolphus William Ward and George Peabody Gooch, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy (London: 1923), II, p. 186. There was even talk that Ferdinand was disposed to recognize independence, but that Don Carlos was opposed. cf. Murphy, Sr. to Rocafuerte, June 6, 1826, in Luis Weckmann, Las Relaciones Franco-Mexicanas, (Mexico: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1961), I, p. 25. (cited hereafter as Weckmann, Relaciones). There seems to be little doubt that Don Carlos was an obstacle in the way of recognition. He was the leader of a fanatical royalist group and probably exercised not a little influence in the Spanish government. cf. A. H. Everett to Henry Clay, Madrid, Feb. 24, 1826, Diplomatic Dispatches, SPAIN, NA, RG 59. The effect Don Carlos had in the prevention of recognition is an area deserving study and research.

37. Ward and Gooch, II, p. 186. An enjoyable and informative guide to the intricacies and intrigues of the Spanish court is provided by Robert Sencourt (Roberto Esmond Gordon George), The Spanish Crown, 1808-1931. An Intimate Chronicle of a Hundred Years. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), See Chapters V and VI for this phase.

none, except Banegas Galván, have indicated what, to Delgado's Pan-Hispanist view, is the more important reason--the preservation of Spanish culture. This, according to Delgado, was especially important in the case of Mexico, since it was so near the threat of the Anglo-Saxon world. "Who but Spain, he asked, would have been able to stop the "voraz apetito expansionista" of the United States? He concludes that only a strong government in Mexico, under a Bourbon prince, would have been able to unite the country and stop the "surreptitious advance of the yankees."³⁸ However, despite all these reasons, Spain did not accept the treaty; the next step was up to Iturbide.

Those provisions of the Treaty of Córdoba and the Plan of Iguala which called for the Cortes to choose an emperor in the event Ferdinand or members of his family were unavailable were perfectly suited to Iturbide's plans. Perhaps he had guessed that Ferdinand VII would never countersign anything which granted autonomy to Mexico, and that, therefore, the choice would be left to the congress, which he was able to control. In any event, he took advantage of the situation when the sergeants of the Celaya Regiment led by Pío Marcha proclaimed him emperor on May 18, 1822. The formal decree was made by Congress the next day, and Iturbide took the oath on May 21.³⁹ With this action,

38. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 89.

39. Robertson, Iturbide, pp. 172-176.

many of the monarchists who had hoped to see the Plan of Iguala carried out left the country in disgust.⁴⁰

Iturbide surrounded himself with all the trappings of a royal court. The details of his coronation were elaborate, and costumes worn by the empress were modeled after the fashions at the coronation of Napoleon.⁴¹ However, Iturbide soon became aware that the apparatus of a court added nothing to his power or political skill, and offered little help against those who meditated his downfall.

The beginning of the end came on February 1, 1823, with the Plan of Casa Mata, which ushered in the republican phase of Mexican history. A Spanish minister remarked that just as the Plan of Iguala had taken Mexico from Ferdinand VII, the Plan of Casa Mata ended the reign of Agustín I.⁴²

Even though the Plan of Casa Mata ended the first Mexican monarchy, it did not end the many attempts to install another. Plans, plots, schemes, and projects to that end were to continue until the overthrow of the Second Empire of Maximilian.

40. Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Mexico (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft and Co., 1885), IV, p. 774. An exodus of prominent Spanish officeholders had taken place before Iturbide assumed the title. cf. Robertson, Iturbide, p. 142.

41. Robertson, Iturbide, p. 184.

42. Robertson, Iturbide, p. 231.

When Spain rejected the Treaty of Córdoba, thereby leaving the field clear for Mexico to choose its own monarch, other ambitious men, such as Alphonso Marcilla de Teruel, Conde de Moctezuma, envisioned themselves occupying the throne. One time Corregidor of Madrid, Moctezuma left Spain in February, 1822, for Paris. It was said his object was to travel to Mexico in order that the crown might be presented to him.⁴³ The ambitious Yucatecan, Lorenzo de Zavala, was supposed to have met with Moctezuma and been declared his Prime Minister.⁴⁴ Miguel Ramos Arizpe, one of the Mexican deputies to the Spanish Cortes, also was considered party to the plot.⁴⁵ However, Arizpe, in a letter to Lucas Alamán, then in Madrid, denied any association with the affair and declared it a "diabolical farce."⁴⁶ He stated: "I never visited nor received visits from Moctezuma: . . . I never spoke nor did he speak with me of his imperial project."⁴⁷ He noted, and severely criticized, an account which appeared in newspapers to the

43. Niceto de Zamacois, Historia de Méjico, desde sus tiempos mas remotos hasta nuestros dias (Barcelona and Mexico: J. Parres, 1880), XII, 262-263.

44. Ibid., XII, 263-264.

45. Ibid., XII, p. 264.

46. Arizpe to Alamán, Paris, September 15, 1821, in Zamacois, XI, Appendix, Document No. 7.

47. Ibid.

effect that the conde de Moctezuma had been called by the natives of Mexico because they adored the name of Moctezuma and hoped he would free them from oppression.⁴⁸ Little more is heard of this strange figure until 1828 when he travelled to Mexico via the United States. Again the alarm was raised, and the Spanish Secretary of State ordered the Spanish Minister to the United States at Philadelphia to keep watch over Moctezuma's activities.⁴⁹ It proved to be another false alarm, however, for Moctezuma's objective was to claim a 25,000 pesos annual pension which the Spanish government had granted him in Mexico. He was forced to leave Mexico and travelled to New Orleans, where he lived quietly, and devoted himself to his claim for payment from the Mexican government.⁵⁰

When it came to building a new government, the combination of former Bourbonists and full-fledged republicans, which overthrew Iturbide, was an impossible union. Factions developed--at first between the Centralists and the Federalists. The Centralists were composed of Masons of the Scottish Rite and the old monarchists who wanted a strong central government with control over the provinces

48. Ibid.

49. Delgado, España y México, I, 345.

50. Ibid.

through a monarchy, and were given the name "Bourbonists."⁵¹ The press organ of the Centralists was the daily newspaper El Sol. Its first editor, Manuel Codorniu, was a physician who had accompanied Viceroy O'Donojú. The paper took its name from one of the main Scottish Rite lodges.⁵² Miguel Santa María, the Colombian Minister, who wrote for the paper under the pseudonym Capitán Chinchilla, criticized events of the day and ridiculed the opposition party.⁵³

The opposition party--the Federalists--was made up of republicans and old Iturbidists seeking revenge. Its goal was a federal type of republic such as that of the United States.⁵⁴ In opposition to the Scottish Rite Masons, a York Rite lodge, composed of republicans, was soon organized. Joel R. Poinsett, the United States Minister to Mexico, figured strongly in its formation. He hoped to counteract the "fanatical party" and to diffuse more liberal principles.⁵⁵

51. William H. Callcott, Church and State in Mexico (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1926), p. 50.

52. Vera (Rogers) Maxwell, "The Diario Histórico of Carlos María Bustamante for 1824" (Unpublished PH. D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1947), p. 10, note 3; Alamán, Historia, V, p. 409. Robertson, Iturbide, 162.

53. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 5.

54. Callcott, Church and State, p. 50.

55. Poinsett to Hon. Rufus King, London, Mexico, October 14, 1825, NA, RG 59.

In 1824, Lionel Hervey, then British Commissioner to Mexico, reported that monarchists of varying persuasions had taken advantage of the unstable situation to spread unfavorable reports and foment discord and rebellion in order to prevent the existing government from consolidating itself. He was of the opinion that a loan then under consideration would give the federal republic as good a chance for success as any other under similar circumstances. However, he noted, one had to take into account the clergy, the nobility, and the army, all of whom who favored a monarchy.⁵⁶ Although the republican party was strongest, the combination of clergy, nobility, and military was not to be discounted. Hervey stated that the problem for the monarchists seemed to be the question of a candidate. As the Spanish Infantes were out of the question, he believed the Duke of Lucca, with French support, would prove acceptable.⁵⁷ This was not because of any partiality on his part to either the Duke of Lucca or to France, Hervey added, but because Mexico felt the need of a great maritime power to support its independence.⁵⁸ He noted that, in correspondence with Lucas Alamán,

56. Hervey to George Canning, January 18, 1824, in Webster, Documents, I, 244.

57. Hervey to Canning, February 21, 1824, in Webster, Documents, I, 446.

58. Ibid.

Prince Polignac had insisted that the establishment of a monarchical form of government was both expedient and necessary "to assure the happiness and security of all nations."⁵⁹

About this time (1824), some concern also had arisen as to the activities of Iturbide, who was known to be planning a return to Mexico. It was thought by some that he was engaged in an intrigue, in conjunction with France, for the restoration of Mexico to Spain.⁶⁰

A year later (1825), Poinsett reported to Henry Clay, the United States' Secretary of State, that Lucas Alamán, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had received word from a secret agent on French views with respect to Mexico which this agent had received from the Conde de Villele, President of the French Council of Ministers.⁶¹ This concerned French pressure on the King of Spain to renounce his right to Mexico in favor of Francisco de Paula, who would be sent to Havana to head a large force to invade Mexico. Although France was disposed to recognize the independence of the Spanish colonies, as had Britain,

59. Ibid.

60. George Canning to Prince Polignac, May 18, 1824, in Webster, Documents, II, 152.

61. Poinsett to Clay, Mexico, September 22, 1825, in William R. Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the Independence of Latin-American Nations, William R. Manning (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), III, pp. 1632-1633 (cited hereafter as Manning, Correspondence).

the form of government the colonies had adopted was a severe obstacle. This barrier might be removed, however, by the establishment of limited monarchies.⁶² Rufus King, United States' Minister to Great Britain, had received similar information from Poinsett, but thought that the United States' Minister to Mexico might be deceived by the partisans of this "old intrigue."⁶³ A few days later King reported that Canning had told him the affair had neither foundation or credit.⁶⁴

Both were wrong, as later events proved, but King correctly used the term "old intrigue" to describe the persistent attempts to create a monarchy in Mexico.

62. Ibid.

63. King to Clay, London, December 21, 1825, in Manning, Correspondence, III, p. 1576.

64. King to Clay, London, December 25, 1825, in Manning, Correspondence, III, p. 1576-1577.

A MONARCHY FOR MEXICO: 1804-1829

I am afraid we must regard this affair as flowing from some of the dregs of that old diplomacy which so long poisoned the body politic of Europe.

Castlereagh

It is not surprising that monarchy was a persistent theme in the nineteenth century. Republican governments were newcomers. In the eyes of Europe, after the Napoleonic era, peace only could be guaranteed by a return to an hereditary monarchy, to the principle of legitimacy. This also involved a process of "restoration," whereby the "legitimate" monarchs of Europe were returned to their thrones, and territories so redistributed that these monarchs might have, if not the same lands as before, at least some kind of territorial compensation.¹ In view of this context, it was quite natural for Europeans to seek "restoration" of the lost Spanish provinces to their rightful owner, Ferdinand VII, and to consider the establishment of monarchies as the way to achieve this, as well as the solution for the problems of Latin America.²

1. Webster, Documents, I, pp. 26-34. This contains a fine short background and statement on monarchy in the New World. cf. also John Franklin Putnam, "Fear of European Intervention in Mexico, 1808-1861" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1936), p. 16.

2. Webster, Documents, loc. cit.

Before and after Mexican Independence plans and schemes to this end were common. There were only three ways this might be accomplished; elevate some citizen to the throne, as in the case of Iturbide; choose a member of the Spanish royal family; or select a prince from some other royal house. These can be reduced to two alternatives, upon which were based all attempts to establish monarchies in the New World--either create a royal lineage or import one.³ In Mexico and in Europe, from the time of the First Empire under Agustín I until the end of the Second Empire with the execution of Maximilian on the Cerro de las Campanías--projects, proposals, and plans to install a monarch were evident. Both empires are typical of the two alternatives, and sources--Mexico and Europe. The First Empire represented the attempt to found a native dynasty as opposed to that taken from one of the reigning houses of Europe--preferably the Bourbon.

Apart from the ill-starred bid of Iturbide and an abortive venture to place a descendant of the Inca on an American throne--which, as Sir Charles Kingsley Webster noted, certainly was an appeal to the principle of "legitimacy"⁴--all projects involved the importation of a prince of a European royal family, mostly from the Spanish Royal

3. Ibid., I, p. 27.

4. Ibid., I, p. 30.

House. In the latter case, Ferdinand VII and his brother Don Carlos did not want to see the colonies ruled by some other member of the family, or, for that matter, by anyone but the Spanish crown itself. Ferdinand persistently refused to participate in any plans to establish independent monarchies, as this would have meant recognizing Mexico's independence, which he refused to do. This condition plagued France for years because of her ties to Spain through the Bourbon Family Compact, which was not abrogated until 1830. Moreover, according to the internal logic of "legitimacy," Ferdinand VII simply could not countenance any member of his own house or any other royal house taking a throne which belonged "legitimately" to Ferdinand himself.⁵

Candidates from other royal houses figured in the various plans from time to time; the one essential qualification was that the prospective king be Catholic. The Duke of Orléans, later King Louis Philippe of France, was a candidate for the throne of Mexico from 1804 to 1806; for the throne of the Río de la Plata from 1806 to 1807; and for Mexico again in 1808.⁶ In 1807 Lord Castlereagh, the British Prime Minister, seeking relief from Napoleon's continental system for England's mercantile economy, had advocated the creation of independent monarchies to end Spain's monopoly, stop the spread of republican

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

ideas, and place Britain in an advantageous position by its aid in the creation of such monarchies.⁷ The candidate he had in mind for Mexico was the Duke of Orléans.

Louis Philippe, Duke of Chartres and, after the death of his father, Duke of Orléans, lived for some time in London with his companion at arms and military advisor, General Charles François Dumouriez, a Napoleonic exile. Both of them were pensioners of the British government. In 1809, the Duke married Maria Amelia, the daughter of Ferdinand IV of Naples, (brother of Charles IV of Spain). After the fall of Napoleon, Orléans returned to France and the court of Louis XVIII. In 1830 he ascended the French throne, which he abdicated in 1848.⁸ While in London between 1804 and 1808, the Duke and Dumouriez tried to convince the British of the suitability of Orléans as a candidate for a throne in America, especially Mexico.⁹

When Napoleon proclaimed himself emperor in 1804, Orléans wrote a thirteen page letter to Lord Castlereagh, British War Minister, dealing with Spanish America, with special emphasis on Mexico. The

7. William W. Kaufmann, British Policy and the Independence of Latin America, 1804-1828 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), pp. 37-38.

8. Carlos Roberts, "El duque de Orléans, pretendiente a los tronos de Mexico y del Rio de la Plata, 1804-1808," Annario de Historia Argentina, (1940), pp. 65-69.

9. Ibid.

object of the letter was threefold; first, to prove that revolution was inevitable and would flood the world with republican ideas; second, to point out the advantages of British interference; third, to delineate the means required to carry out the revolution without danger to the country.¹⁰ As Spanish influence was waning daily, the question was, observed Orléans, who was to guide the revolution and reap the benefit, England or France? Action by the British would deprive Napoleon of resources and would counterbalance his closing of European ports.¹¹ Orléans declared that Mexico ought to be the starting point, "Mexico is the keystone of the arch: when that is removed, all the other parts must fall to pieces."¹² He proposed the formation of various monarchies, beginning with Mexico, and offered his services. "Should this plan be adopted, I most readily offer to his Majesty's Government, as well as to the Prince, who may be intended as the future sovereign of Mexico, my personal assistance and services. I shall rejoice if the knowledge I may possess of that country enables me to be useful upon this interesting occasion."¹³

10. John Rydjord, Foreign Interests in the Independence of New Spain (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1935), pp. 247-248.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Quoted in Carlos Roberts, p. 104.

The insinuation that he might occupy the throne initiated his candidacy, and his friends openly began to espouse his cause. To this end, François Bertrand-Moleville, French Minister of Marine prior to the revolution, on January 7, 1805, offered a memorandum to the British government. He declared that the independence of Spanish America would be a blow to Napoleon, and recommended England begin by creating an Empire of Mexico, for whose throne he considered Orléans the best candidate. Bertrand-Moleville's fifty-nine page memorandum was complete--even to the proclamation Orléans would make when he landed on Mexican soil.¹⁴

On December 26, 1805, Count Montferrand, a French émigré, submitted his memorandum to the British Government. This time the excuse for intervention was the necessity to prevent the southward expansion of the United States, to be accomplished by 15,000 troops to help Mexico become independent and to place Orléans on the throne.¹⁵

General Dumouriez, on June 12, 1806, presented a note to the British in which he recommended that a monarchy be established in Mexico with Orléans at its head, to aid British commerce and prevent the expansion of the United States. Orléans was a natural candidate because:

14. Ibid., p. 71.

15. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

His moral character, his delicate probity, his extensive knowledge, the brilliant valor which he displayed in the war, his constancy in the face of adversity, all his natural and acquired virtues give him an incontestable right to the choice of the government to found a kingdom in America, which will assure England a solid and necessary ally and a certain market for its commerce and manufactures.¹⁶

Castlereagh, in a memorandum to the cabinet May 1, 1807, recommended, as most feasible for the British position, the possibility of independence for South America under a monarchy headed by Orléans,¹⁷ "were such an enterprising individual as the Duke of Orléans, . . . To undertake it, the object might perhaps be accomplished, and in that case must prove beneficial to us."¹⁸

General Dumouriez corresponded with Castlereagh to this end during 1807. In 1808 he prepared a twenty-seven page memorandum on America at the request of Castlereagh. In it he again proposed, in his chapter on Mexico, that Orléans be made king of that country.¹⁹

In 1808 the British Government prepared an expedition to South America under the future Duke of Wellington, which instead was diverted to Portugal to aid Spain in her revolt against Napoleon. Thus ended for

16. Quoted in Carlos Roberts, p. 72.

17. Quoted in Carlos Roberts, pp. 73-77.

18. Quoted in Rydjord, pp. 246-247.

19. Carlos Roberts, pp. 101-103.

a time all the projects for independence with monarchies under the direct auspices of England. After independence was achieved, Great Britain continued to recommend the monarchical system of government to the rebellious colonies until the Canning administration, when Great Britain formally recognized their independence.²⁰

Wellington was convinced that any attempt to conquer the provinces of South America, with a view to their future subjection to the British crown, would fail. "I consider the only mode in which they can be wrested from the Crown of Spain is by a revolution and by the establishment of an independent government within them."²¹ The type of government Wellington considered as best suited to the nature and prejudices of the people was:

A monarchy with such a representative body as will not be difficult to manage, at the same time that it will give the people of the country such a share in the government as will afford them a reasonable security. The Cabildos which have been established throughout those territories afford the means of having a representative body.²²

20. Carlos Roberts, p. 103.

21. Memorandum of 8th February, 1808, in Duke of Wellington, (ed.), Supplementary Despatches and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur, Duke of Wellington. 15 Vols. (London: 1858-72) Vol. VI, p. 62, quoted in Kaufman, p. 39.

22. Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, VI, p. 65.

There were any number of other monarchist intrigues, and rumors of such intrigues, before and after the independence of Mexico-- some of which were so ludicrous as to preclude any serious consideration. On September 12, 1817, G. Hyde de Neuville, French Minister to the United States, notified John Quincy Adams, United States' Secretary of State, of a plot by a so-called Napoleonic Confederacy, composed of exiles, to seize control of a Spanish province (Mexico) and proclaim Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain and the Indies.²³ As intrigues go, this was quite as mad as any that might be imagined. It was, as Hyde de Neuville observed, rather farfetched to consider that Spaniards, who had once tried to escape the grasp of Napoleon, should consent to accept a Bonaparte as king, or that the citizens of the United States would help conquer a throne for him.²⁴ Documents turned over to Adams by the French Minister were signed by a Mr. Lakanal, a former deputy of the French National Convention, who apparently was the principal commissioner in the affair.²⁵

23. Hyde de Neuville to John Quincy Adams, Sept. 12, 1817, in Notes from Foreign Legations, France, NA, RG 59; cf. also Manning Correspondence, I, p. 51, note.

24. Hyde de Neuville to Adams, Sept. 12, 1817, Ibid.

25. This may have been Joseph Lakanal, a French statesman and deputy to the National Convention in 1792. He was a member of the Committee of Public Instruction in 1793. In 1816 he was banished as a regicide (he had voted for the unconditional death of Louis XVI). He emigrated to the United States, was President of the University of Louisiana from 1817 to 1825, and returned to France in 1834. "Lakanal," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., Vol. XV, p. 85.

Lakanal still considered Joseph Bonaparte the rightful ruler of Spain and the Indies: "Why do you not continue to exercise the acts of sovereignty?"²⁶ Since a ruler was empowered to grant honors, and titles, Lakanal requested Joseph Bonaparte to grant him a "Spanish distinction," as this would give him "a degree of political importance, in the eyes of your Mexican subjects." His project called for 900 members of the Napoleonic Confederation to be "armed and equipped as flankers of the Independent Troops of Mexico." One hundred and fifty members, acting as commissioners, were to place themselves at different points in the Missouri, Illinois, Mississippi, Michigan, Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio Territories and the District of Columbia, in order to gain support "by some small present benefits, and by hopes founded upon future contingencies soon to be realized."²⁷

There would be expenses of course, and King Joseph was "humbly entreated" to have the sum of 65,000 francs placed at the disposal of the members of the Confederation. For this munificent sum Joseph Bonaparte was assured that the "certainty is thus afforded to Your Majesty of reconquering one of the first thrones of the universe and of establishing Your Illustrious Dynasty."²⁸

26. Enclosure with Hyde de Neuville to Adams, Sept. 12, 1817.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

The levy of men was not considered a problem, Lakanal stated, because in the Western states the main cultivation was Indian corn, planted in May and harvested in fall. "Thus Summer and Autumn, are seasons of rest for the Western Americans; hunting, fishing, adventurous enterprizes [sic] then occupy them exclusively."²⁹ This was the sum and substance of Lakanal's plan. Adams made investigations and informed Hyde de Neuville that no levies of men had been made and "whatever absurd projects may have been contemplated by one or more individuals, nothing is to be dreaded from them with regard to the peace of the United States and due observance of laws."³⁰

Hyde de Neuville was known as an enthusiastic supporter of the idea of Bourbon monarchies in Spanish America.³¹ His motive in notifying Adams of the supposed plot, which Neuville believed to be authentic, may have been to offset any chances of a Bonaparte occupying a throne in America.

Alexander Hill Everett, the United States' Minister to Spain, reported, in March of 1826, the outline of a plan of an expedition

29. Ibid.

30. John Quincy Adams to Hyde de Neuville, December 5, 1817, in Notes to Foreign Ministers and Consuls, 1793-1804, NA, RG 59.

31. Putnam, op. cit., p. 33.

against the former colonies of Spain which had been submitted to the Spanish Government.³² Its author, a clergyman, was also confessor to Don Carlos. As it was not impossible the details were discussed with the Infante, the plan could reflect the views of Don Carlos. The account is long and rambling; war is the scourge of humanity but can be justified under certain conditions; and Spain has an uncontrovertible right to oppose by force the absolute independence of America. Although the Spanish government would be capable of undertaking the financial burden of such an enterprise in due time, delay was dangerous, therefore recourse should be made to a loan. The amount required for 60 ships of 50 guns each with 4,000 men to man them, 20,000 soldiers for New Spain and Panama and 20,000 for Buenos Aires, would amount to 500,000,000 reales. This sum would be obtained by voluntary and forced subscription from the nobility, clergy, merchants, farmers, artisans and the army, all of whom have a stake in the New World, and whose profit from the enterprise would outweigh the cost.³³ In view of the exorbitant cost involved in this project, it is not surprising that Ferdinand VII, when the plan was put in his hands, simply put it in his pocket; it was never heard of again.³⁴

32. A. H. Everett to Henry Clay, March 13, 1826, in Diplomatic Dispatches, Spain, NA, RG 59.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

In 1823, Sir William A. Court, British Ambassador to Spain, informed his government of an equally preposterous proposal of Gabriel-Jacques Ouvrard, a notable but unscrupulous French financier.³⁵ The South American Company backed by Ouvrard, Baron Rothschild and a Mr. Parish, in exchange for the cession of all the property formerly held by Spain in South America, would advance sufficient funds to offset debts to England and France and to cover the Spanish governmental expenses. The company was to be authorized to recover the ceded property by whatever means it deemed advisable, by force of arms or by mediation.³⁶

About this time, rumors were rampant in Mexico and Europe that Iturbide had carried on intrigues with France to obtain support for the restoration of Mexico to Spain by reconquest.³⁷ A "resident of London," with close court connections, had stated that Iturbide wanted to ask the Russian Emperor for 12,000 men to invade Mexico. Some were to land on the coast of Sonora and Sinaloa while others would proceed overland from Russian territory contiguous to Mexican California. If this were not forthcoming, Iturbide would then ask for a loan of

35. Sir William A. Court, To George Canning, Madrid, November 27, 1823, in Webster, Documents, II, p. 408.

36. Ibid.

37. George Canning to Prince Polignac, May 18, 1824, Ibid. II, p. 152.

30,000,000 pesos, with which to buy ships and arms which he would distribute to his partisans at Tampico and Vera Cruz. In exchange the Russian Emperor would be granted the California Peninsula.³⁸ It is possible the entire affair came out of a report of José Mariano Torrente, an agent of the Duke of San Carlos, Ferdinand's Ambassador in London, wherein he stated that Ferdinand had sought the aid of Iturbide in a scheme to reconquer his former colony, but without success.³⁹ In any case, Iturbide declared that he was the major obstacle in plans "to subject the Americas to their old masters," and that the Court at Madrid used "all imaginable resorts to lull the nation, to multiply my enemies and to destroy me."⁴⁰ In a proclamation signed aboard the brig Spring, Iturbide stated he came only as a soldier to help maintain independence.⁴¹

A conspiracy developed in Mexico during 1827 which aroused no end of concern, implicated many prominent citizens, and was one of the

38. Planes del Sr. Iturbide para la nueva reconquista de America (México: Oficina liberal del Ciudadano Juan Cabrera, 1824), LAF-BNM, No. 1392.

39. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 57 and note 20.

40. Agustín de Iturbide, Exposiciones dirigidas al Soberano Congreso General de la Nación, Londres, 13 de Febrero de 1824, in LAF-BNM, No. 1392.

41. Agustín de Iturbide, Mexicanos, June 1824, in LAF-BNM, No. 1392.

direct causes of the decree of December 20, 1827 which expelled all Spaniards from Mexico. This intrigue involved one Father Joaquín Arenas, a discalced Franciscan, whose only other apparent claim to fame was a charge of counterfeiting coin in a disguised soap factory.⁴²

On the morning of January 18, 1827, Arenas approached Ignacio Mora, Commanding General of the Federal District, and invited him to take part in a plan of revolution whose object was to change the form of government. He presented a plan composed of 18 articles, the first of which designated the grito of the revolution: "viva españa, viva la religión de Jesucristo."⁴³ Arenas told Mora there was near the capital a comisionado regio (royal commissioner), fully authorized by the King of Spain to grant amnesties, favors, and so forth. If Mora would consent to the invitation extended to him, all his doubts would be clarified and he would deal directly with the comisionado regio.⁴⁴ Mora claimed he needed time to think the matter over, but Arenas insisted time was short and that the grito should be given the next day or on January 20th at the latest. However, Arenas agreed to return the next day to receive

42. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 57, note 29.

43. Causas que se han seguido y terminado contra los comprendidos en la conspiración llamada del Padre Arenas. Extractadas y publicadas por disposición del supremo gobierno general de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, T. 1 (México: Imprenta al Correo a cargo del Ciudadano José María Alva, 1828), p. 10.

44. Ibid., p. 11.

Mora's final answer. Mora then informed President Guadalupe Victoria of the affair. Provisions were made that at the next visit of Arenas, his proposals would be overheard by José María Tornel y Mendívil, Deputy for the Federal District, Francisco Molinos del Campo, Governor and Senator of the Federal District, Lieutenant Colonel Ignacio de la Garza Falcon, and Joaquín Muñoz and Francisco Ruiz Fernández, Adjutants to the Commanding General. These witnesses hid in an adjoining room and, after hearing Arenas' plans, surprised, apprehended, and imprisoned him.⁴⁵ Tornel later testified that he and the others had heard Arenas tell Mora that the object of the plan was to bring Ferdinand VII to Mexico.⁴⁶ When questioned about the comisionado regio, Arenas denied such a person existed and claimed it was a ruse to persuade the Commandant. Arenas said he hoped to counteract the false doctrines of the Masons so that in the battle between the Yorkinos (York Rite) and the Escoseses (Scotch Rite), another party of pious and elevated men might arise, composed of the parents of families disgusted by the bad education of their children, and of clergy who

45. Causas. . . , p. 11.

46. José María Bocanegra, Memorias para la Historia de México Independiente, 1822-1864 (México: Imprenta del Gobierno Federal, 1892-1897), I, pp. 622-623.

saw themselves attacked in the press. Arenas believed the only remedy was a change in the government.⁴⁷

Many others were implicated in this supposed conspiracy: Generals José Echavarria and Pedro Celestino Negrete were exiled; Arenas, Father Franciso Martínez, General Gregorio Arana and others were sentenced to death; many officers were degraded and lost their commissions; and a number of civilians were given various penalties.⁴⁸ The mysterious Royal Commissioner was never really identified; he was either Francisco Martínez, a Dominican Friar, or Eugenio Aviraneta, a Spaniard who had come to Mexico in 1825 and who wrote for El Veracruzano Libre, a periodical published in Vera Cruz.⁴⁹ General Arana protested his innocence until the end, and able and impartial lawyers could find nothing in the evidence to justify the death penalty.⁵⁰ Since it was a cause célèbre there were opinions pro and con. Although there might have been some kind of conspiracy, it is improbable that Spain was involved. It is not conceivable that Madrid would have implicated itself in what Lucas Alamán had described as

47. Causas. . . , pp. 12-13.

48. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 58.

49. Bocanegra, I, p. 726; Zamacois, XI, pp. 631-632.

50. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 58, notes 31 and 32.

"a true act of insanity."⁵¹ If the Spanish Court had sent out a royal commissioner to manage an affair of such importance, it is certain they would have selected a man of greater talent and tact than either Martínez or Aviraneta. Furthermore, the person chosen to make contact with elements of Mexican society sympathetic to a monarchy in the person of Ferdinand VII would have been better connected in such society and far more prudent than Arenas evidently was.⁵² Although Spanish Ministers to the United States sent copies of the proceedings to their government in 1827 and 1828, they made little reference to the affair in their dispatches. Nor did Spain display further interest, a good indication that the scheme was of local origin.⁵³ Whatever the case, it was the beginning of a long series of disturbances which plagued the country for many years.⁵⁴ It was used by the Yorkinos as a weapon to discredit, not only their rivals the Escoseses, but also the Spanish population in general, and was instrumental in bringing about the legislation which expelled the Spanish from Mexico.⁵⁵

51. Quoted in Zamacois, XI, pp. 629.

52. Zamacois, XI, p. 629.

53. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 372.

54. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 59.

55. Zamacois, XI, p. 630.

The only serious attempt to place a member of the Spanish royal family on the throne of Mexico, during the period under consideration, involved the Infante, Francisco de Paula. In 1824 reports concerning De Paula made European cabinets suspect that something was afoot. Villele, the French Minister, revealed to Sir Charles Stuart, British Ambassador to France, that Monsieur de la Porterie, a French officer and a member of the household of De Paula, possibly had an influence on the Infante's offer to come to Paris and there consider the best means by which to re-establish Bourbon authority over the revolted colonies. Although Villele assured Stuart the proposal was rejected by France, the British Ambassador thought the project fitted in quite well with the designs which had been entertained by successive French Ministers--

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especially Villele.

Stuart's estimate of Villele proved correct. A year later Henry George Ward, British Minister to Mexico, informed Canning that General Guadalupe Victoria, President of Mexico, had received dispatches from a secret agent of the Mexican government at Paris which contained reports of a conference with Villele. During this meeting, the French Minister had discussed plans for the establishment of a

56. Stuart to Canning, Paris, August 27, 1824, in Webster, Documents, II, pp. 161-162. Stuart to Canning, Paris, June 24, 1824, Ibid. II, p. 158.

monarchy in Mexico.⁵⁷ As General Victoria considered this a threat to Mexico, which he had said he would rather see laid to waste than under Bourbon rule, he therefore sought to obtain the support of Great Britain by forwarding the information he had obtained.⁵⁸

Ward thought the information improbable, but Victoria pointed out that since the agent in question was an "old Spaniard," Villele probably imagined he would be amenable to any plans which might promote the interest of Spain. Furthermore, France had no way of communicating with Mexico since all her attempts to introduce secret agents had failed. Moreover, correspondence between Alamán and Polignac, together with the previous views of the former with respect to the establishment of a Bourbon dynasty in Mexico, would not unreasonably lead France to believe Alamán might be induced to cooperate in such an enterprise.⁵⁹ During the conference, Villele produced a number of letters from Jalapa and Mexico City which painted a sad picture of the state of affairs. Villele said he could find nothing but discontent and dissatisfaction--all of which he attributed to the adoption of the republican system of government. Although he admitted Spain's former

57. Ward to Canning, Secret and Confidential, Mexico, September 22, 1825, Ibid. II, pp. 480-485.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

colonies could no longer be annexed by her and agreed they should be independent, the form of government they had chosen constituted an insuperable barrier to French recognition of independence. The solution, declared Villele, lay in the introduction of a monarchy, and he was pleased that his communications indicated a large party in Mexico in favor of it. For her part, France would be happy to aid this party to carry its plans into effect. In point of fact, revealed Villele, for some time past France had been exerting her influence in Madrid to convince Ferdinand VII to abdicate his rights to the throne of Mexico in favor of his brother Don Francisco de Paula, "who being already blessed with a numerous offspring, might found a dynasty of Bourbons in the New World with every prospect of their watching over the welfare of their subjects there during as many generations as they had in the old."⁶⁰

Villele was optimistic that Ferdinand ultimately would realize the plan was in the interest of Spain and consent to his brother's departure. While "well disposed" Mexicans prepared to receive their king, Don Francisco would proceed to Havana where he would unite the civil and military authority in his own person. His presence in the New World was calculated to produce a "powerful sensation in those

60. Ibid.

countries which had so long flourished under the protection of his family."⁶¹

The French Minister declared he expected no opposition from Britain which, he claimed, had expressed willingness to cooperate in a change of systems of government if monarchy was the only thing that would satisfy the allies. Furthermore, Britain could not complain of Francisco de Paula at the head of 20,000 men in Cuba, "since the hostile intentions of neighboring states," justified any precautions to protect that island.⁶² To avoid suspicion and complaint, it was planned that all the troops were to be sent to Cuba in small detachments and that De Paula was not to take command until all was in readiness. Villele believed the Infante's claim would be admitted by the majority of the Mexican people and that, with the resources France would make available, he could overcome any opposition by the faction then in power. Whatever opposition might arise either would be too weak to offer resistance, or could be bought over, for certainly no revolutionary group could resist the titles, distinctions, and riches a legitimate monarch could bestow.⁶³ It was Villele's contention that the mass of the people, although they desired independence, cared little and

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

understood less about the form of government, whereas the aristocracy would rally to the cause.⁶⁴

Ward's own estimate of the situation was somewhat different. He informed Canning that the principal obstacle to be faced by France in such an enterprise was a deep-rooted dislike of Spain, "which forms a very prominent feature of the national character."⁶⁵ He did concede, however, that this hatred did not extend to members of the royal family themselves, and surmised that, were the Infante to appear alone, clerical influence--with French financial support--would make the Mexican government tremble. It was Ward's opinion that De Paula, backed by an army, and with a host of courtiers to be cared for at the expense of the country, would arouse the populace. "They would see in this nothing but the continuance of the old system, under which every lucrative situation was regulated by the Spaniards as their patrimony."⁶⁶ Nor did Ward believe the aristocracy would rally to De Paula. Even though they cared little for the present system, they would exchange it only for one such as that under Iturbide, where the court positions would be in their hands. In such an undertaking, noted the British diplomat, religion would be enlisted on both sides, and any

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

appeal by the Mexican government to the "public spirit of the country would be useless for the term is not understood." Ward did believe, however, that the supporters of the government then in power would be able to form a formidable coalition determined to exclude Old Spaniards, since all classes would be materially affected by the support which any army and a court required.⁶⁷

One person who was supposed to have played a principal part in the De Paula project was Juan García del Río, professional monarchist and former Minister of Peru in the time of San Martín.⁶⁸ He lived in London with a Conde la Garde, French by birth and a clever spy of both Russia and France at the Court of England, and a Conde de Silenski, a polish adventurer. The trio--all Royalists-- were always ready to consider any intrigues which might bring them power and fortune.⁶⁹ The supposed principal object of a trip García intended to

67. Ibid.

68. Murphy to SRE, Juan de Dios Canedo, London, November 15, 1839, in Jorge Flores D., Juan Nepomuceno de Pereda y su Misión Secreta, Vol. XIX, 2nd Series: Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1964), pp. 164-165. Volumes of the Archivo will be cited hereafter as AHDM, with series and volume number following.

69. Rocafuerte to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, London, March 20, 1828, in Neptali Zuniga, (ed.), Rocafuerte y su Obra Diplomática en Europa, Vol. XVI: Colección Rocafuerte (Quito: Edición del Gobierno del Ecuador, May 17, 1947), pp. 261-266.

make to Mexico was to foment discord, in order to make republicanism disgusting to the people. He also was to appraise the aid Mexico might afford republicans in Buenos Aires and Chile against a monarchist plot of the Emperor of Brazil, another intrigue in which he was involved. Since García had stated publicly that the republican system could not exist in the new American states and, because of his reputation and the suspicious nature of his trip, Vicente Rocafuerte, Mexican representative in London, advised his government to keep García del Río under surveillance.⁷⁰ Although Tomás Murphy, Jr., a Mexican representative at Paris, had managed to avoid granting a passport to him, García del Río had been able to obtain a visa for the United States and had taken passage for New York.⁷¹ Murphy had not wanted to grant García entry into Mexico by virtue of "his well known ideas in favor of the monarchical system."⁷² Moreover, Murphy claimed to possess trustworthy information to the effect that a plan existed among various representatives of Latin American states throughout Europe, especially in Brussels, headed by García. After his arrival in the United States García was denied a passport by the Mexican representative in Washington, on the

70. Ibid.

71. Murphy, Jr. to SRE, Paris, April 10, 1828, in Weckmann, Relaciones, I, p. 157.

72. Ibid.

grounds that Paris already had refused to issue one to him.⁷³ Pressure was exerted on Murphy to declare he had not denied a passport to García so that the Washington representative would then issue one. Luis Gordoa, a Mexican diplomat, published a pamphlet wherein he accused Murphy of bad faith and the Mexican government of vascillation.⁷⁴ Murphy in turn submitted to his government the text of a pamphlet he believed should be published in reply.⁷⁵ At the present time little more is known of García del Río's activities with respect to Mexico.

The plan to make Francisco De Paula, "King of Mexico," principally involved Francisco Claudio Auguste Chanel de Hungria, Marquis de Crouy, who had left the service of Louis XVIII, as Alamán describes it, "to speculate in legitimacy and empires as others do in liberty and

73. Garcia del Rio to Murphy, Jr., Philadelphia, May 29, 1828, Ibid., I, p. 157.

74. Murphy, Jr., to SRE, Paris, July 6, 1828 and February 19, 1829, Ibid., I, pp. 157, 159.

75. Murphy, Jr., to SRE, Paris, February 19, 1829, Ibid., I, p. 159.

republics."⁷⁶ In view of his acquaintance with some important Spaniards he was commissioned by Villele to discuss with Ferdinand VII, the plan to crown Francisco de Paula Emperor of Mexico.⁷⁷ Although Ferdinand refused to lend his consent, the Infante was disposed to leave Spain without it.⁷⁸ In Madrid, De Crouy had an interview with De Paula and acquainted him with Villele's proposals. The Infante agreed with them and, as he desired to leave Spain with his sons, asked that the French Minister obtain the intervention of Charles X to accomplish this.⁷⁹

76. Alamán, V, p. 800, quoted in Delgado, España y México, I, p. 451. Crouy-Chanel was born in Duisberg, Prussia, December 31, 1793, a descendant in direct line of the Arpades, the royal family of Hungary. With the fall of Napoleon in 1814 he entered the military service of Louis XVIII for a period of three years. In 1821 he took part in the Greek war of independence and 1823 found him in Spain where he became associated with a Señor Aguado (a man famous for his financial and industrial operations). His lack of success in the De Paula venture did not end his political activity. He became associated with Louis Napoleon in subversive activities against the government of Louis Phillippe. In 1848 he was in Rome where Pius IX bestowed honors and favors on him. The insurrection of the Hungarians against Franz Josef of Austria served as a pretext for Crouy-Chanel to re-vindicate his right to the throne of Hungary. He died in 1873. cf. Jorge Flores D., AHDM, 2nd Series, XIX, pp. 162-164.

77. Hidalgo, Proyectos, p. 37; Delgado, España y México, I, pp. 451-452.

78. Hidalgo, Proyectos, p. 3.

79. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 452. The eldest sons of De Paula were Don Francisco de Asis and Don Enrique, respectively Dukes of Cadiz and Seville. The former became King Consort by his marriage in 1846 to his cousin, Isabel II. The latter figured in later royalist schemes.

De Crouy returned to Paris with the authority and the instructions of De Paula to begin to appoint the future imperial court; Talleyrand was to be Minister of State with a salary of 40,000 francs per year; Staff Colonel, the Viscount de Astier with an annual salary of 12,000 francs; and a Mr. Reéze, Chamberlain to the emperor at 20,000 annually. The Duke of Dino, Minister of War, and the Conde de la Roche-Aymon were to organize the army, and the Captain of the Navy Gallon was to do the same for the Navy.⁸⁰

Instructions likewise were given to De Crouy to proceed to England and make the project known to Canning in order to gain his support. He was to inform Canning that England would be treated as a most favored nation, that "we count on their aid and protection," and that Mexico would always be a faithful ally to England.⁸¹ De Crouy also was to negotiate a loan of a million pounds sterling to cover the expenses of realizing the project. In order to justify an interview with Canning he had to present documents, but in order not to compromise the secrecy of the project, refused to do so, and therefore neither obtained the interview nor the sought-after loan. He was able to manage

80. Murphy to Canedo, London, November 15, 1839, in AHDM, No. 10, 2nd Series, pp.164-165.; Hidalgo, Proyectos, 37; p. 37; Delgado, España y México, I, p. 452.

81. Copia de la instrucciones particulares dadas por el Infante D. Fco. de Paula al Marques de Crouy (11 enero 1827), in Delgado, España y México, III, Documento XXXII, p. 199.

a small sum from a banker named Goupy, leaving as guarantee the patents of authority given him by De Paula.⁸²

Don Francisco de Paula further empowered De Crouy to enter into discussions with the Mexican authorities concerning conditions under which he would be proclaimed emperor by the Mexican nation. De Paula promised that all agreements contracted by the present government would be ratified and recognized by him; that the civil and military officials would be maintained in their present grade and privileges; that a constitution in harmony with the actual needs of the nation and majesty of the throne would be proclaimed upon his arrival in Mexico; and that persons would not be proscribed for previous actions or opinions.⁸³

Meanwhile, De Paula's intrigues had come to the attention of Ferdinand VII. Since he himself was occupied in considering an operation against Mexico, he ordered his brother to abandon the project. To end the affair, De Paula sent his secretary (a Señor Álamo), to Paris to withdraw the credentials he had given to De Crouy. The

82. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 452.

83. Copia del poder del Infante D. Francisco de Paula al Marques de Crouy para presentarse a los Ministros Mejicanos (11 enero 1827), in Delgado, III, Document XXXIII, p. 201. The constitution was to be that of France except for freedom of religion and press. Murphy to Canedo, London, November 15, 1839, in AHDM, 2nd Series, XIX, pp. 164-165.

banker Goupy refused to surrender them unless reimbursed the amount loaned to De Crouy--500,000 pesos. In order to raise this sum, Álamo had to promise the enterprise would continue and the patents exchanged for others. He was able to raise 200,000 through loans from Señor Alexandre-Marie Aguado, a prominent and very wealthy Spanish banker, and the balance from the brother of the Marques de Crouy, who obtained the needed amount from the sale of some properties.⁸⁴

About the time the De Paula episode had reached its terminal phase, Alexander Hill Everett, United States' Minister to Spain, was visited by a Father Andreza, a citizen of the United States, of French extraction, from Natchitoches, Louisiana. Andreza told Everett he had come to Europe as a tutor to several young gentlemen. The United States' Minister noted that he had plausible manners and "apparently a good deal of talent."⁸⁵ M. de St. Priest, the French Minister to Spain, notified Everett that he too had received a visit from Andreza, who had intimated to him that "he was engaged in a plan for restoring the Spanish authority in Mexico and placing the Infante Don Francisco at the head of the government there as Viceroy or King."⁸⁶ He claimed

84. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 453.

85. A. H. Everett to Henry Clay, Madrid, October 11, 1828, Diplomatic Dispatches, Spain, NA, RG 59.

86. Ibid.

to have correspondents in England, France, and Mexico and had come to obtain the countenance and cooperation of the Spanish government. Although he had little success, he had seen the Princes and the Bishop of León, a leading member of the Council of State.⁸⁷ The French Minister refused to have any discussion with him on the subject, and was inclined to believe that rumors of the British favoring such a design originated with Andreza. St. Priest also noted that:

Propositions of the same kind had been hinted to the French government before his (St. Priest) departure from Paris which could not be traced to any authentic source and appeared to be founded on some private intrigue, probably the same of which this person was one of the agents.⁸⁸

De Paula's name also was mentioned in connection with the ill-fated Barradas expedition.⁸⁹

On July 6, 1829, a Spanish expedition of some 3,000 men set sail from Havana for the reconquest of Mexico.⁹⁰ It was commanded by Brigadier Isidro Barradas, "ignorant, unprepared and of little

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Thomas Murphy, Jr. to SRE, Paris, May 10, 1829, in Weckmann, Relaciones, I, p. 164.

90. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 72.

natural talent, although well-meaning."⁹¹ For some time Spain had considered such a step. All the information she had received about Mexico confirmed its necessity. On April 19, 1827, Miguel de la Torre, Captain General of Puerto Rico, forwarded to his government a copy of a report on Mexico and Guatemala prepared by a Dominican Friar, Antonio Alvarez.⁹² The report, a collection of pithy statements, gave a summary of the areas and groups which supported the King; the Indians, the entire jurisdiction of Tehuantepec, three-fourths of Oaxaca, Spanish residents, and so forth.⁹³ He noted the existence of a plan, "counter revolution of Criollos and Gachupines" with which, after his departure (1826), a member of his order was connected.⁹⁴

The notion that there was considerable support in Mexico for the Spanish plans and that the conquest of Mexico would be a relatively easy task was reiterated by Francisco Tacon, the Spanish Minister at Philadelphia. He noted that all the Spaniards, who had left Mexico when

91. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 443, quoting Jacobo de la Pezuela, Ensayo histórico de la isla de Cuba (New York: Imprenta española de R. Rafael, 1842), p. 546.

92. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 433.

93. Antonio Álvarez, Relación del Estado de México y Guatemala, in Delgado, III, Documento XXV, pp. 121-122.

94. Ibid.; Although he judges the evidence insufficient, Delgado notes the possible connection here with the Arenas conspiracy. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 433, note 7.

threatened with expulsion after the Arenas conspiracy, had declared anarchy reigned supreme in Mexico, and believed "its conquest by Spain would not be difficult" and judged "the present time as very opportune to undertake it."⁹⁵

The question of the pacification and reconquest of the Americas occupied the Spanish Council of State from at least January 15, 1828, until May 29, 1828, when a definitive Consulta was prepared and presented to the King.⁹⁶ This Consulta examined in detail the policies of Europe toward Spain and her colonies: "how foreign influence has contributed to support the rebellion of those rich and extensive Provinces and the measures they have employed to separate them from the Dominion of Your Majesty."⁹⁷ It referred to a March 31, 1824, dispatch of Canning wherein he had noted the favorable notices he had received of the political state of Mexico. The Consulta declared Spain had pointed out the falsity of this view and it cited facts to demonstrate the actual state of anarchy as well as the existence of "many elements of reconciliation and affection for the mother country in virtue of which it

95. Tacon to Secretary of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, May 29, 1828, cited in Delgado, España y México, I, pp. 433-434.

96. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 436.

97. Consulta de Consejo de Estado de 29 Mayo de 1828, in Delgado, España y México, III, Documento XXVII, pp. 127-148.

can be hoped that even after past turbulence the spanish of both hemispheres may again be united."⁹⁸ The Council recommended immediate steps be taken to raise an expedition and was convinced "it would not be difficult to win there a party in our favor, and bring to the royal ranks many who today form the rebel army."⁹⁹ It also was observed that the constant persecution of the clergy, who resented the deprivation of income, privileges and exemptions, would redound to Spain's advantage.¹⁰⁰ The Council declared that Mexico, of all the former colonies, offered the most favorable occasion for reconquest.¹⁰¹ After more consultation, military and economic plans finally were drawn up and put into effect. The outcome of the Barradas expedition, as is well known, became the occasion for another Mexican holiday and added to the growing list of Santa Anna's laurels the appellation--Hero of Tampico. It also demonstrated that much of the information Spain had about Mexico was false. There was no effective local support in sympathy with the invasion: on the contrary--if anything, the presence of Spanish forces united Mexico to drive out the invader.¹⁰²

98. Ibid., p. 131.

99. Ibid., p. 143.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 444.

Nevertheless, the lesson was lost on Ferdinand and his ministers. They were convinced the defeat was due only to the numerical inferiority of Barradas' forces and began to lay plans for a more ambitious undertaking.¹⁰³

To this end a series of Memorias were addressed to the King. One written by a Juan Bautista de Inigo called for an expedition of 8,000 men;¹⁰⁴ others maintained no less than 25,000 men and expenditures of some 15 million pesos were required.¹⁰⁵ A number of these Memorias and Exposiciones which dealt with the reconquest of the Americas were drawn up during the 1820's and submitted to the government. If nothing else they are indicative of a persistent preoccupation with the problem of the former colonies.¹⁰⁶ One Memoria was written by Eugenio Aviraneta, whose name had been mentioned in connection with the Arenas' conspiracy.¹⁰⁷ In it he did not advise the reconquest

103. Ibid.

104. Exposición de Don Juan Bautista Inigo, in Delgado, España y México, III, Doc. No. XXVII, pp. 149-151.

105. Carta del Intendente de la Habana al Secretario del Despacho de Hacienda, Havana, January 15, 1830, in Ibid., Doc. No. XXX, pp. 149-165. cf. also Presupuestos Generales para un Expedición a Nueva España, Doc. XXXI, pp. 165-197.

106. Delgado, España y México, I, p. 454.

107. For an analysis of the role of Aviraneta see Ibid., I, pp. 357-366. cf. also Eugenio de Aviraneta y Ibargoyen, Mis Memorias Intimas, 1825-1829 (México: Moderna librería religiosa de J. L. Vallejo, 1906), Appendix I, pp. 249-269.

of Mexico and observed:

In such vast possessions the colonial system has been one of the causes for the depopulation of the Peninsula and has enriched foreign nations. Spain with all its armies cannot preserve these immense possessions, because the moral force which is public opinion is lacking, and because the desire for independence, which all inhabitants without distinction possess, is inextinguishable.¹⁰⁸

Aviraneta recommended instead that Spain implant a monarchy headed by a Spanish prince as the ideal political regime for Mexico.¹⁰⁹

One of the more interesting recommendations in these Memorias is found in that of D. Pascual de Churruca.¹¹⁰ One section of his Exposición is entitled "Preparation of public opinion in the Peninsula to accomplish overseas expeditions." The title itself is a good indication that reconquest and war with the Americas was not a popular item among the Spanish people, perhaps because they would have to pay for it. Churruca's consideration here is what in modern terms would be called propaganda.¹¹¹ Churruca advocated various means to "reanimate. . . the public spirit of Spain." One method was to use the press

108. Quoted in Delgado, España y México, I, pp. 459-460.

109. Delgado, España y México, I, pp. 459-460.

110. Exposición del Teniente Coronel D. Pascual de Churruca sobre la pacificación de America, Junio 2, 1824, in Delgado, España y México, III, Documento XXXIV, pp. 203-208.

111. Delgado, España y México, I, pp. 454-456.

to demonstrate "the great wealth and riches of our colonies, exclusively attributing our great evils and miseries to their sad loss," and to stir up the populace by "inflaming them with the pleasing memory of the illustrious deeds which the first Spanish conquistadors of that continent immortalized."¹¹² Moreover, Churruca recommended the soldier's length of service overseas be fixed at four or five years, to overcome the repugnance for such service. He also observed that it would be useful to have the parish priests discuss the duties of every good Spaniard "to re-establish concord and peace among the disunited families of our nation, . . . to support the just rights of the throne, and of the Monarchy against the rebels who wish to usurp them."¹¹³ As the American clergy could be useful in the work of pacification, Churruca advised they be attracted to the cause by means of exhortation or Apostolic Brief from the Pope.¹¹⁴

Besides indicating Spain's serious concern over the problem of her lost colonies, the Memorias are another rich source for the view Spain had of Mexico. It is not surprising that they present the same picture of Mexico which is found in the accounts of travellers and the reports of officials, for undoubtedly the information contained in the

112. Churruca, Exposición. . . .

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

Memorias was gleaned from such accounts and reports. Nor, it appeared, could this official view be changed by defeat--in truth, at least the ministers of the Bourbons forgot nothing.

An example of the ministers' inflexible royalist viewpoint with respect to Spain's former colonies is provided by the Conde de Ofalia. In 1828, Ofalia, then Spanish Ambassador to France, submitted a report to the Spanish Council of State, which it incorporated in its Consulta of May 29, 1828 to the King regarding the pacification of the rebellious provinces. In the report, Ofalia insisted that the countries concerned would never succeed in achieving any degree of tranquillity under the republican forms of government they had adopted. The habits, customs, and laws under which these countries had lived for so long would sooner or later again come to the fore, and provide the occasion for the erection of a monarchy.¹¹⁵

A similar Consulta to Queen Isabella II in 1833, and signed by Ofalia, now Secretary of the Council of Ministers, reiterated much the same point of view. It reflected the conviction that the peoples of the former Spanish dominions in America would become disillusioned with the republican theories which were so opposed to their habits and customs, and come to the realization that a monarchical form of

115. Consulta de Consejo de Estado de 29 Mayo de 1828, in Delgado, España y México, III, p. 138.

government was their only salvation and would satisfy all their social necessities.¹¹⁶ The saying that Bourbons learned little and forgot nothing very well might be applied to their ministers.

Similar views were echoed in the Spanish periodicals during this period.¹¹⁷ The solutions to the evils and troubles of America were to be found in the paternal government of Ferdinand VII, outside of which there was only anarchy and confusion. Moreover, America was immature (some liberals also held this theory) and Spain ought to direct and teach it. If this direction were not submitted to voluntarily, it would then be necessary to impose it.¹¹⁸ Jaime Delgado, in his study of the Spanish press during this Period, maintained that from this notion came the continual demands to send troops to reconquer America.¹¹⁹

Thus ended a phase of the only monarchist intrigue after Mexico became independent (excluding the Maximilian episode), wherein documentation from the candidate himself is available to lend credence to the rumors, and authority to the plans. Over a decade later, the Conde

116. Consulta del Consejo Gobierno a la Reina Gobernadora, December 3, 1833, in Delgado, España y México, III, p. 326.

117. Jaime Delgado, La Independencia de América en la Prensa Española (Madrid: Seminario de Problemas Hispano-americanas, 1959), p. 317.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

de Crouy, brother of the Marques, spoke to Tomás Murphy, Mexican Minister to England, "endeavoring to insinuate that he still has not abandoned it entirely, and citing various Mexicans on whose influence and support he counted."¹²⁰ A trip to the United States at that time (1839) by the eldest sons of Francisco de Paula, the Dukes of Cadiz and Seville, brought on another spate of rumors.¹²¹ According to some newspapers, their object was to investigate, by means of secret agents, the strength of monarchist support in Mexico and other countries of America.¹²² Maximo Garro, Mexican Minister to France, reported that their object was to see "if their proximity to the old Spanish colonies would produce any movements in their favor."¹²³ However, Garro noted that persons close to the Infante did not believe in this project "for the moment, at least," because, among other reasons, of a lack of funds.¹²⁴

120. Murphy to Canedo, London, November 15, 1839, in AHDM, 2nd Series, No. 19, pp. 164-165.

121. Ibid. cf. also Garro to SRE, November 11, 1839, in Weckmann, Relaciones, I. p. 88.

122. Ibid.

123. Garro to SRE, November 11, 1839, Ibid., I, p. 88.

124. Ibid.

MEXICO THROUGH THE EYES OF DIPLOMATS

The Mexican nation lacks pride in the past,
feeling for the present and faith in the future. It
is a sinking ship; no force can save it.

De Ambroy, French Consul at Tampico

In Mexico the sky and the land are magnificent, but
the men do not even resemble the species.

Alexis de Gabriac, French Minister to Mexico

Why would European nations, particularly France and Spain, look upon Mexico as fertile ground for monarchy or simply intervention? Certainly the French would not have undertaken so costly and complicated a venture as that which placed Maximilian on the throne of Mexico were they not fairly certain the outcome would redound to their advantage. Assuredly, there were economic and political motives. France, as well as the rest of Europe, was perfectly aware of the "wealth of the Indies," and in the past had benefitted from that wealth. Alexander von Humboldt's Political Essays on New Spain, although written in the colonial period, had provided the groundwork, and conjured up the image of an immense and wealthy region poorly exploited by a decadent Spain. This image, by no means new, was revived and given added color by von Humboldt's brilliant study.

The many changes in government which Mexico had undergone since Independence created in the minds of Europeans a picture of instability and chaos--a land rent by constant revolutions wherein life and property were totally unsafe. Mines and haciendas had gone to ruin and the great resources of the country were not being properly developed. Mexicans were not considered capable of governing, let alone developing, their country. Europe should come to its aid, provide a stable government--preferably a monarchy--and thus keep her from ruination. Present too was the desire to prevent the spread of republican principles and to arrest the southward expansion of the United States.

What brought about these views vis-à-vis Mexico in particular? Here the reports and correspondence of diplomatic officials play an especially important role; they helped to create the intellectual climate within which Europe viewed Mexico and the environment which shaped the ideas about it.

The first Spanish Ambassador to Mexico, Angel Calderón de la Barca, a confirmed royalist, lost no time in reporting to his government, after about a month in Mexico, that his first (and only, for it did not change) impression was one of poverty, confusion, and the

"most deplorable backwardness in civilization."¹ Only the ruins of roads and buildings Spain had constructed testified to what had been and what could be. Divided into factions since its "premature separation from the mother county," Mexico had adopted a republican form of government, "far from reality" and "opposed to its ancient usages and customs." The Indians were no happier than before, for they no longer had the special protection they had enjoyed under Spanish rule; nor did the rest of the people understand or appreciate the change.²

For Calderón, the society in Mexico was that of a viceroyalty whose chief was absent for an indefinite period. The landed gentry clung to their titles of Count or Marquis, to their aristocratic tastes,

1. Calderón de la Barca to First Secretary, January, 22, 1840, in Javier Malagón Barceló, Enriqueta Lopézlira, and José María Miquel i Vergés (eds.), Relaciones diplomáticas hispano-mexicanas, Documentos procedentes del Archivo de la Embajada de España en México: Despachos generales, Serie I, (México: El Colegio de México, 1949-1966), I, pp. 25-31. Cited hereafter as RDHM.

Thomas C. Reynolds, United States' Minister to Spain said of Calderón: "In Mexico, regardless of Spain's manifest interest to cultivate friendly relations with that organic anarchy, and of his Government's policy of enticing its former colony gently back into allegiance, he so shamefully and actively served the interests and acted as a tool in the intrigues of the British Minister, that Mexico demanded his recall. He had thus been tried in two furnaces, and, though a consummate dissembler and adept in deception, it was thought he would not exercise those talents which might be so useful to England, in duping her." Reynolds to James Buchanan, August 12, 1847, Diplomatic Despatches, Spain, NA, RG 59.

2. Ibid.

and lived withdrawn from society "longing for times past and deploring the present." Riches were almost exclusively in the hands of strangers or money-changers who had made fortunes by means of easy contraband or usurious contracts. "Here, as in all independent Spanish America, disorder predominates and those who rule and make their authority palpable for the moment are the military."³ Calderón noted that even though the army was small, retired generals and officers were quite numerous, and "alone consumed the small income of the republic."⁴

When in 1840, Gutiérrez Estrada published his famous pamphlet which called for a monarchy, Calderón was ecstatic that it had "exposed to the mockery and scorn of the world the disorder and confusion of the administration and the vices which have weakened this society."⁵ Calderón was convinced the Mexicans would agree to summon a monarch to rule Mexico and that the Anglo-Americans would oppose such a move. He noted prophetically:

Only a pact among the principal powers of Europe and their association to that end, will make possible the plan of Gutiérrez Estrada; the only thing that can stop the ruin of all the so-called hispanic-american republics.⁶

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Calderón to First Secretary, November 16, 1840, in RDHM, I, pp. 167-168.

6. Ibid.

Calderón's successor, Pedro Pascual Oliver, believed republicanism was an "exotic plant here."⁷ His reports carried similar information with regard to the necessity for a monarchy in Mexico as did those of Calderón.

A constitutional monarchy with a European prince surely will be the form of government which might be able to lead this country from the depression and prostration in which it finds itself; . . . to restrain the pride and ambition of foreigners; but only Señor Gutiérrez Estrada had the necessary courage to proclaim this truth in Mexico.⁸

Oliver declared Mexico lacked the funds necessary to cover state expenses. She was without industry or commerce. Furthermore, personal security and justice were non-existent, a condition Oliver ascribed to the lack of power on the part of the civic authorities, and to the "pride and boasting of the military class which aspires to govern everything and in effect be the government."⁹ These and other evils born of complete social disorder had their origin in the independence Mexico had chosen, and in the system of government adopted in 1823.¹⁰ Moreover, observed Oliver, there also was confusion and anarchy in the

7. Oliver to Gonzales, April 20, 1842, in RDHM, II, pp. 35-37.

8. Oliver to Secretary of State, January 20, 1843, in RDHM, II, pp. 216-18.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.; cf. also Oliver to First Secretary, Mexico, November 29, 1844 in RDHM, III, p. 128.

opinions expressed on all sides. Although the clergy and the greater part of the old nobility retained monarchical sentiments, they were divided. Emancipation was abhorrent to some who wished it had never been accomplished. Others supported the ideas of the Plan of Iguala, that is, a Mexican throne with a prince of royal blood.¹¹ The military and civil service feigned republicanism; for most of them this was nothing more than a fictitious and convenient opinion. None had greater attachment than these two classes to distinctions and honors, and none required more deference and respect from their subordinates and from the public in general.¹² Although somewhat of a republican sentiment did exist among lawyers, doctors, men of letters and artists, Oliver insisted these were few in number and, for the most part, merely aspirants to office. Their opinions were therefore inconsistent and changed with their position. Nevertheless, in these classes the liberal doctrines of the country had taken refuge, and from them came the cries of the press, and the opposition in parliament.¹³ Oliver had little to say of the rest of the population except that it was composed of "Indians almost incapable of reason," and so out of touch that "some

11. Oliver to First Secretary, Mexico, January 24, 1844, in RDHM, III, p. 14.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

still inquire about the health of their king Ferdinand VII." With elements of society such as these, and the resultant confusion, "the simplest solution would be to turn back to the year 1821 and embrace the Plan of Iguala, which our Cortes so shamefully scorned when it was proposed to them," lamented Oliver.¹⁴

With the advent of the Santa Anna government in 1842, Oliver felt certain that the change would "open the road to hopes which did not exist before and present as possible in time the establishment of a very firm throne on this soil which we conquered with our blood and with our valor."¹⁵

As proof of the monarchical habits of the people, Oliver described the magnificent reception given Santa Anna upon his entrance into the city, on June 3, 1844, to take charge of the presidency. He remarked that Santa Anna, in view of such flattery, would need "a firm head not to give himself up to some dangerous project of monarchy."¹⁶

Oliver was even more outspoken about the necessity and possibility of establishing a monarchy in Mexico than was Calderón de la Barca. In a dispatch to the Conde de Almodovar, Spanish First

14. Ibid.

15. Oliver to Secretary of State, Mexico, December 22, 1842, in RDHM, II, pp. 181-184.

16. Oliver to First Secretary, Mexico, June 6, 1844, in RDHM, III, p. 66.

Secretary of State, he noted that the day might not be far off when Mexico would again offer Spain the Plan of Iguala "about which eventuality I will have the honor to speak to your excellency in a separate dispatch."¹⁷ Neither the dispatch referred to by Oliver nor the instructions to him of March 31, 1843, were found in the Archives of the Spanish Embassy in Mexico.¹⁸ The existence of the instructions is alluded to in another report:

Thus, I am preserving the instruction with the secret obligation which Señor Conde de Almodovar had the goodness to communicate to me in his dispatch of March 31 of last year, not without the hope that some day it might have practical application and will manage to make our name loved and respected among the Mexicans. . .¹⁹

Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, the Spanish Minister to Mexico from 1845 to 1847, described the sad state of the country during the war with the United States, and specifically commented on the lack of public spirit or patriotism.²⁰ According to him, the most alarming symptom of the disorder in Mexico was the tendency toward independence

17. Oliver to First Secretary, Mexico, December 18, 1842, in RDHM, II, pp. 176-177.

18. RDHM, III, pp. XIII-XIV.

19. Pedro Pascual de Oliver to First Secretary of State, Mexico, January 24, 1844, in RDHM, III, pp. 13-16.

20. Castro to First Secretary, Mexico, June 28, 1846 in RDHM, III, pp. 278-280, in the El Colegio de México Microfilm Collection of the Spanish Embassy in Mexico, also typescript of parts of this collection

on the part of the various Mexican states. He noted that "the lack of a common center and local pretensions" was "one of the principal causes which hasten dissolution and augment confusion."²¹ Furthermore, the possibility of calamities which might occur in the future, such as war with the United States, did nothing to erase the apathy of the government and the nation. "There is here a particular art of making illusions and these natives are so accustomed to finding themselves in a state of perpetual revolution. . . that they do not look to the future or make plans for tomorrow."²²

With the war under way, Bermúdez de Castro reported that enlightened men "looked to Europe for aid."²³ External support could erect a stable political system, for there were no elements of resistance. The people wanted stability and order after so many years of revolution and anarchy.²⁴

graciously made available by Luis F. Muro Arias, Secretary, El Colegio de México, México, D.F. References taken from this collection will be cited hereafter as CM.

21. Castro to First Secretary, Mexico, March 31, 1847, in CM.

22. Bermúdez de Castro to First Secretary, Mexico, June 29, 1845, in RDHM, III, pp. 195-200.

23. Bermúdez de Castro to First Secretary, Mexico, June 28, 1846, in RDHM, III, pp. 278-280; Bermúdez de Castro to French Foreign Minister, June 28, 1846, in CM.

24. Ibid.

Bermúdez de Castro was involved in the international intrigues of the Paredes administration, and was considered director of a plot in Mexico. He proposed the Infante Prince Henry, brother-in-law of Isabel II of Spain, as candidate for the throne of Mexico.²⁵ It was reputed important monarchists met in his home in Mexico City and signed an agreement which committed them to accept a Spanish prince. The supposed plot was discovered and exposed, and not only had to be abandoned, but the government denied any participation and condemned the entire affair.²⁶

During his appointment as Spanish Minister to Mexico, Juan Antonio y Zayas reiterated what his predecessors had reported. The demoralization of the country was the fruit of the laxity of its laws and the administrative anarchy which introduced a form of government not

25. Jorge Gurria LaCroix, Trabajos sobre Historia Mexicana (México: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1964), p. 103. Luis Nicolau D'Olwer in his prologue to Volume III of the Relaciones Diplomáticas Hispano-Mexicanas (p. xv), notes that Bermúdez de Castro, appointed by General Ramón María Narváez, First Secretary of State and President of the Council of Ministers, probably carried precise instructions concerning monarchical intrigues, especially that the subject not be mentioned in his general dispatches--which it is not. D'Olwer points out that when Bermúdez left Mexico he probably took with him his secret correspondence and also perhaps the documents relating to Oliver, for they do not appear in the Spanish Embassy Archives.

26. Jorge Flores D., Pereda y su Mision, AHDM, 2nd Series, XIX, pp. 167-168.

in harmony with the character, habits, and education of the peoples. It was a "weak and vicious society which cannot be maintained by itself alone."²⁷

The general apathy shown by the people when President Mariano Arista was replaced by Juan B. Ceballos, provoked Zayas to remark that: "In this people the last sentiment of patriotism had been extinguished," and that, even though agitators were still able to stir up the people and the army, it was "only as a galvanic pile might agitate a cadaver without giving it life."²⁸

The man who replaced Zayas as Spanish Minister to Mexico, Juan Jiménez de Sandoval, Marquis de Rivera, was another strong advocate of monarchy in Mexico. He believed the Conde de Montemolin, the son of Don Carlos de Bourbon (brother of Ferdinand VII), was the perfect candidate for the throne. Moreover, since Montemolin was a Carlist pretender to the throne of Spain, the Spanish problem of succession would be solved at the same time.²⁹ Besides, his acceptance and consent to work in agreement with the Spanish government would bring about this reconciliation with the royal family. Inasmuch as

27. Juan Antonio y Zayas to First Secretary, Mexico, August 2, 1852, in CM.

28. Zayas to First Secretary, Mexico, February 1, 1853, in CM.

29. Rivera to First Secretary, April 30, 1853, in CM.

Montemolin would renounce any claim to the throne of Spain, many of his military supporters would follow him to Mexico, observed Rivera, and two problems would be solved with one candidate. "If these plans, which perhaps are only found in my mind, would be possible, Mexico could save itself, maintaining its nationality and even independence-- but not without the efficacious patronage of Spain."³⁰

During 1853, the Marques de Rivera was very much concerned that Spain take cognizance of monarchical ideas then prevalent in Mexico:

Recalling at the proper time that when, in another era, they tried to establish in Mexico a monarchy with a prince of the royal family of Spain on the throne, there was more than one man of high rank, notwithstanding the absurdity of the idea, who sought a prince of the House of Austria. So it will not be strange then that if the case again presents itself and Spain refuses, as it refused then, they would have recourse to a Prince of another royal house of Europe.³¹

Rivera wanted to report the true state of things in Mexico in order that the Minister of State could appraise "a project still very embryonic and susceptible of a thousand alterations, but which--despite the tremendous difficulties which I certainly believe to be involved in its realization--is not utterly impossible."³²

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Rivera--muy reservado, Mexico, May 27, 1853, in CM.

Recalled at the behest of the Mexican government, Rivera claimed that Señor Manuel Díez de Bonilla, Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Mexico, was the guiding spirit behind his ouster. He maintained that Bonilla feared his influence with Santa Anna, and, together with Señor Arroyo, Chief Clerk of the Secretariat of Foreign Relations, "complained that I have discredited Her Majesty the Queen."³³ This Rivera denied, satisfied in conscience that he had fulfilled his duties as a good Spaniard and faithful representative of the Queen.³⁴ Sometime prior to his own recall, during negotiations of a convention with Spain, Rivera had spoken with Arroyo who, among others, gave him to believe that his predecessor, Zayas, also had been recalled at the request of the Mexican government.³⁵ He also had come to understand that if Calderón de la Barca were re-assigned he would not be received "because his wife had written a book about Mexico."³⁶ Rivera reported that he had heard it said that if Bermúdez de Castro had not left, the Mexican government would have requested he be relieved as well.³⁷ A

33. Rivera to First Secretary, March 2, 1854, in CM.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

conversation Rivera had with Lucas Alamán concerning the recall of Zayas convinced him "that this was a very dangerous terrain for the Ministers of Spain."³⁸

Not only did these diplomats markedly favor a monarchy for Mexico, but they also insisted there was a sizable group in the country who had similar views and desires. Calderón de la Barca, two months after his arrival reported he had "not spoken with any Mexican of any education who has not discredited and deplored the fact that Spain did not accept the Plan of Iguala and who did not believe that this vast territory will not prosper without a monarchical regime."³⁹ Later he noted that it was "the most judicious and well-trained persons" who professed that Mexico could not "go forward without the establishment of an executive power clothed with prestige and effective vigor, that is to say, of a constitutional monarchy."⁴⁰ However, in another dispatch he stated there was no definite party of any kind and "much less an organized one which desires and proposes an end or system."⁴¹ A

38. Ibid.

39. Calderón to First Secretary, February 29, 1840, in Delgado, III, p. 444. cf. also Oliver to First Secretary, January 24, 1844, in CM.

40. Calderón to First Secretary, October 17, 1840, in RDHM, I, pp. 164-165.

41. Calderón to Secretary of State, July 3, 1840, in Delgado, España y México, III, pp. 456-457.

short time later Calderón was able to report that the letter of Gutiérrez Estrada had awakened the parties and renewed "the ideas of monarchy among those who desire and would adopt it if they could invent a manner of realizing it without sacrifice or efforts."⁴² According to Pedro Pascual de Oliver, there was no lack of prudent men who desired a monarchy, but the fate which befell Gutiérrez Estrada discouraged many.⁴³

The only variance from the views expressed by the Spanish Minister to Mexico from the time relations were established in 1839 until the 1860's, with respect to the need for monarchy, the strength of the monarchist party and monarchist opinion, and the deplorable state of the country was voiced in 1862 by General Juan Prim, Conde de Reus, Special Minister Plenipotentiary to Mexico and Commander of the Spanish Expeditionary forces. In a letter to Conde Odilon Barrot, French Minister to Spain, Prim attested that he was a confirmed monarchist, and that if he could see any chance of its establishment in Mexico he would do his best to help:

42. Calderón to First Secretary, November 16, 1840, in RDHM, I, pp. 167-168.

43. Oliver to Gonzalez, April 24, 1842, in Delgado, España y México, III, p. 524.

But, Mon Cher, I believe such thoughts are impossible to realize if we have to count on the will of the country for the decisive and conclusive reason that there are no monarchists in Mexico.⁴⁴

In a prophetic paragraph, Prim observed that the people would fight against monarchy and that the throne of a foreign prince, imposed by bayonets

will fall to earth the day the support of soldiers from Europe is withdrawn, just as the temporal authority of the Pope fell to earth the day the French soldiers left Rome.⁴⁵

Prim wrote to Napoleon III on March 17, 1862, and indicated that he believed there were few men with monarchic sentiments in Mexico, "and it is logical that it be so for here they never knew the monarchy in the person of the Monarchs of Spain but only in Vice-roys."⁴⁶ Consequently, there were none of the interests of a secular nobility, or anything of moral interest which might make the present generation desire the re-establishment of a monarchy "which they did not know and which none has taught them to love and revere."⁴⁷ Prim agreed that it would not be difficult for Napoleon to bring Maximilian to

44. Conde de Reus, Juan Prim to Barrot, Vera Cruz, March 11, 1862 in CM.

45. Ibid.

46. Prim to the Emperor of the French, Orizaba, March 17, 1862, in CM.

47. Ibid.

Mexico and crown him king but pointed out that the day the imperial mantle was taken away "the monarch will fall from the throne elevated by Your Majesty."⁴⁸

Among several other prominent subjects revealed in the dispatches of the Spanish Ministers was the reiteration of the need for a strong government, preferably a monarchy, to offset the manifest destiny doctrine of the United States and prevent its southward expansion, as well as to forestall the general spread of republican principles. The expansionistic intentions of the vain and ambitious Anglo-Americans were well known and permeated their national thinking, observed Oliver.⁴⁹

Related to this theme was a strong anti-Anglo-American, pan-hispanic current, which linked the necessity for a monarchy with the preservation of Spanish culture, the Latin race, and the Catholic religion. The first care and preoccupation of the United States was the destruction of European influence on the American continent. This, noted Bermudez de Castro, was exemplified by General Winfield Scott's Manifesto to the Mexican people of May 11, 1847, wherein he advised them to cast off their colonial habits, to remember they were Americans

48. Ibid.

49. Oliver to First Secretary, Mexico, August 24, 1844, in RDHM, III, pp. 86-88.

and that their felicity had not come from Europe.⁵⁰ Moreover, observed Bermúdez de Castro, there were Mexicans who aided this anti-Europeanism, and American agents who carried on intrigues with the ultra-democratic party, which wanted at all costs a triumph of republican principles.⁵¹ In addition, officials of the United States continuously preached the fraternity of the American Republics and declared their principal object was to save "the democratic principle threatened by monarchical plans which the cabinets of Europe are preparing."⁵² Bermúdez de Castro declared the expansion of the United States was a threat to the maritime and colonial interests of Spain, and he expressed concern over the extension of her influence in the gulf of Mexico which he saw as a threat to the Spanish Antilles--he pointed out that Cuba even had been a subject of discussion in the United States Congress as well as in the press.⁵³

In 1853, the Marquis de Rivera reported the essence of a conversation he had with General James Gadsden of the United States,

50. Bermúdez de Castro to First Secretary, Mexico, May 29, 1847, in CM; cf. also U. S. Congress, House, Mexican War Correspondence, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 1847, House Exec. Doc. No. 60, pp. 971-974.

51. Bermúdez de Castro to First Secretary, Mexico, May 29, 1847, in CM.

52. Ibid.

53. Castro to First Secretary, Mexico, June 29, 1847, in CM.

wherein the General spoke of buying Cuba.⁵⁴ Rivera commented on this proposal: "To speak to Americans of pecuniary disinterest is to speak a language they do not understand; for them there is no other God than money,"⁵⁵ Nor was Rivera less taken aback when Gadsden broached the subject of the formation of an independent nation from Cuba, Jamaica, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico under the protection of the United States, "all is possible to an American, if a thing is profitable to him, nothing frightens him."⁵⁶

On his second mission to Mexico, Juan Antoinio y Zayas, reported that Gadsden was the instigator of conspiracies, that he distributed arms and money to foment revolution, and that he had given impetus to a project to establish a United States' protectorate over Mexico. Furthermore, the basis of the protectorate had been drawn up in the United State's Legation. It was a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance wherein the United States would guarantee the integrity of Mexican territory; provide a thirty million dollar loan hypothecated

54. James Gadsden, a southern railroad builder, was appointed by President Pierce to negotiate with Mexico for the sale of an area south of the Gila River in Mexican Territory, comprising present-day southern Arizona.

55. Rivera to First Secretary, Mexico, December 29, 1853, in CM.

56. Ibid.

by church property; and establish a bank with a capital of \$10,000,000 to finance agricultural and mining enterprises.⁵⁷

The question of financing the government was one that had plagued successive administrations in Mexico. Oliver believed the sad state of the treasury was due to the abandonment of good principles of financial administration put into effect by the Spanish, which had been "a model of wisdom and excellence."⁵⁸ In time of civil disturbance the viceroys had maintained up to 90,000 men under arms without straining the treasury resources: "Who does not know today they can barely support 20,000 starving soldiers and that public employees, the retired, and widows scarcely receive a quarter of what is due them?"⁵⁹

This pride in things Spanish and the good old days when Mexico was still a colony of Spain, prompted an historical interpretation of three events in Mexican history by the Marques de Rivera; the grito de Dolores of September 16, 1810; the entry of the trigarante army into Mexico City proclaiming independence, September 27, 1821; and the battle of Tampico, September 11, 1829. During the month of September, the independence of Mexico was celebrated and the anniversaries of

57. Zayas to First Secretary, Mexico, September 19, 1855, in CM.

58. Oliver to First Secretary, Mexico, July 12, 1844, in RDHM, III, pp. 77-78.

59. Ibid.

these events duly observed. In every state capitol commissions were nominated to direct the public festivities and deliver appropriate orations to "arouse the enthusiasm the people had lost."⁶⁰ On these occasions the Spanish legation abstained from participation, did not hoist the national flag, and secured the legation entrance against any outrage which some citizen who had imbibed too much might commit.⁶¹ The Spanish Minister considered the grito de Dolores as nothing more than the cry of assassins who hid behind the names of Ferdinand VII and the Virgin of Guadalupe and murdered the innocent. "This bloody anniversary is a blot which annually stains the history of Mexico ever since it represented itself as an independent nation."⁶² As for the September 27 anniversary of the trigarante army, it was considered little more than a revolt of Spanish troops.⁶³ Indeed, it was to these disloyal Spanish troops that Mexico owed its independence. Since Spain did not recognize Mexico as independent until 1836, she would not take part in the observance of this anniversary either.⁶⁴ The custom of celebrating

60. Marques de Rivera to First Secretary, Mexico, August 24, 1853, in CM

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., Also see Chapter V below.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

the defeat of the Spanish forces under General Barradas at Tampico, September 11, 1829, had not been observed for some time. However, with the Mexican hero of that battle, Santa Anna, again president, the practice was revived with greater pomp and splendor than before--and wounded Spanish pride more than ever. To add fuel to the fire, Santa Anna boastfully wore a decoration with the inscription (ladavisa), "I humbled Spanish pride."⁶⁵

The Spanish government approved the conduct of its legation in Mexico, but warned the Spanish population not to make any open demonstration which might indicate sentiments opposed to those of the Mexicans. Albeit the legation was not to take part in public ceremonies, it was to comply with common courtesies so as not to bring public attention.⁶⁶ This cautious attitude of the Spanish government with regard to its relations with Mexico was not new. From time to time, instructions given Calderón de la Barca, strictly admonished him not to be favorably disposed to any of Mexico's political parties, and ordered him to observe "the greatest precaution and tolerance because the situation of Spaniards who today are establishing themselves in Mexico is quite different from that which they enjoyed when we were masters of the

65. Ibid.

66. Real Orden #427, Madrid, November 4, 1853, Primera Secretaría de Estado. 2a Sección, Angel Calderón de la Barca al Marques de Rivera, in CM.

territory."⁶⁷ Similar instructions were provided succeeding Spanish Ministers to Mexico. Pedro Pascual de Oliver was told that dignity and moderation were the watchwords, and that he was to charge Spaniards resident in Mexico "not to mix directly or indirectly in political affairs."⁶⁸ In addition, he was to augment by any available means the natural sympathies of the Mexicans toward their Spanish brothers.⁶⁹ One means of advancing friendly relations was to encourage Spanish artists resident in Mexico to exercise their respective professions.⁷⁰

In 1840, Madame Calderón de la Barca had written her impressions of the theatre in Mexico City as "dark, dirty, redolent of bad odours; the passages leading to the boxes so dirty, so ill-lighted, that one is afraid in the dark to pick one's steps through them."⁷¹ By 1844

67. Instrucciones del Primer Secretaría del Despacho de Estado, Evaristo Perez de Castro, al Ministro de España en México, Angel Calderón de la Barca, Madrid, May 26, 1859, in RDHM, I, pp. 6-12; cf. Real Orden de J. M. de Ferrer al Calderón de la Barca, Madrid, February 19, 1841, in RDHM, I, pp. 168-169.

68. Real Orden del Primer Secretaría del Despacho de Estado, al Ministro de España en México, Pedro Pascual de Oliver, May 6, 1844, in RDHM, III, p. 17.

69. Ibid., p. 18.

70. Ibid.

71. Fanny Calderón de la Barca, Life in Mexico: The Letters of Fanny Calderón de la Barca, eds. Howard T. Fisher and Marion Hall Fisher (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. 113.

this situation had been rectified, for the Spanish Minister proudly reported that a new theatre had been constructed by a young Spanish architect, Lorenzo Hidalgo. Spain was represented among the portraits of the world's most celebrated authors which hung in the first balcony-- figures such as Calderón, and Lope de Vega were included among those of Shakespeare and Molière. Three distinguished contemporary Spanish poets admired by the Mexicans were also featured; Martínez de la Rosa, the Duque de Rivas, and Manuel Bretón de los Herreros.⁷²

Apparently Spain's Ministers were not too careful to avoid becoming involved in local affairs for again and again injunctions to abstain from such involvements were handed down from the Secretary of State. Consuls were informed that "the first complaint, the most trifling denunciation raised by the Mexican Government on this point will bring the immediate removal of the consul who, with his imprudence, might have provoked it."⁷³

Spaniards resident in Mexico, who had been warned not to become involved in the political arguments, were even told that Spain

72. Oliver to First Secretary, Mexico, February 22, 1844, in RDHM, III, pp. 17-18.

73. Copia de la instrucciones dadas al Consul General de España en México por el Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado, Evaristo Perez de Castro, Madrid, 10 de enero de 1840, in RDHM, I, pp. 54-56.

would withdraw her protection from anyone who favored any of the political parties which sought the leadership of the government, "whatever might be the principles it proclaims or the flag it unfurls."⁷⁴ It was to be made clear to the Mexicans that Spain sincerely accepted their Independence. Past deeds were to be forgotten and the spirit of Spanish superiority was to be discouraged. To the domination she had exercised in the past, Spain now preferred to strengthen the type of relations which equality of origin, bonds of blood, language, and customs invited.⁷⁵ Her policy was to establish good commercial relations, and to unite the peoples of the two countries by the stimulation of material interests, for in the final analysis these made "men industrious and peaceful and will solidly tighten the love and good relations of the members of the great Castillian family."⁷⁶

At least two of the Spanish Ministers to Mexico supported newspapers which promoted the interests of Spain, and defended her and things Spanish against attacks made in the liberal press. La Hesperia,

74. Primer Secretario de Estado, Dirección Política, Leopoldo al Embajador de su Majestad en México, Madrid, November 7, 1860, in CM.

75. Primer Secretario, Evaristo Perez de Castro al Angel Calderón de la Barca, Madrid, May 26, 1839, in RDHM, I, pp. 6-12.

76. Real Orden del Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado, Joaquín María de Ferrer al Ministro de España, Madrid, November 17, 1840, in RDHM, I, pp. 123-124.

which appeared in 1840, was backed by Calderón de Barca. He told the editors (one of them, Juan Covo, was a former clerk of his) that he would not aid them beyond the loan of his library and the offer of his frank opinions, with the proviso that they not give the least hint that the publication had been suggested by him or that he exercised the least influence on its publication; it was to promote the interests of their fellow countrymen and thus make them appreciate the benefits of their government.⁷⁷

The pamphlet of Gutiérrez Estrada which appeared, in 1840, was the occasion of an extended polemic in La Hesperia with José María Tornel y Mendívil, Minister of War.⁷⁸ During this polemic Calderón was warned to take care not to let it become known that La Hesperia was an echo of the Spanish legation.⁷⁹

In 1853, the Marques de Rivera informed his government that an ultra-democratic newspaper, El Siglo XIX, "had tried to awaken barely calmed hatreds and to revive bastard passions against a nation

77. Calderón de la Barca to First Secretary, Mexico, March 24, 1840 in RDHM, I, pp. 45-46: cf. also Calderón de la Barca to First Secretary, June 28, 1840 and annexes, in RDHM, I, pp. 91-95.

78. Calderón to First Secretary, Mexico, November 24, 1840, in RDHM, I, pp. 169-171.

79. Real Orden al Ministro Español, Angel Calderón de la Barca, Madrid, February 20, 1841, in RDHM, I, p. 171.

which made so many sacrifices for its colony."⁸⁰ To defend Spain against these attacks, a newspaper, Eco de España, was established. Its editors, Anselmo de la Portilla, former editor of the defunct Español, and Eduardo Asquerino "proposed to defend our country from the diatribes of its enemies, to bring out the truth, and call upon its detractors the just indignation of honorable men of all countries."⁸¹ Rivera believed that the praise of Spain's glories would have a laudable effect on the "sensible part of the population," and he therefore favored the publication and aided the editors with his advice.⁸² The Spanish government approved his conduct and encouraged his support of the paper, but cautioned him that such support should be indirect and not ostensible. Moreover, he was to impress on the editors the necessity for strict neutrality with regard to internal questions, as this was the basis of Spain's policy, especially "on this occasion when only a false rumor of a protectorate on our part has given rise to the excesses committed by the newspaper El Siglo XIX."⁸³ This advice was given in a Royal Order by one who had experience in such things--Angel Calderón de la Barca, then in the office of the Secretary of State.

80. D. Antoine, Marques de Rivera, Mexico, July 26, 1853, in CM.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Real Orden #418, Primera Secretaría de Estado, 2a Seccion, December 28, 1853, signed by Angel Calderón de la Barca, in CM.

Through her representatives in Mexico, Spain continued to receive a rather dreary picture of her former colony. It was backward, in fact had regressed since independence, and the people were not as well off as they had been under the benevolent rule of Spain. The disorder and confusion were due to the republican form of government. Monarchy was the only cure for all these evils, moreover, there was a sizeable group in Mexico which favored such a course. Monarchy was needed, not only to end Mexico's internal strife, but also to prevent the United States from absorbing the entire country.

Spain repeatedly cautioned her representatives to refrain from political activity. The fact that she did this so frequently, and the indications that Mexico had requested the recall of three of the Spanish Ministers, is evidence that they were engaged in such activity. Although Spain was trying to erase her bad reputation in Mexico through appeals to a common culture, language, blood, and religion--her representatives seemed to exemplify the "ugly Spaniard."

The case of the French representatives to Mexico is similar and they presented like points of view to their government.

In January, 1823, France sent to America, two agents, Julien Schmaltz and Achilles de la Motte de Malta, to gather information on

the political status of Colombia and Mexico.⁸⁴ They were to endeavor to reach an understanding relative to commercial relations between these countries and France before Great Britain did. It is not known whether their instructions ordered them to try to induce these countries to erect a throne for a prince of the House of Bourbon, although Daniel Sheldon, United States Chargé d 'Affaires in Paris, was of that opinion.⁸⁵

The two agents were landed at the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, Vera Cruz. Although they were supposed to be merchants, their baggage and bearing caused the authorities, apparently fearful of attempts to erect a monarchy in Spanish America, to become suspicious and arrest them.⁸⁶ The Mexican authorities believed they were French spies sent by Louis XVIII to investigate the condition of America with respect to political, commercial, and financial relations, military and naval

84. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 52; cf. also Isidro Fabela, Los Precursores de la Diplomacia Mexicana (Mexico: SRE, 1926), AHDM 1st Series, Vol. XX, p. 169.

85. Sheldon to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, Paris, January 18, 1824 in Manning, Correspondence, II, pp. 1401-1403. cf. also AHDM, 1st series, XX, p. 169.

86. Extracto de una carta recibida en México, fechada el 10 de noviembre de 1823, in Ernesto de la Torre Villar, (Ed.), Correspondencia Diplomática franco-mexicana, 1808-1839 (México: El Colegio de México, 1957), p. 16. (Cited hereafter as CDHM); cf. also, William Spence Robertson, France and Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1939), pp. 315-316.

forces, and imports and exports. It was claimed they were instructed to dissuade the various American states from the formation of any federal union, to provoke dissension, and, in this manner, advance and support French interests. In addition, Schmaltz was supposedly the bearer of instructions to persuade the Mexicans to accept the Duke of Lucca as the heir of Montezuma.⁸⁷

Lucas Alamán, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained to the French Government that Schmaltz and La Motte had been detained because the Mexican Government had received information from El Espectador of Cadiz and other sources which branded them as spies. He also noted that some of the documents they carried were in code and dealt with matters which would hardly concern travelers for business or pleasure.⁸⁸

Even though the cold reception afforded the agents diminished the hope of the establishment of Bourbon princes on the throne of Mexico, it did not cause the project to be abandoned, reported Daniel Sheldon, United States Chargé d' Affaires at Paris. In fact, he asserted, "whatever measures may at this moment be adopted, and

87. Ibid., Extracto. . . , in CDHM, p. 16.

88. Nota explicativa de don Lucas Alamán. . . 30 de junio de 1824, CDHM, p. 24; Informe. . . los senores Schmaltz y Aquiles de la Motte. 11 de febrero de 1824. in CDHM, pp. 20-21.

which the force of circumstances may compel Spain and the allied powers to consent to temporarily, it is this plan which they intend shall finally prevail."⁸⁹

Until 1823 the impression which France held with regard to the situation in Mexico was that society, religion, customs, and habits of the Mexican people called for a form of monarchy, and it is almost certain that Schmaltz and La Motte inspired French statesmen with such ideas.⁹⁰

Upon his release from prison, Schmaltz traveled via Tampico to New Orleans, where he arrived February 7, 1824. From there he sent a report to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which painted a black picture of conditions in Mexico. He also notified Armand Jules Marie Samouel, a French naval lieutenant who had been appointed special commissioner to Mexico, that among the most distinguished

89. Sheldon to Adams, January 18, 1824, in Manning, Correspondence, II, pp. 1401-1403.

90. AHDM, 1st Series, XX, p. 170. General Octaviano d'Amilvar was in Mexico immediately after the insurrection of 1810. He returned after independence only to be expelled in 1825. He propagated ideas contrary to the republic and affirmed that Mexicans longed for the monarchy's return--independent of Spain. He tried to persuade his listeners after his return to France, that the party which held these ideas was large and wealthy, and apparently protected by the clergy, especially by Antonio Joaquín Pérez, Bishop of Puebla. Tomás Murphy, Sr., Paris, January 2, 1826, in Weckmann, Relaciones, I, p. 87.

and reliable people in Mexico whom he would find most useful, were Alamán, Rafael Mangino, José María Bustamante, and the Fagoaga family.⁹¹

Lt. Samouel was selected for the mission to Mexico primarily because of the close friendship he had developed with Lucas Alamán. Samouel had met Alamán in Martinique during 1821 while the latter was on his way to Spain as one of Mexico's representatives to the Cortes of Cadiz.⁹² The French officer was given instructions by both the Marques de Clemort-Torrerre, the French Marine and Colonial Minister, and Chateaubriand, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Among his many duties, he was to report on "The most general opinions in Mexico with respect to the form of government most suited to the country."⁹³ He was to appear simply as an official authorized to travel for his own education, or as one sent by the Governor of Martinique to study affairs of interest for the Royal Navy and Merchant Marine.⁹⁴

91. Murphy (Sr) to Michelena, October 1, 1824, in Weckmann, Relaciones, I, p. 19.; CDFM, pp. 20-21; Robertson, France and Latin America, pp. 315-316.

92. AHDM, 1st Series, XX, p. 179.

93. Clemort-Torrere to Samouel, December 17, 1823, in AHDM, 1st Series, XX, pp. 180-184.

94. Ibid.

In his instructions to Samouel, Chateaubriand noted:

According to the information we have of Mexico, there is reason to believe there still does not exist any solidly established government and that opinion is indecisive with respect to the nature of that which will result from the prevailing disturbances. The social and religious state, the customs and habits of the Mexican people seem to call for a monarchical form. It is noted that under the old government Mexico was the colony which perhaps suffered least from the regime to which it was subject. This circumstance leads to the judgment that it will be, among all the revolted colonies, the easiest to conquer. . . Perhaps it would consent to receive a viceroy who would preside over a purely Mexican administration, which would decide in all the internal affairs of the colony. This system would secure for Mexico a real independence, shielded from all exterior attacks and internal dissensions, since it only would concede some subsidies to Spain, it would secure certain particular advantages for its commerce and would give it, finally the privileges of sovereignty. . . which the Mexicans proposed in 1821.⁹⁵

Samouel spent several months in Mexico during 1824 and was received in a more cordial fashion than Schmaltz and La Motte. He had interviews with Lucas Alamán, whom he noted was cautious to avoid suspicion that he was openly partisan to the French. Samouel reported that "the greater part of the population want independence, detest the Spanish, and a majority prefer a representative monarchy to any other form of government."⁹⁶ The constitutional monarchy party

95. Chateaubriand to Samouel, December 17, 1823, in AHDM, 1st Series, XX, pp. 184-189.

96. Donzelot to Damas, October 30, 1824, in CDHM, pp. 31-32.

was the strongest and most powerful in the country. It was composed, noted Samouel, of the clergy, nobility, groups which had maintained ties with Spain, and all those who wanted a strong and stable government. The English Commissioner had hinted to the leaders of this party to ask for a German prince as monarch in order to keep a Spanish Bourbon off the throne--a situation, observed Samouel, which would be contrary to the interests of France, Spain, and Naples.⁹⁷ Although he thought the Republic in Mexico would soon be replaced by a monarchy, Samouel was convinced it would be difficult to establish. The Mexicans lacked anyone illustrious enough to merit the throne, and a European prince would face many obstacles. To occupy the throne and sustain himself in power, he not only would have to overcome the American envy and protest, but also would require the concerted will of a united Europe.⁹⁸

A similar sentiment was expressed by Viscount Granville in a conversation with Baron Auge H. M. Damas, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in December 1825. He noted that the French were "still disposed to listen to projects, which, if adopted some years ago, possibly might have secured to the Royal Family of Spain a continued dominion over that country."⁹⁹

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Viscount Granville to George Canning, Paris, December 15, 1825, in Webster, Documents, II, pp. 203-204.

French Ministers had indeed listened to many projects, for Damas was approached in the spring of 1825 with a project for the reconquest of Mexico by Gregor McGregor, a Scottish soldier of fortune, who had fought under José Miranda in Venezuela.¹⁰⁰ In 1823 Chateaubriand had been approached by this same adventurer.¹⁰¹ McGregor had proposed that, since Spain would never succeed in subjugating her American colonies, she cease all acts of hostility toward the insurgents. Spain would then divide Spanish America into four principalities ruled by Bourbon princes. Each of these princes would be furnished with a suitable bodyguard and squadron of warships, and natives who were known to favor monarchical principles would be attached to the household of each sovereign. Titles and honors would be liberally distributed and commerce would be placed on the basis of equality for all nations. This was but a variation of the old proposal of Aranda, and an official of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had inscribed on the copy of the proposition, "this plan is certainly very good, but its execution is difficult."¹⁰²

The Cabinet of the Tuilleries expressly commissioned Charles Bresson in 1828 to examine the possibility of constituting a monarchy

100. Robertson, France and Latin America, p. 365.

101. Ibid., pp. 281-282.

102. Ibid.

in South America. Accompanied by Napoleon Lannes, Duke of Monte-Bello, Bresson traveled to New Orleans en route to Mexico, but changed his itinerary and the focus of his monarchical intrigues to Colombia when he heard of the events which had occurred in Mexico in December--the riots which resulted in the destruction of the Parian market.¹⁰³

In 1830, Athanase Laisne de Villeveque, the French Vice-Consul at Acapulco, wrote to his father, a French Deputy, of the deplorable moral and physical habits of the Mexican people and the moral habits of their leaders. Although Villeveque worked for and favored the candidacy of the Duke of Parma for the throne of Mexico, whom he claimed Lorenzo de Zavala preferred, he apparently did so without official sanction. Prince Polignac denied that Villeveque had ever been authorized to do so, since the French government would never oppose whatever intentions Ferdinand VII might have concerning his former colony.¹⁰⁴

The establishment of a Spanish prince on the Mexican throne was a project still adhered to and considered possible by the French court

103. Lorenzo de Zavala, Ensayo histórico de los revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830 (New York: Elliot and Palmer, 1832), II, pp. 242, 247.; William H. Harrison, U.S. Minister to Colombia to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State, Bogota, May 27, 1829, in Manning, Correspondence, II, p. 1335.

104. Letter of Laisne de Villeveque to his father, January 24, February 3, 1830, in CDFM, p. 82.

in 1830. As far as France was concerned, it was not only feasible, but desirable, for it would aid monarchical governments everywhere by the shock it would give to republicanism in America.¹⁰⁵

French Ministers consistently affirmed that republicanism was an institution of American origin and a complete contradiction in a country without political education, such as Mexico, and that only a monarchy could bring peace and stability.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore they maintained there were in Mexico considerable forces which favored such a course.¹⁰⁷ They noted, however, that foreign intervention was needed to establish a monarchy and with it, law and order.¹⁰⁸

Another advocate of such intervention was Louis-Eugene Maissin, aid de camp to Rear Admiral Charles Baudin, who headed the French Naval force which blockaded Mexican ports in 1838 in "retaliation against mistreatment of French citizens in Mexico," who wrote of his

105. H. U. Addington, British Minister to Spain to Earl of Aberdeen, Madrid, February 19, 1830, in Webster, Documents, II, p. 475.

106. Baron Deffaudis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 15, 1833, in CDFM, p. 121.

107. Ibid.; Deffaudis to Thiers, August 27, 1836, in CDFM, p. 143; Deffaudis to Thiers, September 26, 1836, in CDFM, p. 144.

108. Deffaudis to Ministry, September 29, 1837, in CDFM, p. 159; Deffaudis to Minister, June 3, 1837, in CDFM, p. 154.

experiences and commented on the state of Mexican society.¹⁰⁹ One of the Captains of the fleet was Prince de Joinville, a son of Louis-Philippe, whose presence may have encouraged Mexican monarchists in plans to erect a monarchy.¹¹⁰ Maissin observed that the "Spanish Clerical Party" with enough "intrigue, insults, and provocations," could incite France to conquer Mexico; "once this was accomplished, a monarchy would be possible."¹¹¹ Moreover, Maissin believed France was ideally suited to realize such a project.

Of a quarrelsome nature, we are eager to right all wrongs even though we may suffer in the attempt. More important, France would place on the throne of Mexico a member of the House of Bourbon, a family that has preserved intact its prestige with the Spanish people it governed so long. The Church would be assured of supremacy; property holders and the remaining Spaniards would form an aristocracy with the usual rights and privileges. Such were and still are the dreams of the Clerical Party, of which Señor Lucas Alamán is said to be the leader, and of which Secretary Cuevas is said to be one of the mainstays.¹¹²

109. Eugene Maissin, The French in Mexico and Texas (1838-1839), Trans. from the French with introduction and notes by James L. Shepherd, III, (Salado, Texas: The Anson Jones Press, 1961), p. XIX of Introduction.

110. Ibid., p. XX of Introduction.

111. Ibid., p. 27.

112. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

Owing to a rupture in relations between France and Mexico between 1845 and 1847, Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, the Spanish Minister to Mexico, acted as Chargé d'Affaires for France. During that period he reported to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in much the same fashion--and sometimes with much the same information--as he did to his own government. "All enlightened men look to Europe," he declared, "because in the present circumstances only external aid would be able to establish a stable political system and save this nation from anarchy."¹¹³

Andre Levasseur, French Minister to Mexico from 1848 to 1854, likewise was convinced that unity and force were required in Mexico. He believed that a dictatorship, an almost despotic centralization of power, was needed.¹¹⁴ Levasseur was undoubtedly happy to pass on to his government a request for French support from the leading conservative figure in Mexico--Lucas Alamán. The report of his interview with Alamán also must have influenced the French Foreign Ministry's estimate of the Mexican situation. Alamán averred that it was to the

113. Despatch #28, Salvador Bermúdez de Castro to French Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 28, 1846; Despatch #264, Bermúdez de Castro to Spanish Secretary of State, Mexico, June 28, 1846, in RDHM, III, pp. 278-280.

114. Andre Levasseur to Ministry, February 1, 1853, in Lilia Diaz, (ed.), Versión Francesa de México, Informes Diplomáticos, 1853-1858 (México: El Colegio de México, 1963-1966), I, p. 2 (cited hereafter as Diaz).

French population that Mexico owed the development of all the useful arts, and that Mexico sought to increase French immigration. The political principles Mexico desired were "those which your illustrious sovereign had valiantly imposed in France and encouraged in Europe: principles of order, justice and religion; principles without which, as we see here, there cannot be happiness for the people."¹¹⁵ Alamán sought to strengthen the bonds between the two countries and declared: "we wish to trace our political institutions from those of France... establishing here an hereditary monarchy."¹¹⁶ However, he believed this impossible for Mexico to achieve, much less maintain, by herself. Outside support was definitely required because the threat of invasion by the United States was always present.¹¹⁷

When Santa Anna came to power for the last time in 1853, rumors were current that he intended to crown himself king. These rumors undoubtedly were given added strength when he took the title of His Most Serene Highness and when he re-established the Order of Guadalupe. Iturbide had assumed the same title before he became emperor, and had founded the Order of Guadalupe. Alphonse Dano,

115. Levasseur to French Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 30, 1853, in Diaz, I, p. 43.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

the French Minister succeeding Levasseur, did not, however, share the belief that Santa Anna would take such a step, and informed his government that a monarchy with a foreign prince was still a viable solution to Mexico's problems:

Although the monarchical system has the declared sympathies of all rich and intelligent men, it is known that this form of government could not establish itself in a lasting way with a national dynasty. On the contrary, however, a foreign royal prince will be defended and received by all. ¹¹⁸

Santa Anna had been president seven times before, three times invested with extraordinary powers, and each time he had fallen from authority. Were this to happen again and the republican system revived, warned Dano, the country would fall apart or be absorbed by the United States. ¹¹⁹

Repeatedly the French Ministers emphasized that the imminent threat of invasion by the United States could be averted, in the eyes of many Mexicans, only by the prompt and energetic intervention of the great European nations. ¹²⁰ Europe could not permit Mexico to be absorbed--she was needed to maintain the balance of power in the New World. This was a problem with which Europe must concern itself,

118. Alphonse Dano to Minister, Mexico, January 4, 1854, in Diaz, I, pp, 88-93.

119. Ibid.

120. Gabriac, Mexico, January 25, 1853, in Diaz, I, pp. 160-163.

since the confessed end of republicanism or "universal demagoguery" was the downfall of all the regular and monarchical governments of the Old World.¹²¹ It was the considered opinion of Alexis de Gabriac, Dano's successor, that the best defense against this "universal demagoguery" of republicanism was to take the offense, not by direct invasion or war, but indirectly through Mexico. Were Europe to agree in the establishment and maintenance of a monarchy "in the Constantinople of America" the United States would not be long in dividing herself.¹²² The United States could not expand, grow, or dominate in America unless it were surrounded by small republics in a constant state of anarchy. The singular and strong direction of a monarchical government as a neighbor would bring about her downfall and division.¹²³

In 1858 a number of articles appeared in United States' newspapers concerning the necessity for a protectorate for Mexico. They echoed the sentiment of an account in the London Times which advocated that the United States be invested with this charge.¹²⁴ These articles were translated, reproduced, and disseminated by liberals in Mexico. However, an article published in the Le Courrier of Le Havre signed by

121. Gabriac to Minister, Mexico, July 1, 1856, in Diaz, I. p. 304.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Gabriac, Mexico, April 11, 1858, in Diaz, II, pp. 11-13.

a Mr. E. Mouttet held a contrary opinion. It proposed that a monarchy be formed in Mexico, and that an equilibrium be created in the hispano-american republics by means of small monarchical governments. This would offer an effective counter-balance to the ever-growing force of Anglo-Saxon democracy and would maintain the principle of monarchy in the New World.¹²⁵ These two ideas, a United States protectorate, and a restored monarchy, had a great influence throughout Mexico, reported De Gabriac. Albeit the great majority of public opinion favored the latter, and the fear of opposition by the United States was a factor, "it is possible that the excess of evils in which Mexico is today submerged, could provoke a general manifestation in favor of monarchical restoration."¹²⁶

Several reports of monarchist plans forwarded by Gabriac must have reinforced the belief of many in the French Government in the necessity of a monarchy to prevent the southward expansion of the United States, and deluded them with respect to the size and quality of monarchist support in Mexico. One report involved a curious plan or proclamation published by El Monitor Republicano, which it claimed was found among the papers of Antonio Haro y Tamariz, a leading

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

conservative, when he was deported.¹²⁷ An hereditary and constitutional empire named Anahuac was proclaimed. Its emperor was to be don Agustín de Iturbide, the eldest son of the former emperor. In the event of his refusal the honor was to devolve on Haro. The charter guaranteed the Catholic religion as the only state religion; it also guaranteed equality before the law and demanded the restoration of military and clerical fueros--an obvious contradiction. Perhaps the most interesting feature of this scheme was the obligation imposed on the emperor--were he single--to take a wife a Mexican of Indian origin, who would be chosen by a constitutional cortes.¹²⁸ Although De Gabriac thought this plan a little farfetched--at least for the moment--he agreed it was consistent with the spirit and desire of the clergy, the military, and the propertied class--they lacked only men to insure success. This led him again to make his point that a capable foreign prince with a small force of five or six thousand men and some financial backing could conquer Mexico without difficulty.¹²⁹

As if to re-enforce this view, Tomás Murphy, former minister of Mexico to England, sent a Memorial to the French Government

127. Gabriac to Minister, Mexico, January 5, 1856, in Diaz, I, pp. 245-246.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

in which he declared that Mexico was condemned to seizure by the Anglo-American race in a short time "unless a strong hand saves it."¹³⁰ Thirty years of unremitting anarchy was the product of the introduction of republican institutions, "whose essence is diametrically opposed to the customs, character and other circumstances of the Mexican people."¹³¹ Murphy noted that this Anglo-American conquest was not something Europe could take lightly, for it affected world equilibrium. The conquest of Mexico was but the beginning; Cuba and the Antilles would surely be next. This would not only augment the strength of the United States, but would pose a threat to Europe by opening a vast new field for republican institutions.¹³² Thus the problems of Mexico were the problems of Europe from three points of view; world equilibrium, the security of peace, and the tranquil reign of monarchical institutions. Mexico's only hope lay in the interest of France, England, and Spain in the containment of the impetus of the Anglo-American race.¹³³ As for the type of aid these powers could offer, Murphy outlined the basis of a project which he believed would prove satisfactory:

130. Memorial of Tomás Murphy, February 17, 1856, in Diaz, I, pp. 261-264.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

1. Establish a monarchy under a Spanish prince or any other Catholic dynasty, with the collective guarantee of France, England and Spain.
2. Land and naval forces and economic subsidies being necessary to establish and sustain this government, the powers would furnish these means within certain limits.¹³⁴

As if to anticipate any objections which might arise, Murphy posed some of his own. It was possible, he noted, that such action implied war with the United States and that Mexico did not inspire sufficient sympathy among European nations to take such a risk. Furthermore, Europe would lose nothing by the occupation of Spanish-America by the Anglo-Saxon race. On the contrary, Mexico would be occupied by an active, hard-working, intelligent race which in a short time would develop the great resources of the country, organize the population and thus create vast and rich markets, beneficial to European industry and commerce.¹³⁵ Murphy denied war would be a consequence of this project; rather it would be a guarantee of peace. The North Americans appeared audacious because they believed England and France--the only powers they feared--would never agree to oppose their pretensions on the American continent. This, noted Murphy, was the point of departure, although not expressed, of the Monroe Doctrine,

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

and the consideration which gave the Americans the audacity to go against law and justice. When, however, they saw that such an alliance could be made together with Spain--all possibility of war would disappear.¹³⁶ Moreover, the Mexican people were not unworthy of France and England. They were the unhappy victims of the bad faith and ignorance of their leaders who had taken advantage of their simplicity to impose a political regime contrary to their customs. Besides, it was not only to the exclusive interest of Mexico that the European powers should oppose the pretensions of the Anglo-American race, but also to the general interest of Europe "in order to assure the equilibrium of the world, threatened with innundation by a race which already is giving excessive proofs of its aspirations to grandeur and its unlimited arrogance."¹³⁷ As to any advantages commerce and industry might gain from a well-developed Mexico--these would be assured in equal or better fashion by the intervention of Europe to establish regular and sound government.¹³⁸

De Gabriac was aware of plans to seek a candidate for the throne of Mexico, and reported that he understood Prince Juan Carlos, brother of Count Charles de Montemolin had been selected and had accepted.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

However, despite his efforts, he was not able to obtain any definite information. It seemed the plan provided for a provisional government of five members; a general, a bishop, an industrialist, a landholder, and the President of the Supreme Court. This group was to convoke a council of well-known personalities which would then publish a manifesto in order to relate the evils of forty years of anarchy, the permanent state of national bankruptcy, the loss of national territory, the urgent precautions to be taken in the presence of the yankee threat, and, finally call for the adoption of a monarchical government.¹³⁹

Gabriac believed the plan had merit; it would be a mortal blow for republicanism in general and, above all, particularly for republicanism in America. He observed that even though organization and secrecy were most necessary, in the final analysis all depended on the ability of the prince. If the prince were up to the task, all would be easy; if not, the era of revolutions would not end and Europe would gain no advantage with the change.¹⁴⁰

From time to time Gabriac served as intermediary for solicitation from the conservative party and interests which begged for French intervention. On each occasion Gabriac reminded them that in

139. Gabriac, Mexico, September 1, 1856, in Diaz, I, pp. 321-323.

140. Ibid. One of the more interesting projects in which Gabriac was involved is discussed in Chapter VI below.

his official capacity he could not receive their petitions. He insisted he ought not, or could not mix directly, or indirectly, in the internal affairs of Mexico. Of course, all such petitions and memorials were duly forwarded to his government. In October of 1856, a group of influential members of the clergy, army, landholders, and commercial establishment twice approached Gabriac and requested him to forward a message to his government on their behalf.¹⁴¹ In it they asked Napoleon III to consider the sad state of Mexico, and asked his intervention to end the anarchy which threatened to destroy their country. They insisted that the majority of the Mexican people wanted to ask for the protection and support of France and England:

For the establishment of a monarchical government with a prince chosen by all, whose government would be sustained by the two courts, . . . Mexico desires and openly, positively, will solicit a restoration of monarchy.¹⁴²

Furthermore, they declared, there were a thousand to fifteen hundred armed men ready to begin the revolt and overthrow the existing government.¹⁴³

141. Gabriac, Mexico, October 29, 1856, in Diaz, I, pp. 354-357.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

About a year later, a descendant of one of the richest families of the colonial period, the Marques de Rayas of Guanajuato, came to see Gabriac on a similar errand. He appeared "in the name of a great party and for his political friends," and made a flattering appeal to the Emperor of France:

As chief of the latin race in Europe. . . as arbiter of its destinies your sovereign cannot desire that this race perish in America, and with it catholicism, the principle of monarchy, and the equilibrium of the New World. We are not able to rely on England because of her oppressive and protestant politics, nor on Spain because of its continual decadence and debility. We wish to ask you to officially solicit the emperor's intervention to arrange our external affairs and establish a stable regime, in conformity with the traditions and customs of our unfortunate country. He is the only one who can save us.¹⁴⁴

A short while later Gabriac was visited by a former high official of the previous Santa Anna government. He too was sent by the conservatives to seek the support of France and England to save Mexico. This former official stated that the reaction against the government had gained momentum, that it depended upon a chief, a leader--not Santa Anna--but a general resolved to provoke a popular manifestation and seriously solicit the aid of western powers.¹⁴⁵

144. Gabriac, Mexico, September 17, 1857, in Diaz, I, pp. 432-433.

145. Ibid.

Gabriac also believed the conservative cause had gained momentum and that there was evident a pronounced change of public opinion, which he advised his government to take into consideration. He reported that even Comonfort (then President of Mexico) recognized the necessity for a monarchy, since in a conversation with Gabriac, Comonfort had let slip the remark: "unfortunately Iturbide, after having wanted to create an empire. . . didn't have all the qualities necessary to a monarchy and a lineage."¹⁴⁶ Gabriac also had received a letter from an importantly connected, well-to-do friend in New Orleans, which convinced him that this opinion in favor of monarchy had spread to the United States. The letter indicated that the idea of Napoleonic intervention in Mexico was well received in New Orleans, and that a growing body of public opinion in favor of a monarchy had developed due to the fears inspired by the internal situation of Mexico.¹⁴⁷

One of the more original and interesting observations on the local scene made by Gabriac during his years in Mexico concerned the influence of women in politics.

There exists in Mexico an influence, latent but skillful, which plays a large role in the internal politics of the country: the influence of the woman. I was not able to believe it, but was obliged to

146. Gabriac, Mexico, October 29, 1856, in Diaz, I, pp. 354-357.

147. Ibid.

submit before the evidence. The domestic relations are of an intimacy and intensity similar only to that of the Spanish. In the bosom of the family, the 'puro' yields before the constant sermons of the mother, wife, daughter or sister. This makes him sacrifice his convictions and social doctrine. But away from her he is changed into an atheist, a communist, into a man capable of selling his wife and daughter, or exchanging them as he would a burro, sheep or a chicken, the same as the 'pintos' do in the south of the republic. It is rare to find women who, having the misfortune to count one of these profound political thinkers in the family, does not constantly raise objections to them. This is one of the strongest reasons for the unpopularity of the 'puros.' The party represented by Haro had, on the contrary, the support of the fair sex and, consequently, that of the clergy. ¹⁴⁸

Besides his anti-democratic, anti-United States bias, De Gabriac had little love for the Mexicans, and less than admiration for the way the country was governed. They were not a people, he declared, "only conquerors and Indians." The wealthy of the country always had remained at the fringe of public affairs; there was no good faith or public opinion. ¹⁴⁹ "In Mexico the sky and the land are magnificent, but the men do not even resemble the species." ¹⁵⁰

It is revealing to note that when Gabriac returned to France, the same conservative interests which had approached him from time to time petitioned the French government that he be re-assigned to

148. Gabriac, Mexico, February 1, 1856, in Diaz, I, pp. 250-252.

149. Gabriac, December 29, 1858, in Diaz, II, pp. 51-52.

150. Gabriac, November 1, 1855, in Diaz, I, pp. 219-220.

Mexico.¹⁵¹ When the Miramón government fell and the liberal party and government of Juárez triumphed in 1860, Dubois de Saligny, the successor of Gabriac, was told by Melchor Ocampo that if Gabriac had remained as head of the French legation he would have been expelled from the country.¹⁵²

In the reports, dispatches, and letters of Spanish and French officials in Mexico during the first half of the nineteenth century, one can find certain abundant and persistently recurrent themes and ideas. These can be reinforced and substantiated from another source--where they were equally abundant and persistent--a series of accounts narrating the experiences of travellers in Mexico.

Even as today, travellers narratives were a popular and informative literary genre in the nineteenth century and at times went through several editions. Margarita M. Helguera of the University of Mexico

151. Petición en favor del Vizconde Alexis de Gabriac, México, May 9, 1860, in Diaz, II, pp. 157-158.

152. De Alphonse Dubois de Saligny, Mexico, January 28, 1861, in Diaz, II, p. 200. There were good and sufficient reasons for Mexico being reluctant to see Gabriac again. Francisco Bulnes mentions that Gabriac was not a man of means when first nominated for the Mexican post, and that his salary was \$16,000 per annum. He remained in Mexico five years, and, upon his return to France, carried with him \$150,000. Furthermore, he left real estate which still (1904) remained in the control of his family. Bulnes believes the money came from the clergy. Francisco Bulnes, El Verdadero Juárez y el verdad sobre la intervención y el imperio. (Paris, Mexico: Libreria de la Vda. de Ch. Bouret, 1904), pp. 35-37.

had delineated from a number of these works some interesting points which parallel those found in the reports of French and Spanish officials.¹⁵³ Although her study was limited to accounts of French travellers, undoubtedly the literature of travellers from other countries could provide similar material and like parallels could be found in the official correspondence of these countries.¹⁵⁴ The authors of these accounts were a heterogeneous group; novelists, men of letters, historians, an archaeologist, and a Catholic missionary. Three of those mentioned in Helguera's study had a direct connection with the French government: Michel Chevalier, who travelled in the United States and Mexico between 1833 and 1835 as an agent of the French government, and later became a senator and a state minister;¹⁵⁵ Desiré Charnay, an archaeologist sent by Napoleon III to Mexico to

153. Margarita M. Helguera, "Posibles antecedentes de la intervención Francesa." Historia Mexicana, XV, #1 (Julio-Septiembre, 1965), pp. 1-24.

154. One author who immediately comes to mind is Frances Calderón de la Barca, wife of the first Spanish Minister to Mexico. She wrote a series of letters which were later (1843) published under the title Life in Mexico. She described a Mexico which was an extension of the old vice-regal society and often alluded to the benefits conferred by Spain on her former colony. A more comprehensive listing of foreign travellers accounts may be found in a bibliography provided by C. Harvey Gardiner, "Foreign Traveler's accounts of Mexico, 1810-1910," Americas, VIII: 3 (January, 1952), pp. 321-351.

155. Helguera, op. cit., p. 7.

study ancient Mexican cultures; and finally, the abbe Emmanuel Domenech, who later became a sort of press and propaganda agent for Maximilian.¹⁵⁶ The last-named, an avowed apologist for monarchy, stated that "serious men who more or less know and the Mexicans are in agreement about the necessity to establish immediately in that country a constitutional monarchy."¹⁵⁷

Although these travellers visited Mexico at different times and differed in their own intellectual formation and outlook, a series of common themes run through their accounts:

- a. the inexhaustible riches of Mexico;
- b. the disastrous political situation of Mexico;
- c. the Mexicans and their defects;
- d. the great reforms and improvements which Europeans could introduce in Mexico;
- e. the very limited inconveniences it would be necessary to confront to accomplish said reforms;
- f. the declared suggestion or petition of a French intervention in Mexico, which would be good for everyone, French as well as Mexican.¹⁵⁸

Similar themes can be found in the correspondence of French and Spanish officials, and we may add the following to the above list:

156. Helguera, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

157. Emmanuel Domenech, L'Empire au Mexique, et la candidature d'un Prince Bonaparte au trone Mexicain (Paris: Libraire-Editeur, 1862).

158. Helguera, op. cit., p. 14.

1. a pronounced dislike of republican institutions and a conspiratorial theory of history regarding them;
2. a definite bias against the United States, as representative of republicanism in the New World;
3. a derogatory interpretation of Mexican history and society since the end of Spanish rule;
4. the necessity to stop the expansion of the United States;
5. the necessity to preserve the Latin race and culture, and the Catholic religion;
6. to accomplish the last two, and establish order in Mexico, the necessity of a monarchical form of government, the only one compatible with Mexican customs and traditions.

These subject themes provided a framework, an intellectual climate within which at least France and Spain viewed contemporary Mexico in particular, and the New World in general.¹⁵⁹ Within the context furnished by these motifs, statesmen formulated their policies and made their decisions. When the Jecker bond affair and the question of Mexico's external debt triggered a reaction in France, no doubt the councillors of Napoleon III recalled the comments made by French

159. As evidence that the British government may have had a different view, witness the following report: "The great error which as it appears to me, pervades the calculations of the Spanish Cabinet in respect to Spanish America, and especially Mexico, is that they obstinately persist in the conviction that because Mexico is at present in a state of anarchy, therefore Mexicans must be and are anxious to terminate such a state of things by returning to the Spanish dominion. Against this supposition, which all the information that I have been able to collect satisfies me is utterly erroneous." H. U. Addington to Earl of Aberdeen, Madrid, March 3, 1830, in Webster, Documents, II, pp. 475-476.

travellers as well as by her official representatives about Mexico, her people, and her government. As for intervention and monarchy, it should be remembered that within the nineteenth century context these were perfectly respectable solutions. The accounts of travellers and officials did no more than reinforce and justify already prevailing convictions.

JOSÉ MARÍA GUTIÉRREZ ESTRADA:

MONARCHIST PAMPHLETEER

The whole world is talking of a pamphlet written by Señor Gutiérrez Estrada, which has just appeared and seems likely to cause a greater sensation in Mexico than the discovery of the gunpowder plot in England.

Frances Calderón de la Barca

Thus did the wife of the first Spanish Minister to Mexico describe, in October, 1840, the reception given a letter written by José María Gutiérrez Estrada and published in pamphlet form together with an essay which amplified and clarified his position. The letter, addressed to President Anastasio Bustamante, carried the date August 25, 1840, whereas the pamphlet did not appear until October 18, 1840.¹

1. El Presidente de la República a sus conciudadanos. October 24, 1840. Copy used was found in Papeles Varios, 29:8, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley. See also La Hesperia, #62, October 28, 1840.

The title of the pamphlet is: Carta dirigida al Excmo. Sr. Presidente de la República, sobre la necesidad de buscar en una Convención el posible remedio de los males que aquejan a la República; y opiniones del autor acerca del mismo asunto. (México, Impreso por Ignacio Cumplido, 1840.) A modern edition may be found in José R. Colin, (Ed.), 1840-1850: Documentos de la Época, Vol. I: Colección de Documentos Político-Económicos (México: Editorial Rostra, 1948), pp. 49-114. The pamphlet will be cited hereafter as Gutiérrez Estrada, Carta.

The letter addressed itself to the necessity for a convention to seek a solution for Mexico's problems. The remedy advocated by Gutiérrez Estrada in the essay which amplified his position, and which caused such a sensation--was a constitutional monarchy.

José María Gutiérrez Estrada (1800-1867) was one of the leading political figures of his time. A member of a rich and illustrious Yucatecan family, he served in many governmental capacities. In 1833 he was Senator from Yucatan, and was Secretary of Foreign Affairs for a short time during 1835. He married Loreto Gómez de la Cortina, the daughter of a wealthy and well-known family from Mexico City and had two sons, Fernando and Loreto. After the death of his first wife, and while Mexican representative in Rome, he married the daughter of the Marquesses of Saint Laurent, whom he had known in Vienna. He later married a third time, to the Countess of Lützow.²

Madame Calderón de la Barca said of his action in publishing the pamphlet:

Even those who most question his prudence in taking this step, agree that in this, as well as in every other political action of his life, he has acted from thorough

2. José Manuel Hidalgo, Un Hombre de Mundo escribe sus impresiones, Cartas de José Manuel Hidalgo y Esnaurrizar, Minister en Paris del Emperador Maximiliano. Recopilación, prologo y notas de Sofia Vera de Bernal (México: Editorial Porrúa, 1960), p. 15 note. Cited hereafter as Hidalgo, Cartas. cf. also Diccionario Porrúa de Historia, Biografía y Geografía de México. (México: Editorial Porrúa, 1964), p. 666.

conviction and from motives of the purest patriotism, unalloyed by one personal feeling; indeed, entirely throwing behind him every consideration of family or personal interest, which even the best men allow to have some weight with them on such occasions.³

She went on to quote the so-called father of Mexican liberalism, José María Luis Mora, who had written of Gutiérrez that he "was one of the few who remained firm in his ideas, and above all, true to his political engagements."⁴ He had a thorough and brilliant education, spoke and wrote French and English, and in his public career had remained unsullied by corruption.

Flexible by nature, honorable by education, and expeditious in business, his services have been perfect and, above all, loyal and conscientious. Gutiérrez is a man of progress by conviction and principles, he belongs to the personnel of the scotch party and his political conscience is firm, certain and enlightened; for that reason, notwithstanding the gentleness of his temper, he does not yield in what he considers his obligation even when it interferes with the most intimate friendships or most weighty considerations.⁵

In 1840 he had just returned from four years abroad, during which time he had traveled extensively in America and South and Central Europe, "from one extreme to another of the entire political ladder, from the most annoying democracy. . . in the United States, to the

3. Fanny Calderón de la Barca, Life in Mexico, p. 341.

4. José María Luis Mora, Obras Suelos (México: Editorial Porrúa, 1963), p. 163.

5. Ibid.

despotism of Naples and the theocracy of Rome."⁶ His travels convinced him that "liberty can exist under any form of government, and that a monarchy can be just as free and happy, and much more free and happy than a republic."⁷ He noted with envy the progress, at least in a material sense, which a prolonged peace had brought to the countries he visited.⁸

When he returned in 1840 and attempted to land at Campeche, he was refused permission to debark by the rebels blockading the port. Finally after twenty-four hours, the intervention of the Spanish Consul enabled him to land, although he resented the fact that he, a Mexican citizen, required the aid of the representative of a foreign nation to get ashore in his own country.⁹

The revolt which had blocked his landing had begun in May of 1838. Santiago Iman, a captain of the state militia, had pronounced against centralism at Tizimin in Northeastern Yucatan. The rebels sought independence for Yucatan until such time as the federal system was restored.¹⁰

6. Gutiérrez Estrada to Bustamante, August 25, 1840 in Gutiérrez Estrada. Carta, p. 62.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 64.

9. Ibid., p. 63.

10. Nelson Reed, The Caste War of Yucatan (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 27-28.

Gutiérrez Estrada hardly had returned to Mexico City when the revolt, which had spread there, flared up on July 15, 1840 under the leadership of General José Urrea and Valentín Gómez Farías. Among other things, the federalists called for a return to the Constitution of 1824. They captured President Bustamante but later released him and had the city under a virtual state of siege for twelve days.¹¹ Madame Calderón de la Barca reported cannon planted all along the streets, and soldiers who fired indiscriminately on all passers-by.¹² During the fracas, on July 17th, Count José María Justo Gómez de la Cortina, the father-in-law of Gutiérrez Estrada, was slightly wounded and had to be carried to his country home in Tacubaya.¹³ Finally, on July 26, the federalist forces capitulated, and were granted complete amnesty by Bustamante--an action of which Gutiérrez was highly critical.¹⁴ Perhaps this bloody uprising, to which he was an eyewitness, and in which a member of his family was injured, prompted him to write his letter to Bustamante and eventually publish the pamphlet.¹⁵

11. Bancroft, Mexico, pp. 220-222.

12. Fanny Calderón de la Barca, Life in Mexico, p. 298.

13. Ibid.

14. Gutiérrez Estrada, Carta, p. 64.

15. Zamacois, XII, pp. 210-211.

Prior to the pronouncement of July 15, the possibility that it would occur, coupled with what seemed to Gutiérrez an utterly hopeless situation because of the various factions which contended for power, brought him to write to his old friend José María Luis Mora. Gutiérrez told Mora that whatever the outcome of the crisis, whether the federal system or a purely military one were proclaimed, "my opinion is that we will go from bad to worse each day."¹⁶ As far as Gutiérrez was concerned, Mexico was virtually in a state of anarchy.

The letter Gutiérrez had written to President Bustamante in August made no mention of monarchy. It simply proposed a convention be called to consider possible remedies for the troubles which afflicted Mexico.¹⁷ He observed that neither the Constitution of 1824 nor that of

16. Gutiérrez Estrada to Mora, July 4, 1840, in Genaro García, Documentos inéditos o muy raros para la historia de México (México: Librería de la Vda de Ch. Bouret, 1905-1911), VI, pp. 31-34. (Cited hereafter as García, Documentos)

17. Many writers have made the mistake of stating that Gutiérrez Estrada's letter to President Bustamante called for a monarchy. It did not, and perhaps this is why Bustamante saw nothing unusual in it. Only when it was published as if it were a preface to Gutiérrez's essay, which did advocate a monarchy, did trouble begin. In his proclamation to the people, Bustamante mentioned that the inclusion of the letter had been done without his permission. Even a most recent author, when dealing with this period in his introductory remarks, stated: "He published an open letter to President Bustamante, urging Mexicans to return to monarchy." Carl H. Bock, Prelude to Tragedy (Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), pp. 25-26.

In fact, Gutiérrez wrote a second letter to Bustamante on September 28, 1840, which re-iterated statements in his letter of August 25 and wished Bustamante peace and prosperity. Both were included when the pamphlet was published. Cf. Life in Mexico, p. 743, note 7.

1836 had fulfilled its mission and satisfied the majority of the people, for on July 15, 1840, an attempt was made to overthrow the government and bring back the Constitution of 1824. This Constitution, so he said, had been tried before--for twelve years--and had not satisfied a significant portion of the population and consequently was replaced by the central system under the Constitution of 1836. To attribute Mexico's misfortunes exclusively to this last code, and look for the complete and immediate remedy to these problems under a return to the Constitution of 1824, obviously was the height of foolishness. Such an alteration in power, with its consequent revolutions, could be interminable. Quite clearly then, as neither of these two great codes could exist without great inconvenience and disadvantage, it was necessary to "repair the social machine," although it had to be remembered that a constitution was only a dead document if there were no men capable of implementing its provisions.¹⁸

No better way could be found to "repair the social machine" than to call an ad hoc constitutional convention which would take from each code whatever was useful and adaptable, fill in the gaps, and thus present to the country an arrangement suited to its peculiar circumstances. Perhaps in this way it might succeed in conciliating the common

18. Gutiérrez Estrada to Bustamante, August 25, 1840, in Gutiérrez Estrada, Carta, pp. 52, 57.

interest and the public opinion with order and stability and "renew the life which seems to be extinguished in the government and society of the nation."¹⁹

Whereas the letter made no mention of monarchy, the situation is entirely different in the body of comments and opinions which follow the letter in the pamphlet. To bring order and stability to Mexico, Gutiérrez had proposed the convention in his letter to Bustamante. In his essay he held that this convention, when seeking a way to alleviate conditions in Mexico, should not limit itself to such political combinations as had already been in effect. Since independence, Mexico had been governed by a central government under a supreme executive authority, a Mexican emperor, a federal republic, and a central republic. "In short," observed Gutiérrez, "we have experimented with all the ways a republic can exist: democratic, oligarchic, military, demagogic, and anarchic."²⁰ It followed, therefore, that if the adherents to republicanism had not been able to make a reality of it after so many years, that system was not suited to the needs of Mexico.²¹

For this reason no restrictions were to be placed on the convention. It had to consider, in all its phases and ramifications, the

19. Ibid., p. 57.

20. Ibid., p. 68.

21. Ibid., p. 70.

form of government most fitted to Mexico's situation. There was absolutely no reason why, in its deliberations, the convention should not impartially consider whether the monarchical form of government, with a king or royal lineage, might not be more suited to the character, customs, and traditions of a people, who since their foundation had been governed monarchically.²²

Gutiérrez affirmed that no one would proclaim more cordially than he the advantages of a republic--in a country where it could be established. "Nor will anyone more sincerely lament that, for the present, Mexico could not be that privileged country."²³ For him, Mexico's sad experiences with a republic seemed to authorize a trial of a true monarchy in the person of a foreign prince. He insisted the prince be foreign after the "sad spectacle the nation presented, when a Mexican, illustrious for his military deeds and nothing more, governed it in the style of an emperor."²⁴ Mexico simply lacked the great men such a position required.²⁵

This was one of the key points in the thinking of Gutiérrez. Months before, in a letter to José María Luis Mora, he had stressed

22. Ibid., p. 72.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

this notion. "The advantages of a system of government serve as nothing if there are no men to make them effective; that there are no men in either party who are capable of toning up this unruly machine, is a truth as clear as the light of day."²⁶

Gutiérrez averred that a form of government in itself was neither good nor bad--all forms presented difficulties. It was more important that it be suited to the people it was to govern. This was another key idea to which he constantly referred. Nowhere did there exist, he declared, the same customs, requirements, enlightenment, morality and all that which contributed to the determination of the class of government best adapted to a nation's needs. Not to take this into consideration was to commit the classical error. This was, as it were, the root cause of the nation's problems and difficulties. To what other cause could the picture of desolation and anarchy presented by the Spanish American republics be attributed?²⁷

Since Mexico was divided into two competing parties of almost equal strength, there would always be a constant competition for power. This was another reason to consider the creation of a monarchy: "A power capable of dissolving the competition between the two parties,

26. Gutiérrez Estrada to Mora, July 4, 1840, Genaro García, Documentos, Vol. VI, pp. 31-34.

27. Gutiérrez Estrada, Carta, p. 73.

forming from them a single truly national party."²⁸ Gutiérrez turned to the example of France and quoted Chateaubriand: "The representative republic perhaps will be the future state of the world, but its time has not yet arrived."²⁹

If the time for a republic had not yet arrived for a cultured, civilized France--a country well organized in all branches of administration, gifted with a national spirit and great statesmen--it was presumptuous to think it had arrived for Mexico.³⁰ Gutiérrez declared that this was because France had always been governed by a monarchy. This was exactly his point--so had Mexico. True, it had not had a king, but his representatives, the legislation, institutions, and customs were all monarchical. Mexico was not less monarchical in tradition because a king had not been present; moreover, a constitution could not change the habits of the people and transform them into something other than what they were.³¹ It was his conviction that the day was not long off when other nations "tired of the scandal we present and of our inability to remedy it, . . . might take charge of

28. Ibid., p. 76

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 77.

correcting it themselves, by intervening in our affairs."³² In the event Mexico did decide to accept a monarchy, at least the sovereign would be one of her own choice and not that of some foreign power.³³

Another important reason offered by Gutiérrez for choosing a monarchical form of government was that it would save Mexico from the imminent threats of the Anglo-Saxon race.³⁴ If something were not done to provide a stable basis for the country, it would not be able to resist the incursions of the United States and "perhaps not twenty years will pass before we see the flag of North-American stars wave in the National Palace; and before we see a protestant service celebrated in the magnificent Cathedral of Mexico."³⁵

These were the ideas which formed the essence of Gutiérrez Estrada's controversial pamphlet. Mexico was in a state of anarchy; if this was not the immediate result of republican principles, at least they had not alleviated the condition. An assembly should be convoked to examine the means to bring order and stability. Since various republican governmental combinations had been tried and found wanting, it behooved this assembly to consider the creation of a monarchy as

32. Ibid., p. 82.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 83.

35. Ibid., p. 85.

more in keeping with the traditions of Mexico than a republic. Since Mexico lacked the men of distinction for such a position, this monarchy should be headed by a prince of a foreign royal family. A monarchy would provide a balance of power against the threat to race and religion by the ambitious United States. In one form or another, these ideas are found in every argument which favored a monarchy for Mexico. When Gutiérrez fled to Europe and into exile he never ceased to propagate these concepts whenever and wherever he could, and never wavered in his sincere belief that the only salvation for Mexico lay in a monarchy headed by a European prince.

The pamphlet may not have impressed the whole world--à la Madame Calderón de la Barca--or even incited the indignation of the entire country as Justo Sierra would have it,³⁶ but it did cause no end of consternation in official circles and the liberal camp. It also forced Gutiérrez to leave the country and brought about the imprisonment of his publisher.

The first official reaction came from the Congress. On October 20, 1840, Senator Garza Flores proposed that the Minister of the Interior be called upon to report on what action the government contemplated with respect to the pamphlet and its author and suggested the

36. Justo Sierra, Evolución Política de Pueblo Mexicano (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1948), p. 222.

Senate remain in session until the Minister made such a report.³⁷

When General Gabriel Valencia, Army Chief of Staff, protested the publication of the pamphlet, Juan N. Almonte--then Minister of War and later an active monarchist himself--responded in the name of the government and assured Valencia that Mexico would never be ruled by any king, especially a foreign one.³⁸

President Bustamante's first official reaction was to address a proclamation to the army on October 23, 1840, wherein he branded the pamphlet as "a subversive and seditious publication of the first degree." He declared such publications fomented civil war and asked the army to unite against those who sought to deprive the country of its liberty and independence.³⁹ It is interesting to note that Bustamante's first concern was for the army. His centralist government, which had been in office for almost four years, was beginning to totter and the support of the army was vital.

On October 24, 1840, Bustamante made another proclamation--this directed to the people. He stated that the use of the letter of August 25, 1840, as introduction in the pamphlet, was done without his

37. La Hesperia, #62, October 28, 1840.

38. Delgado, "España y el monarquismo," p. 71.

39. Anastasio Bustamante, October 23, 1840, in Papeles Varios, 29:8 Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California. Cited hereafter as BAN.

knowledge, and thereby had placed in doubt his good faith, and his adherence to republican principles. He reiterated his faith in republicanism and warned that a change would foment discord and threaten independence.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, the Minister of the Interior had reported to both houses of congress that the government had taken action against Gutiérrez Estrada because the pamphlet seemed subversive, directly opposed to the constitution, protected the designs of any foreign invader, and was conducive to disobedience to government authority by its detractions of present institutions.⁴¹

The publisher, Ignacio Cumplido, was arrested and imprisoned in the Acordada for thirty-three days. In his defense, Cumplido declared that, even though the contents of the pamphlet were not to his liking, he had published it because freedom of the press was involved. He insisted that rather than be condemned, he should be honored for upholding this law, and claimed he was completely impartial in the

40. El Presidente de la República, A Sus Conciudadanos, October 24, 1840, in Papeles Varios, 29:8, BAN.

41. Invitación que hace el impresor C. Ignacio Cumplido al Juez de letras de lo Criminal Licenciado D. J. Gabriel Gómez de la Pena, . . . como impresor del folleto que escribió D. J. M. Gutiérrez Estrada (México: Impreso por el autor, 1841), LAF-BNM, #38; Also BAN, Papeles Varios, #29:4.

exercise of his profession.⁴²

The defense petition asserted that freedom of the press was threatened and that a publisher could not be expected to be responsible for the content of whatever he published.⁴³ The fiscal pointed out that, although it might be presumed the pamphlet was a well-constructed attempt to accomplish secret plans against the independence of Mexico, this had never been proven.⁴⁴ He declared it his opinion that the proceeding against Cumplido be dropped and that he be released. On November 25, 1840, the order of October 31, 1840, which had imprisoned Cumplido, was revoked.⁴⁵

In the course of his defense, Cumplido made a profession of his political faith, which, as Jaime Delgado observed,⁴⁶ perhaps represented an entire sector of the Mexican thought of the period.

I am a republican by conviction and by a tolerant spirit; were I less sincere, I would not have admitted the manuscript of Señor Gutiérrez in my publishing house. Printing it contributed, without breaking the laws, to the liberty I wish for all,

42. Manifestación al público del impresor ciudadano Ignacio Cumplido, con motivo de su prisión, verificada el 21 de Octubre (México: Imprenta de Cumplido, 1840), p. 7. LAF-BNM, #352.

43. Invitación que hace. . . . , p. 28.

44. Ibid., p. 30.

45. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

46. Delgado, "España y el monarquismo Mexicano en 1840," p. 74.

even those who do not think as I; and in my position as publisher, by my own opinions I did not void the liberty which the same laws concede for the public interest. I could not fear any evil against the country by the publication of a paper whose isolated concepts were going to be dispersed and lost in the vast atmosphere of the republicanism of the Mexicans, profoundly rooted in their hearts.⁴⁷

He also declared the idea of monarchy would not be defeated by the hand of authority, but by "the evidence of the error of seeking health in everlasting chains."⁴⁸

One protest against Gutiérrez Estrada's pamphlet was written by José María Tornel and was printed in Cosmopolita, October 31, 1840. In it, Tornel made some derogatory comments relative to Spaniards in general and Hernan Cortés in particular. His historical interpretation of the period of Spanish domination charged Spain with the destruction of the indigenous peoples, accused her of a lack of social conscience, and insisted Spanish administration had been based on ignorance and fear.⁴⁹ A by-product of this attack by Tornel was the pertinent and interesting counter interpretation on the part of "various Spaniards" in the pages of La Hesperia. This was a bi-weekly

47. Ibid., Quoting Manifestación al público . . . , p. 15.

48. Ibid.

49. Cosmopolita, October 31, 1840.

newspaper published by and for the Spanish residents of Mexico, and backed by the Spanish Minister Angel Calderón de la Barca. It said of Tornel's remarks, "Anyone would figure upon hearing such accusations that this had been a nation of hottentots until the time of the revolution, before which there was never seen in it examples of virtue, moderation or wisdom."⁵⁰

On the contrary, insisted its editors, the period of Spanish control had been comparatively happy, abundant in resources, material prosperity, and civic and religious virtue. Certainly the magnificent churches, beautiful cities, sumptuous palaces, the many colleges and hospitals were a testament to the fecundity of that society. "We see the seal of the genius and activities of our fathers impressed in the public works and private undertakings which yet are left to us."⁵¹

Tornel's disparaging remarks about Cortés and his captains--the "slag of human species"--found a particularly sensitive spot in the armor of Spanish pride. "Cortés and his illustrious captains are the dross we esteem more than the most refined gold. . . Tornel could offer us in exchange."⁵² Cortés was admired, declared the editors,

50. La Hesperia, November 21, 1840.

51. Ibid.

52. La Hesperia, November 21, 1840.

as a genius, a conquistador without rival, a great discoverer, virtuous patriot, great christian, and great administrator; "in short, the man, who in a situation unique in history, displayed a resourcefulness also unique in the annals of the world." ⁵³

The example of Bartolomé de las Casas was used by the editors to give the lie to Tornel's charge of a lack of social conscience and enlightenment. Here was a man whose entire life was "consecrated to the triumph of one idea, the freedom of the Indians, in whose behalf he had crossed the ocean seven times." ⁵⁴

This facet of their historical interpretation--still very much alive today--involved Spain's Indian policy. The editors of La Hesperia conceded atrocities were committed; that the Indians had suffered--yet it was quite evident that in what Tornel had described as an age of progress and civilization, compared with the time of Spanish domination--the Indians were still persecuted. They pointedly compared Spanish Indian policy with that of the United States, the republican

53. Ibid. In distinguishing between liberals and conservatives from their respective critiques of Mexico's Spanish heritage, one must be cautious. These traditions were important to both: the differences between them with respect to this heritage was often one of degree. Cf. Charles A. Hale "José María Luis Mora and the Structure of Mexican Liberalism," HAHR, XLV, (May, 1965), p. 211.

54. Ibid.

stronghold in America. "We know the consequences of the extermination policy of the English race in the United States and Canada, before which the native race disappeared as if by magic."⁵⁵ Although this comparison was not made to justify Spanish conduct, yet it was certain the Indians at least were a part of Mexican society. "We have not been able to stop their decadence, but we have given them the protection of our laws, and we have let them share in the benefits of our civilization."⁵⁶ The missionaries had united the Indians in communities, given them paternal rule, instructed them in the civilized arts, and defended them. Why then, asked the editors, speak of the evils and hide the good? "Because it is necessary at all costs to serve the interests of the moment."⁵⁷

There was a significant difference in both attitudes toward the Indian, and in this case it would seem the editors of La Hesperia had the better of the argument. The liberals of the first half of the nineteenth century were apathetic with regard to the Indians. Although the Indians made up the majority of the population, the liberals did not

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

consider that they represented the core of Mexican nationality.⁵⁸ José María Luis Mora denied any belief in racial superiority, yet held the Indian to be inferior and had little hope of improving his status.⁵⁹ Guillermo Prieto had written, "it is not in it (the Indian race) that nationality resides today."⁶⁰ Among the liberals there were even advocates of extermination or forced removal. The liberals wanted liberty and legal equality, and were opposed to legislation which might favor a particular group--even the Indian community. On the other hand, the conservatives insisted on the tradition of certain fueros, or privileges, and were supported by a strong religious institution and a belief in a paternalistic government which could provide justice against exploitation. Neither one had any real concern for the freedom and progress of the Indian.⁶¹

Gutiérrez Estrada, in order to support his favorite project of a monarchy for Mexico, had castigated the institutions and times in which he lived. To defend republicanism, Tornel followed the standard liberal theme of progress versus reaction and had resorted to the expedient of

58. Charles Hale, "José María Luis Mora and the Structure of Mexican Liberalism," HAHR, XLV (May, 1965), p. 213.

59. Ibid., p. 214.

60. Ibid., quoted on p. 214.

61. Ibid., p. 218.

condemning Mexico's Spanish heritage. "Both conducts seem intolerant," observed La Hesperia.⁶²

However, the editors of La Hesperia had themselves disparaged the accomplishments of another age and people, with the observation that the monumental remains of past civilizations found in Mexico "were not and could not be the work of the people met here by Hernan Cortés."⁶³ They insisted these were clearly Egyptian in origin, for neither Montezuma nor his subjects could have built them. Thus they were involved in a version of the expedient used by Tornel. Presumably the Egyptians were removed far enough in time to be respectable.

The polemic continued in like vein for some time. In November, 1840, Tornel wrote to Calderón de la Barca and complained of insults leveled at him personally. He stated that he had nothing against the Spanish Minister, and had always been on good terms with him, but he had found out that the author of the article--a Señor Cobos--was attached to the Spanish Legation, and declared he would make the conduct of Cobos known in Madrid.⁶⁴ Calderón replied that he regreted what

62. La Hesperia, November 21, 1840.

63. La Hesperia, December 16, 1840.

64. José María Tornel to Angel Calderón de la Barca, November 23, 1840. Enclosed in report of Calderón de la Barca to First Secretary, November 24, 1840, RDHM, I, pp. 169-171.

Tornel had told him happened because "these irritating polemics never have an end and are an inexhaustible source of disgust."⁶⁵ Nevertheless, he disclaimed any knowledge of the identity of the author of the offensive article. When La Hesperia had begun publication, he had proposed to have nothing to do with its editorial policy, or permit any of his staff to write publicly on political matters. He denied that Cobos was attached to the Legation, but admitted he was a family friend and had performed some clerical work for him.⁶⁶

Calderón was convinced nothing could be gained by the continuation of the polemic, as it served only to open old wounds--especially as his instructions had cautioned him to be discreet.⁶⁷ Calderón received commendation for his prudent conduct, but was told it would be expedient, in consideration of the agitation aroused by the Gutiérrez Estrada pamphlet, not to call attention to La Hesperia as an echo of the Spanish Legation.⁶⁸

65. Calderón de la Barca to José María Tornel, Mexico, November 23, 1840. Enclosed in report of Calderón de la Barca to First Secretary, Mexico, November 24, 1840. RDHM, I, pp. 169-171.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Real Orden al Ministro Español, Angel Calderón de la Barca, Madrid, 20 de Febrero de 1841. RDHM, I, p. 171.

It is of interest to note that Calderón had enclosed a copy of the pamphlet in his dispatch of October 17, 1840--the day prior to the apparent official publication release. It is quite possible he had obtained a copy beforehand, since he and his wife were on intimate terms with Countess Cortina, whose daughter was the wife of Gutiérrez Estrada.⁶⁹ It is also possible that Count Cortina, who headed the aristocratic group in favor of a monarchy,⁷⁰ had influenced the thinking of Gutiérrez along similar lines.

When the Spanish Minister forwarded the pamphlet to his government, he noted that although many agreed with the proposal it made, they thought Gutiérrez Estrada's action inopportune.⁷¹ He also reported that there existed a division of thought among those who favored a monarchy; some would consider any foreign prince, others insisted he be Spanish. "Neither of these opinions are pleasing to the generals who only are waiting for the moment to take possession of the dictatorship."⁷² In any case, the greatest difficulty was that no one would propose that a foreign prince be called because the United States and the Texans, as

69. Frances Calderón de la Barca, Life in Mexico, pp. 208, 521.

70. Deffaudis to Thiers, CDFM, I, p. 143. José María Justo Gómez de la Cortina (1794-1860) had been Treasury Minister at one time.

71. Calderón de la Barca to First Secretary, October 17, 1840, RDHM, I, pp. 164-165.

72. Ibid.

well as some foreigners who feared the loss of their commercial monopoly, would be opposed to such a course of action. Calderón declared:

To my way of thinking this plan cannot be accomplished without the European powers agreeing to the effect that they want to put an end, in the interests of humanity and their common advantage, to the disasters and disorders of Spanish America.⁷³

The pamphlet, he continued, had produced two contrary effects; on the one hand, it had given new energy to the parties, and renewed monarchist faith in those who wanted and would adopt a monarchy "if they were able to discover some means of obtaining one without sacrifice or effort on their part."⁷⁴ On the other hand, it had given Santa Anna and the generals a pretext to destroy the existing government with the intimation that the country was in danger from a monarchist coup. Again Calderón repeated his conviction that there were many who would welcome a monarch, and that the Mexicans would reach an agreement to call one. He observed prophetically that "a pact among the principal powers of Europe and their association to that end, will make possible the plan of Gutiérrez Estrada."⁷⁵

73. Ibid.

74. Calderón to First Secretary, November 16, 1840, RDHM, I, pp. 167-168.

75. Ibid.

Some of the Spanish colony had pressured Calderón to complain, and oppose some "furious and insulting" articles which had appeared in El Sonorense and La Opinion Publica. He resisted, and observed that it was of little value to complain in a country where there was freedom of the press. Furthermore, any interference on his part would compromise future results of his mission.⁷⁶

Calderón was caught between the attempt to maintain and expand friendly relations with Mexico, and the impassioned demands of his fellow countrymen to save their honor and salve their pride. The fruitless polemic had caused the Spanish minister a good deal of trouble. It had served as a pretext for the opposition to reanimate old grudges and jealousies. Calderón declared that the federalist opposition would use any means to make the Spaniards hated; certain their actions would find favor with those who envied Spanish prosperity and industry. Yet he was too good a Spaniard to ask the young Spanish patriots to permit Spain to be insulted without making some effort to defend it. However, in compliance with his instructions, he did try to restrain their ardor.⁷⁷

The Spanish government had indicated the attitude Calderón was to assume with respect to the uproar occasioned by Gutiérrez Estrada's

76. Calderón to First Secretary, Mexico, December 10, 1840, RDHM, I, p. 178.

77. Calderón to First Secretary, February 24, 1841, RDHM, I, pp. 183-184.

pamphlet. While he was not to overlook any opportunity to gain advantages for Spanish nationals, he was to inculcate in them a spirit of tolerance and caution "because the situation of the Spaniards who today are going to establish themselves in Mexico is quite different from that which they enjoyed when they were masters of the country."⁷⁸

In addition to newspaper editorials, a number of pamphlets opposed to the position Gutiérrez Estrada had taken also appeared. One, written by Antonio del Raso, was published in Querétaro on November 16, 1840. Del Raso took particular exception to the contention that little progress was made under the republican regimes, and resorted to a long point by point refutation. The author pointed out that population had increased during the nineteen years of independence, as had agriculture, commerce, and mining. Also, eight new colleges had been opened and industries had expanded. "This progress known to all Mexicans and admired by foreigners contradicts the indiscreet assertions of Gutiérrez Estrada."⁷⁹ A federalist supporter, Raso asserted that the geographic makeup of Mexico, the difficulty of communication, the diversity of produce and climates, the great separation of provinces,

78. Real Orden de J. M. de Ferrer al Ministro de España, Angel Calderón de la Barca, Madrid, 19 de febrero de 1841. RDHM, I, pp. 168-69.

79. Antonio Del Raso, Refutación del proyecto-monarquico-extrangero de don José María Gutiérrez Estrada (México: Impr. de Galvan a cargo de M. Arevalo, 1840), p. 15, in Papeles Varios, 29:3, BAN.

were contrary to the unitary, centralized government of a monarchy.⁸⁰ Furthermore, monarchy, whatever its advantages, was always a threat to liberty and to the rights of man. An hereditary monarchy did not have the right or authority to oblige future generations to the same form of government. In support of his argument Raso quoted the Bible, chapter and verse, Judges 8:22-25; Kings 8:9-18, and made a ringing appeal:

Mexicans!!! Heed the divine oracle and tremble. These are not the predictions and conjectures of our politicians, they are the infallible prognostications of the eternal truth which weighed on the people of Israel, and which would burden Mexico were she to follow the opinion of Gutiérrez Estrada.⁸¹

Another tract in opposition to Gutiérrez Estrada, and one whose reasoning was more dispassionate, scored some telling points against his arguments. The author revealed some inconsistencies in the demonstrations Gutiérrez made to show that it was necessary to secure a king from abroad. Gutiérrez had insisted that Mexico did not have men sufficiently knowledgeable to govern the country, or suited to such a role. Were this the case, declared the pamphlet, not only the king, but all his ministers and all the imperial dignitaries would have to be

80. Ibid., p. 5.

81. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

foreign.⁸² In this event, the expenses involved would be far greater than any ever incurred during federal and central republican administrations. If the nation were in such dire financial straits what would be the situation under a monarchy?⁸³ Moreover, observed the author, Gutiérrez refuted his own arguments and contradicted himself when he proposed a convention be called to choose the form of government.

This was a public confession that there were Mexicans capable of forming a convention, and quite able to choose the form of government the nation should adopt. It was an admission that Mexicans were capable of forming a constitution, a contract between themselves and a sovereign, but that under the basis and principles they established--a foreign monarchy was required to govern them. This, asserted the author, was equivalent to saying there were competent and learned men in Mexico who were able to organize a government, but--in order that it be good--this government must be monarchical. "Then the Mexicans are skillful, but if it is a democracy, we are fools: we should like Sr. Gutiérrez Estrada to tell us if the sceptre and diadem produce infused knowledge."⁸⁴

82. J. M. de A. Impugnación a las cartas de D. J. M. Gutiérrez Estrada sobre El Proyecto de establecer en Méjico una monarquía moderada (Méjico: Impreso por Juan Ojeda, 1840), p. 11.

83. Ibid., p. 29.

84. Ibid., p. 33.

Not everyone was opposed to Gutiérrez; many approved of what he had suggested. Shortly after he had published his pamphlet, he received a number of commendations for his action. Baron Alley de Cyprey, the French Minister to Mexico, wrote to him on October 28, 1840, and asserted that those who had censured him would come to praise him, "Their cries of rage confirm your observations and hasten the triumph of your opinions. . . . The remedy you propose is the only one which can save the state."⁸⁵ Moreover, there was no reason for the persecution to which he was subjected. He had not provoked civil war, nor invoked force to overthrow the government. Cyprey advised him not to be concerned as his detractors would not prevail--their efforts were in vain: "Providence who watches over the destinies of nations and who has inspired in you the publication of this manuscript . . . will make your maxims prevail."⁸⁶ Sir Richard Pakenham, the British Minister to Mexico, wrote, on December 11, 1841: "I could tell you nothing of the strange things happening here (Mexico), unless

85. José María Gutiérrez Estrada, México y el Archiduque, Fernando Maximiliano de Austria (México: Imprenta de Andrade y Escalante, 1863), pp. 10-11. Copy used here is from the excellent Mexicana Collection of pamphlets at the Sutro Branch of the California State Library at San Francisco. (Hereafter referred to as SUTRO Collection).

86. Ibid.

it is that everything confirms the exactness of the judgments and opinions you expressed in your recent booklet."⁸⁷

The Diario de los Debates of September 12, 1842, carried an exposition by a member of the French Senate before that body which praised the position of Gutiérrez Estrada, "It is more than a simple manuscript, it is an event."⁸⁸ The article recommended that Europe follow the advice of Gutiérrez and intervene, before the United States, which had already taken possession of Texas, extended its dominion over all the Mexican provinces.⁸⁹

During his lifetime Gutiérrez Estrada wrote many more pamphlets which were more or less amplifications and variations on his original theme. In 1847 he published a pamphlet in Paris under the editorship of Dr. Francisco Xavier Miranda, another Mexican exile who strongly favored a monarchy. Entitled Mexico and Europe, it had been written in 1846 as a memorial addressed to the British Government and to King Louis Philippe.⁹⁰ Gutiérrez declared that King Louis had taken the memorial under serious consideration, but that the affair of

87. Ibid., p. 11.

88. Ibid., p. 12.

89. Ibid.

90. J. M. Gutiérrez de Estrada, México y Europa (Paris: Imprenta Appert, 1847). SUTRO Collection.

the Spanish marriages "came inopportunately to frustrate for that king my most legitimate hopes."⁹¹ In the memorial Gutiérrez observed that when General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga replaced President José Joaquín de Herrera in January 1846, Paredes published a proclamation which, although it left to a constituent assembly the power to determine the form of government the country was to have, clearly indicated that only a monarchy could free Mexico from anarchy. From that time on, averred Gutiérrez, not only did Mexico have a duty to fulfill, but there was born in Europe both the duty and the necessity of helping Mexico.⁹²

The memorial pointed to the dangers from the United States, "whose invader spirit knows no bounds," and which already had issued decrees excluding Europe. This last was not only a danger for Mexico, but also for Europe. It was in Europe's interest to protect a market which each year contributed from twenty to twenty-five million pesos to the European economy.⁹³ If Mexico did not remain independent, if she did not achieve a stable government to end the incessant revolutions

91. J. M. Gutiérrez Estrada, Paris, May 30, 1862. Introduction to J. M. Gutiérrez Estrada, México y Europa, SUTRO Collection. Extracts of the original were republished in 1862.

92. Ibid., p. 34.

93. Ibid., p. 35.

which plagued her, and if, because of the chaotic conditions, the mines stopped production or fell into the hands of the United States, Europe would experience another great loss.⁹⁴

Gutiérrez asserted that if a conference were proposed by England and France to fix a common policy with regard to Mexico, other nations, whose subjects had interests there, would readily agree to it since neither conquest nor usurpation to the benefit of any one country would be involved. Nor would Mexico lose her independence; on the contrary, the conference would guarantee it by the introduction of stable institutions. This, of course, was dependent on the form of government suited to Mexico--which only could be a monarchy. That this was so, Gutiérrez claimed he could easily demonstrate to such a conference. Moreover, in the light of the easy American victories, no great effort was required on the part of Europe to accomplish this end. Europe had a very strong motive to save Mexico from anarchy and guarantee her a stable social order--her own self-interest.⁹⁵ Thus, Gutiérrez offered added inducements to his appeal for a balance of power against the United States. If social institutions were consolidated by means of a monarchy, mercantile relations between Europe

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

and Mexico would also be strengthened, and the interest of Europe would be protected.

In a pamphlet he had written in Rome in January 1848 entitled México en 1840 y en 1847, Gutiérrez stated that only Europe could provide "for us and for all the former Spanish Colonies, the necessary equilibrium and counterweight to the growing and oppressive preponderance of the North Americans."⁹⁶ Written after the American invasion and occupation, the pamphlet contained a bitter indictment of republican institutions, which were blamed for all that had occurred. They had been adopted with "thoughtless enthusiasm." What was the result of this error? "We have lost a great part of our territory, the North American flag is in the National Palace, in our Capitol; and we are perhaps on the eve of being erased, with contempt, from the catalogue of free peoples."⁹⁷

In November, 1861, Gutiérrez wrote another pamphlet, México y El Archiduque Fernando Maximiliano de Austria, which was sent to Mexico for distribution, but whose publication was delayed until 1863 due to "unforeseen circumstances." In essence it was a plea addressed to the Mexicans on behalf of the candidacy of Maximilian for the throne.

96. José María Gutiérrez Estrada, México en 1840 y en 1847, (Paris: Imprenta de LaCrampe Hijo, 1848), pp. 17-18. BAN, Papeles Varios, 29:18.

97. Ibid.

It incorporated sections of his 1840 pamphlet as well as some correspondence in approval of the stand he had taken at that time.⁹⁸

He observed that many of the prognostications he had made in 1840, and for which he had been called a visionary and traitor, had come to pass. In 1840 he had written that perhaps in less than twenty years the North-American flag would fly over the National Palace. In 1847, he pointed out, this prediction not only had come true, but the American Commanding General, Winfield Scott, had even used similar expressions in a proclamation when he stated: "The valor of our arms protected by God, after many glorious battles, has made the flag of our country wave in the capital of Mexico and in its National Palace."⁹⁹

To give evidence of the unfortunate conditions which prevailed in Mexico, Gutiérrez quoted various sources, among them President Buchanan who in his message to Congress in 1858, had said, "Mexico has lived in a constant state of revolution, almost from the moment in which it won its independence." In order to show that he was not alone in these views, he pointed to the London Conference of October 31, 1861, wherein the three most powerful and civilized nations of the

98. Gutiérrez Estrada, México y El Archiduque, see note 85 above.

99. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

world, Spain, England, and France had manifested to the world the "true state of affairs in Mexico."¹⁰⁰

The time was right, European support was at hand, the United States was occupied with internal problems, and the principle of monarchy was accepted by all, observed Gutiérrez. The only question that remained was the candidate--without hesitation he recommended the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria.¹⁰¹

In a manner of speaking, this was but the logical and natural complement of what he had proposed in 1840. His ambitions and hopes had come full circle--for in 1821 he had been a member of the delegation which had offered the crown to another Hapsburg--Archduke Charles of Austria.

100. Ibid., p. 15.

101. Ibid., p. 18.

POLEMIC IN THE PRESS AND FURTHER INTRIGUE: 1845-1850

There is in America a colossus whose invasions
it is necessary to stop in time. . .

Gutiérrez Estrada

The pronunciamiento of Ciudadela made evident
the importance of the appeals of the monarchy:
actors of that badly rehearsed drama appeared
as punchinellos surprised outside the salon where
the carnival was celebrated.

G. Prieto

Between 1840 and 1850, the presidency of Mexico was occupied, either by substitute, provisional, or interim executives, some nineteen-times--five times by Santa Anna. The former province of Texas had become part of the United States, and Mexico had been involved in a war which had resulted in the loss of half of her territory. During this period there was continual agitation to bring a monarchical government to Mexico. Interest in such a project was minimal until the appearance, at the beginning of the decade, of Gutiérrez Estrada's Pamphlet, wherein he had advocated a monarchy with a foreign prince as the only way to save Mexico from anarchy. The controversy caused by the tract served to arouse the interest of Mexican monarchists and strengthen their resolve. As the decade wore on and Mexico's problems mounted, it seemed his predictions were borne out, and the solution he had offered gained renewed respect among conservatives.

In 1845, General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, who since 1832¹ had the profound conviction that only a throne could save Mexico from perdition and the ambitions of the United States, headed an army of some five thousand men which had been ordered to Texas. Paredes, born in Mexico in 1797, had been a cadet in the Spanish army and a member of Iturbide's trigarante army. He also had supported Santa Anna in the establishment of his Basés of Tacubaya.² A popular and successful general and stern administrator, he was considered personally honest.³ The army which he commanded refused to proceed to Texas, and on December 14, 1845, at San Luis Potosi, pronounced against the existing government. They adopted resolutions which called for the dismissal of the existing administration and the convocation of an extraordinary congress to provide a new government.⁴ On December 15, Paredes announced he had undertaken the task of the reorganization of the Republic and the defense of its national rights against the United States. In his pronouncement Paredes contrasted the conditions which Mexico had

1. José Manuel Hidalgo, Apuntes para escribir la historia de los proyectos de Monarquía en México desde el reinado de Carlos III hasta la instalación del Emperador Maximiliano (Paris: Garnier, 1868), p. 38.

2. Bancroft, Mexico, V, pp. 293-294.

3. Callcott, Church and State, p. 139.

4. Bancroft, Mexico, V, pp. 290-291.

enjoyed under Spanish administration with the then existing situation.⁵
The pronouncement clearly indicated only a monarchy could save the country.⁶

The plan called for a Junta of Representatives to be appointed by the general-in-chief of the army. They were to choose the executive, who was to rule until the extraordinary congress met, and then the Junta was to disband.⁷ Among the members of the Junta chosen by Paredes, were such conservatives as Archbishop Manuel Posado y Garduno, Nicolás Bravo, Lucas Alamán and Bishop Pardo of Yucatan.⁸ Needless to say, Paredes was chosen President ad interim.

With the appearance of Paredes the monarchists took heart. The time seemed ideal; the government was backed by a strong army and had the support and sympathy of the church and the Spanish government.⁹ In this benign climate they began to work with renewed enthusiasm to achieve their goal--a king for Mexico. The candidate under consideration was the Infante Duke Henry of Seville, brother-in-law of Isabell II,

5. Ibid., p. 292, note 12.

6. J. M. Gutiérrez Estrada, México y Europa, p. 34.

7. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 293, note 7.

8. Francisco de Paula Arrangoiz y Berzábal, Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1867 (Madrid: Imprenta a cargo de A. Perez Dubrull, 1871--1872), II, p. 270.

9. Gurria LaCroix, Trabajos sobre Historia Mexicana, p. 103.

in whom it was claimed certain conservative interests in Spain had invested one hundred thousand pesos.¹⁰ The intrigues involved Bermúdez de Castro, the Spanish Minister to Mexico,¹¹ and Ignacio Valdivielso, the Mexican Minister to Spain. Manuel Crecencio Rejón asserted the latter was empowered by Paredes to propose the Bourbon restoration to the cabinets of Spain and France.¹² It was maintained that Bermúdez de Castro carried secret instructions from the Duke of Valencia and had met with Paredes. He held meetings in his home with various notables who signed an agreement to accept a Spanish prince.¹³

In Spain much palace intrigue surrounded the candidacy of Duke Henry for the Mexican throne. General Ramón María Narvaez, President of the Spanish Council of Ministers, had proposed Henry for the position, but was opposed in this choice by the ex-regent Maria Christina, who wanted one of her sons seated on the Mexican throne.¹⁴ A Mexican newspaper reported on the rumors of the intrigue and declared, "we do not believe the Spanish government nor the Infante would have

10. Jeronimo Becker, Historia Relaciones Exteriores de España durante el Siglo XIX. Apuntes para una historia Diplomacia (Madrid: Estab. Tip de J. Rates, 1924), Vol. II, p. 473; Hidalgo, Proyectos, p. 38; Arellano Belloc, "La monarquía," p. 88.

11. See Chapter III, pp. 9-10.

12. RDHM, III, xvii.

13. Becker, Relaciones, II, p. 101.

14. RDHM, III, xvii.

been capable of such an unwise idea. We take it as one of those rumors which so frequently appear in European periodicals."¹⁵

A conservative who castigated both Alamán and Paredes, and opposed monarchy, but who later played a large part in monarchist intrigue, was Antonio Haro y Tamariz. Haro took exception to the contention that monarchy was the form of government most adapted to Mexico's circumstances.¹⁶ He observed that one support of monarchy was an aristocracy. With a touch of irony, he pointed out that even though Mexico lacked an aristocracy it could improvise one from the various generals and other "notable" persons by turning them into Dukes, Counts, Barons, and so on.¹⁷ As for the lack of capable men necessary to rule the country, Haro wondered if by the sole fact of the proclamation of a monarchy "inspiration came from heaven and converted our mediocre politicians into Metternichs, Peels and Nesselrodes?"¹⁸

15. La Reforma, January 23, 1846.

16. Antonio Haro y Tamariz, Esposición que Antonio de Haro y Tamariz dirige a sus conciudadanos y opiniones del autor sobre la Monarquía Constitucional (México: Imprenta en el Arquillo de la Alcaicería, 1846), #306, LAF--BNM.

17. Ibid., p. 14.

18. Ibid., p. 18.

José María Tornel, who had replaced Juan N. Almonte as Minister of War--an action which displeased the monarchists,¹⁹ wrote two letters, on September 26, and on October 8, 1846, to the editors of El Republicano. In them he denied the administration had anything to do with promoting the establishment of a foreign king. Tornel placed the entire blame on Lucas Alamán, who, he said, had used the newspaper El Tiempo to direct a political and doctrinal movement to that end.²⁰

Certainly Lucas Alamán was Mexico's leading conservative in the first half of the nineteenth century, but it is difficult to pin the monarchist label on him before 1850 as some writers have done.²¹ The conservative party, although it stood for order and stability, was not the "mirror of monarchy."²²

When El Tiempo was established in 1846, it defended conservative principles, and openly advocated a monarchy. Directed by Alamán, it listed among its contributors, according to Hidalgo, Díez de Bonilla,

19. Bancroft, México V, p. 294, note 20.

20. Jorge Flores D., Pereda y su misión, AHDM, 2nd Series, Vol. XIX, pp. 168-169.

21. Jorge Gurria LaCroix in his Trabajos sobre Historia Mexicana considers Alamán a confirmed monarchist. José C. Valades, Alamán, estadista y historiador México (México: José Porrúa e hijos, 1938), takes a more balanced view. He states that anti-monarchist elements began to call Alamán a monarchist after he saved the remains of Cortes from violence.

22. Valades, Alamán, pp. 417-418.

Elguero, and Tagle.²³ Its first appearance January 24, 1846, began a lively polemic among the newspapers of Mexico. La Reforma, El Monitor Republicano, and others entered the lists in an attempt to refute the arguments and historical interpretation advanced by El Tiempo.²⁴

Those who contributed to El Tiempo were intelligent and talented writers, capable of awakening the public interest.²⁵ In the first edition its editors admitted that although their principles were essentially conservative this did not mean their minds were closed to progress. They noted that the name they had chosen for their paper was the key to their ideas: "to seek in times past lessons and experiences to direct us in the present time."²⁶ As nature required time to develop species, so too did the moral development of political societies require time to become worthwhile.²⁷

To this evolution versus revolution theme they added a powerful critique of the republican form of government, by pointing to the twenty-

23. Hidalgo, Proyectos, p. 38.

24. Jesús Reyes Heróles, El Liberalismo Mexicano (México: Universidad Nacional de México, 1958), II, p. 348.

25. Zamacois, XII, p. 420.

26. El Tiempo, January 24, 1846.

27. Ibid.

five years of continual disorder, revolutions, and insecurity. In their view, the causes did not lie in the ambitions of military chiefs, party strife, and vascillating opinions, nor did they attribute the country's problems to inexperience.²⁸ The editors observed that twenty-five years was sufficient time to acquire the experience necessary to overcome the disorder and confusion. Had the country been educated to its circumstances and necessities, it could have contained military ambition and party strife.²⁹ El Tiempo insisted these pretended causes were no more than the effects of a more profound and incurable evil. What, it asked, had been the situation prior to independence? There was a government modeled on the Spanish monarchy, without any idea of a representative form of government or democratic principles. The clergy was master of a third of the country's real estate and, for this reason, and because of its religious principles, very influential. The army in 1810 and 1818 gave evidence of its strength and thereby acquired an esprit de corps. Land was unequally distributed. The education of the middle class consisted of little more than ecclesiastical studies and forensics: the mass of the people received almost no instruction.³⁰

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., also El Espectador, April 1, 1846 for similar view.

30. Ibid., El Tiempo, January 24, 1846.

El Tiempo declared the Constitution of 1824 did not, nor could not, make any significant alteration in these elements, since changes in the social order were made only by the slow lapse of time or by violent revolution. The twenty-five years of revolts and disorder were the result of the clash between the fictitious ideals of the constitution and the realities of Mexican political society.³¹ Representative assemblies often were composed of those who only wished to parrot the French Convention and overturn the existing order. Landholders and clergy saw their interests threatened, and, with lack of support from the law, either had to comply with those they feared or seek support from the army.³²

The solution, according to El Tiempo, was to accommodate political institutions to reality, not the other way around. The present generation must suit the constitution to its needs and let future generations modify it in accord with their requirements.³³ The editors asserted that those who wanted a country internally happy, quiet, calm, and externally respected, sighed for the days when they enjoyed these things

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

"in the shadow of other institutions more solid, more adapted to our requirements, and more in conformity with reality."³⁴

This last statement was interpreted by Memorial Histórico, January 31, 1846, as an implication that El Tiempo favored a monarchy. The editors of that paper denied the accusation, and asked, "where are the words which prove their assertion?"³⁵ They admitted that they had said the demoralization, insecurity, and loss of territory were the result of political errors, but disavowed they had claimed monarchy was the universal panacea. In fact, the editors of El Tiempo asserted, the form of government was not for the press, but for the coming congress to determine. The editorialists insisted they had not provoked any new discussion of monarchy, which indeed they had not--at least in so many words. Nonetheless El Tiempo reminded its readers that, inasmuch as Memorial Histórico had broached the subject, it should be recalled that the first notice of the existence of a monarchical party, and the first attempt to give it organization and life came from the celebrated pamphlet of Gutiérrez Estrada which, El Tiempo pointed out, "came from the presses of the editor and proprietor of Memorial Histórico."³⁶

34. El Tiempo, January 25, 1846.

35. El Tiempo, February 2, 1846.

36. El Tiempo, February 2, 1846. Ignacio Cumplido was the publisher of Memorial Histórico and of the pamphlet.

More interest and opposition was generated by the promulgation, on January 27, 1846 of the edict which convoked the extraordinary congress, principally because its authorship was attributed to Lucas Alamán.³⁷ The edict called for congress to fulfill the Plan of San Luis Potosi and direct itself to saving the rights and dignity of the nation. The congress was to be comprised of 160 deputies to represent 9 classes of society: 38 for real estate owners and agriculturists; 20 for merchants; 14 for mineowners; 14 for manufacturers; 14 for the literary professions; 10 for magistrates; 10 for public officials; and 20 each for the clergy and the army.³⁸ The representatives were to be chosen by their respective classes and had to possess a certain amount of wealth.³⁹ In this manner those who had something at stake were to be tied to the government. Although monarchy was not mentioned, the fact that the author or authors of the edict were believed to have monarchist tendencies, and because six years before Gutiérrez de Estrada had suggested convocation of a congress, republican opposition was aroused. They

37. Arrangoiz, II, p. 271; Zamacois, XII, p. 421.

38. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 295, note 23.

39. Zamacois, XII, pp. 422-423.

suspected the government was attempting to resurrect and implement Iturbide's Plan of Iguala.⁴⁰

Each succeeding issue of El Tiempo developed another facet of their critique. On February 5, 1846, the editors focused their attention on the United States, which they declared to be the source of Mexico's troubles.⁴¹ Mexico had made a mistake in the adoption en toto of the political institutions of the United States, for they were diametrically opposed to her particular requirements. El Tiempo observed that many who saw the amazing prosperity of the North Americans supposed it was due to their political institutions. This the editors denied, although they recognized the impact of the assertion. They pointed out that the United States had enjoyed these benefits before it had become a republic, and that the well-organized monarchies of Europe also possessed them. Furthermore, the cause of this prosperity was due to the protection afforded the trade and commerce of North America by the English, and

40. Bancroft, Mexico, V. p. 295. No doubt fuel was added to the suspicions of the opposition when Paredes appointed a Junta composed of General José Gómez de la Cortina (father-in-law of Gutiérrez Estrada). D. Francisco Fagoaga and D. Manuel Eduardo Gorostiza, all leading conservatives, to consider the establishment of a general police force to cover the entire republic. It would be concerned with security, correctional, municipal, urban and rural policing, but in no way was to interfere in what was not entrusted to them or in political opinions. Memorial Histórico, January 19, 1846. This periodical, incidentally, praised the idea.

41. El Tiempo, February 5, 1846; February 13, 1846.

the good sense the leaders of its independence had in recognizing this and not changing it.⁴² El Tiempo stated that world equilibrium required a counterbalance to the political influence and commercial advantage of the United States. As the only barrier to United States' expansion, Europe had a direct interest in Mexico's prosperity and organization.⁴³

The editors of El Tiempo believed it was beneficial to discuss these matters in order that the nation might make a choice. In a statement reminiscent of Gutiérrez Estrada, they insisted they were not "blindly partisan to this or that form of government, considered in the abstract, we say we believe in no one form, because all can be good or bad, and because we are persuaded that none are incompatible with liberty."⁴⁴ Whatever the form of government, it must be one adapted to the needs of the people concerned.⁴⁵ Over and over again in various ways, El Tiempo used this argument--it was the keystone of their entire critique: People existed before constitutions; these codes were made to regulate already existing societies; they must therefore accommodate themselves to the customs, character, and requirements of a nation. The inverse was not true. Circumstances are the work of

42. Ibid.

43. El Tiempo, February 13, 1846.

44. El Tiempo, February 7, 1846; Gutiérrez Estrada, Carta, p. 62.

45. El Tiempo, February 8, 1846.

nature and are not subject to change by a legislator. It would, for example, be a mistake to grant a great number of political rights to men unable to comprehend their importance or to make use of them.⁴⁶

Next El Tiempo addressed itself to the coming congress and noted that the nation was to send its representatives to establish a new government because the prosperity and peace they desired was not to be found in the existing regime, or even less in the ones that had preceded. "Something new is wanted, something new is required."⁴⁷

In like vein, El Tiempo continued its criticism of, and antagonism toward, the republican system in Mexico and, without mentioning monarchy in so many words, insisted a radical change of government was necessary. Those familiar with the pamphlet of Gutiérrez Estrada no doubt could see what direction the argument was to take, since the

46. Ibid., El Espectador, one of the few papers to support El Tiempo's position, preferred a sort of aristocracy of the intelligent and wealthy. Sovereignty of the intelligence was to be substituted for national sovereignty. Sovereignty and social direction lay in the intelligence and not in the number of individuals. Diffusion or suppression of political rights stemmed from this; sovereignty of the intelligence, which is the result of education, is the supremacy of the wealthy. "Take the first twenty well-dressed persons who pass in the street and the first twenty of inferior rank and it will be found the former are those most superior in knowledge of all kinds and in capacity to judge affairs of state." Political rights should be extended only so far as said capacity extends. El Espectador, April 29, 1846.

47. El Tiempo, February 8, 1846.

ideas presented by El Tiempo were amplifications of some of those which had been expressed six years before.

Finally, on February 12, 1846, El Tiempo published a profession of faith and openly advocated a representative monarchy. The editors affirmed their belief in the independence of Mexico. The Plan of Iguala had accomplished this independence because it conciliated and united all sympathies. When it was not accepted, Iturbide had sought to establish his own dynasty. His empire, without basis, legitimacy, or respect for time and tradition, fell at the first sign of revolt. The United States, asserted El Tiempo, then began to create another type of empire in Mexico with the republican ideas spread by its representatives. These ideas took hold and were formulated into a government, which did not take into account the differences of origin, religion, or history. It did not consider that Mexico's social, political, and religious unity dictated a monarchical form of government; just as the variety of religions, people, and language presaged the republican federal form. "We thought that the quickest road to liberty was to throw ourselves into the arms of the United States; to servilely imitate its institutions and follow its perfidious advice."⁴⁸ The present consequences, observed El Tiempo, were; a disorganized administration, an empty treasury, enormous debts, revenues hypothecated to creditors,

48. El Tiempo, February 12, 1846.

justice neglected, Yucatan independent, the United States occupying Mexican territory, and "all this without a navy to defend our shores, and without the ability to offer the army the necessary resources to drive the bold invaders from the soil of the country."⁴⁹

After more of a long litany of complaints and criticism leveled at the republican form of government, El Tiempo revealed:

We want a representative monarchy; we want national unity, order together with civil and political liberty, we want the integrity of the Mexican territory, in short, all the promises and guarantees of the Plan of Iguala, in order to assure a stable basis for our glorious independence.⁵⁰

This was the form of government the most advanced and civilized countries of the world had adopted, asserted the editors of El Tiempo. It would provide a form of government which would guarantee the impartial administration of justice; a stable government of laws to protect the interests of its citizens; an elective legislature; regularity of commerce and protection for industry, and development of the intellectual activity of the nation. As in Europe, said the editors, aristocracy was to be based only on merit, ability, education, wealth, or

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

military and civil service: "Where a man is not asked where his parents come from, but what he has done."⁵¹

El Tiempo also wanted a strong army in which the military hierarchy would be respected, but above all it wanted the Catholic religion sustained:

We want the honorable and worthy support of the Catholic religion of our fathers, not that continual menace with which anarchy threatens its properties. We were born in the womb of the church, and we don't want to see the cathedrals of our faith converted into temples of those sects which scandalize the world with their religious quarrels; and we don't want to see on its towers the hated flag of stars in place of our national standard.⁵²

Having made its profession of faith, El Tiempo challenged its adversaries La Reforma, Memorial Histórico, and El Monitor, to do the same. Did they want a federal or central republic? What foreign policy would they follow--an alliance with the United States which would result in the loss of Mexican integrity and nationality?⁵³ The editors of El Tiempo declared each should present its position for open discussion and permit the nation to decide. As for themselves, when the extraordinary congress met and made its choice, whether republic or

51. El Tiempo, February 12, 1846.

52. Ibid.

53. El Tiempo, February 17, 1846.

monarchy, federalism or dictatorship, "we will obey their decision as the political law of the land. Discussion before; obedience afterwards."⁵⁴

On February 14, 1846 La Reforma, one of the main opponents of El Tiempo, declared the profession of faith made by the latter had not come as a surprise. It was, to them, but the natural epilogue of ideas mentioned in previous editorials.⁵⁵ They considered it no more than a call for the selection of Don Carlos for the throne. They reasoned that since, in accordance with the Plan of Iguala, the king was to be chosen from the family of Ferdinand VII, and inasmuch as one daughter of Ferdinand was now Queen, and another heir to the throne, only Don Carlos remained. La Reforma approved of open discussion, but insisted that if any conspiracy were discovered, particularly if it had connections with Europe, no punishment the law could provide would be too excessive.⁵⁶

All Mexico's disorders, which El Tiempo insisted were due to republicanism, La Reforma, equally insistent, attributed to the Plan of Iguala. Its editors maintained the entire timing of Iguala had been wrong. If independence has been consummated before or after the time it had been, a happier state of affairs would have resulted. Had it come

54. El Tiempo, February 17, 1846.

55. La Reforma, February 14, 1846.

56. Ibid.

earlier, independence would have been more acceptable to the then passively obedient people and more in keeping with the times, as well as the prevalent customs and political ideas. Had it come later, the enlightenment afforded by advances in education would have been conducive to the establishment of a government of law and order. But, happening at the time it did, the results could not have been other than they were.⁵⁷ La Reforma agreed the Plan of Iguala had brought a certain uniformity of opinion with regard to independence, but it has also united interests which could work in harmony up to a certain point, that is to say, they had little else in common but a desire for independence. In effect, the Plan of Iguala contained the seeds of its own destruction. There had not been proper consideration of the fact that Ferdinand VII would never have approved it, or that the United States was opposed to any monarchy.⁵⁸

La Reforma denied that monarchy was suited to the customs and habits of the people. The vice-regal government, they noted, had been merely a military administration. That republican principles were older than independence, was shown in Morelos' Constitution of

57. La Reforma, February 20, 1846.

58. Ibid.

Apatzingán. Besides, the one important ingredient required for monarchy which Mexico did not have was an aristocracy of blood.⁵⁹

The last point was immediately countered by El Tiempo, which attempted to show that, since this was no longer the case in the constitutional monarchies of Europe, neither would it be needed in Mexico. A democratic aristocracy based on talent and merit was the new wave. "The Ancient aristocracy of blood is no more than a glorious reminder of the military glory of nations, an historical memorial which as an element of power and government had disappeared."⁶⁰ This led La Reforma to observe that it was precisely from this aristocracy of knowledge and merit that the most enthusiastic founders and supporters of the republic had come.⁶¹

El Tiempo maintained that, historically, Mexico had opted for a constitutional monarchy when she chose independence under the Plan of Iguala, which all classes of society had supported. The clergy saw that the plan protected their religious beliefs and principles of Christian morality, and provided guarantees for their property. And the army, "by reason of its interests and its glory, cannot be in its true element except under constitutional monarchical institutions."⁶² El Tiempo

59. Ibid.

60. El Tiempo, February 21, 1846.

61. La Reforma, February 26, 1846.

62. El Tiempo, February 26, 1846.

believed in the necessity for a strong army to preserve national unity. Its editors declared the army had not been the cause of the many revolts which had plagued Mexico, but in fact, by its very existence, had made them less frequent and violent.⁶³

The contention that the clergy had chosen independence to protect their interests was, in view of the provisions of the Spanish constitution of 1812, more correct than the view of La Reforma, which maintained the clergy had opted for independence in 1810 with Hidalgo, Morelos, and others.⁶⁴

The editors of La Reforma took El Tiempo to task and exposed some inconsistencies in its arguments. El Tiempo had insisted that no form of government was better than another; liberty could exist under all forms; the form of government need only be adapted to the circumstances of the country.⁶⁵ Yet, observed La Reforma, El Tiempo then reversed itself and declared that the advantages of impartial justices, stability, regularity of commerce, and so on, could be found only under a monarchy. "What kind of logic is this? In what school did they learn it?"⁶⁶

63. El Tiempo, March 21, 1846.

64. La Reforma, February 26, 1846.

65. El Tiempo, February 7, 1846.

66. La Reforma, March 16, 1846.

The February 12, 1846, "profession of faith" on the part of El Tiempo caused another reaction. A Colonel Manuel Montoro appeared before Criminal Judge José Ignacio Jaurégui, February 18, 1846, with the complaint that the article was subversive and tended to destroy the republican system.⁶⁷ He declared the "profession of faith" was simply a resume of the Gutiérrez Estrada pamphlet of 1840 which already had been branded "subversive."⁶⁸ Montoro requested that the article be judged "subversive and seditious in the first degree."⁶⁹ Jaurégui subsequently decreed the article abused the freedom of the press, and declared it to be "subversive and seditious in the first degree."⁷⁰

The editors of El Tiempo questioned the legality of Jaurégui's condemnation on the grounds that the Plan of San Luís Potosi had convoked an extraordinary congress to constitute the nation "without end, limit or obstacles to its sovereign decisions."⁷¹ This, they maintained, meant the press had the indisputable right to debate freely questions related to the political organization of the country. Although the plan

67. Col. Manuel Montoro to Editors of Memorial Histórico, February 19, 1846, in Memorial Histórico, February 28, 1846.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. El Tiempo, February 20, 1846.

declared illegal the incitement of disobedience or attacks made on persons, El Tiempo denied it had done either one and asserted no law forbade their defense of monarchical principles. It further stated that it was Jaurégui's decree which was truly seditious, for it attacked the basis of the Plan of San Luis Potosi, which ruled Mexico.⁷² The then existent monarchist party, observed El Tiempo, was not the same as the "miserable bourbonism of the first years of our independence."⁷³ Composed of men who loved their nation and wanted to keep it free and independent, it was not concerned with the ridiculous intrigues and iniquities of the old masonic clubs, but with the preservation of Mexico's integrity from the covetousness of its northern neighbor.⁷⁴ Despite this legal attack, the editors of El Tiempo considered themselves "enthusiastic and decided champions of the liberty and independence of the fatherland, guaranteed and sustained by a constitutional monarchy."⁷⁵

On June 6, 1846, General Paredes appeared before the newly assembled extraordinary congress and made a declaration in favor of a republican system of government. The following day El Tiempo

72. Ibid.

73. El Tiempo, June 5, 1846.

74. Ibid.

75. El Tiempo, April 14, 1846.

deplored the recommendation Paredes had made and, considering its mission ended, suspended publication.⁷⁶

With the demise of El Tiempo, and the imminent threat of war with the United States, another phase of monarchist thought ended. With some variations, the arguments were similar to those Gutiérrez Estrada had used six years before. For the base of its argument El Tiempo had made use of the evident continual disorder which had prevailed since independence and the subsequent loss of national territory. Albeit it may have exaggerated the disorders to strengthen its position, these plus the loss of national territory provided an effective argument which the opposition was never really able to overcome. Using this basic premise, the next proposition El Tiempo offered was that, since a republican form of government had been in control since the ouster of Iturbide, to it must be due the misfortunes which plagued the nation. As an adjunct to this line of reasoning, it pointed to the United States as a source of Mexico's troubles, since it was primarily responsible for the political institutions so inimical to Mexico's traditions and customs. A political institution had to evolve; it could not be imposed on existing reality by revolution. The keystone of El Tiempo's position was its insistence that political institutions must be adapted to reality. Its definition of that reality was that Mexico, by tradition and custom,

76. El Tiempo, June 7, 1846; Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 298.

was monarchical. It therefore followed that a monarchy was the type of government Mexico needed. El Tiempo insisted the extraordinary congress which had been summoned had the power to change the form of government; therefore it ought to examine all forms to find one most suited to the nation's requirements. This, according to its editors, was a constitutional monarchy guaranteed by the Plan of Iguala. El Tiempo also had designated several errors in which its opponents were involved: (1) in the period of Spanish domination there was no peace in Mexico; (2) the disorders in Mexico had been exaggerated; (3) monarchists were the cause of the disorders; republicans were innocent.⁷⁷

Even though it was true that the social, economic, and political problems which had plagued Mexico brought about conditions of instability, neither side offered really convincing reasons for their existence, or effective solutions to alleviate them.

Meanwhile, rumors from Europe concerning monarchist intrigues continued unabated. Memorial Histórico had reported on January 22, 1846 that the Correro de Ultramar of November 3, 1845 had carried an article which spoke of the existence of a project which called for the Infante, Duke Henry, to command a squadron directed to Mexico to take advantage of the sympathy which existed for him there.⁷⁸ Although

77. El Tiempo, April 13, 1846.

78. Memorial Histórico, January 22, 1846.

Memorial Histórico considered this was simply gossip, the United States Consul at Havana, Robert Campbell, believed more than idle rumor was involved in the efforts to put a European prince on the throne of Mexico.⁷⁹ Although overtures were made in this regard to Santa Anna, then resident in Cuba, he rejected them.⁸⁰ The rumors, coupled with the advent of the Paredes administration, created suspicion in Mexico as to the intentions of the President ad interim. John Slidell, the United States Minister to Mexico, believed the establishment of a foreign monarchy only was an idea which some of the clergy maintained, and that, although Paredes wanted to establish a despotic government, "it is equally certain that he intends to place himself at its head."⁸¹ He revised this opinion somewhat after the appearance of El Tiempo's February 12, 1846, "confession of faith."⁸²

The rumors tended to abate the complaints against the United States, and liberals in Mexico began to look to it for protection against

79. Robert Campbell to James Buchanan, Havana, January 7, 1846, in William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932), XI, p. 351. Cited hereafter as Manning, Inter-American Affairs.

80. Ibid.

81. Slidell to Buchanan, Jalapa, February 6, 1846, in U.S. Congress, House, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. House Executive Doc. No. 60, p. 58.

82. Slidell to Buchanan, February 17, 1846, Ibid., p. 61.

European interference.⁸³ In fact, many preferred annexation to the United States rather than a monarchy, particularly a foreign one.⁸⁴

The United States had received accounts from many sources to corroborate Slidell's reports, and believed a considerable royalist party existed among the Mexicans.⁸⁵ Moreover, it was thought this party would increase in size until the majority of the people would accept a monarch, who, rumor indicated, was to be Prince Henry.⁸⁶ Slidell was instructed to be on the alert concerning the ramifications of any plot which might exist, for the United States would oppose any attempt on the part of any foreign power to impose a Spanish or other European prince.⁸⁷ Because he felt that Britain and France would never agree on the candidate, Slidell had not attached much importance to such a project. Furthermore, he believed the financial difficulties and the possibility of war with the United States provided an additional barrier to such an enterprise. Yet many well-informed people in Mexico as

83. Slidell to Buchanan, Jalapa, March 1, 1846, Ibid., p. 62.

84. John Black, U. S. Consul at Mexico City to John Slidell, March 14, 1846, in Manning, Inter-American Affairs, VIII, p. 830.

85. Buchanan to Slidell, Washington, March 12, 1846, Ibid., pp. 191, 192.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

well as the press convinced him some kind of negotiations were going on.⁸⁸ In view of this possible contingency, Slidell urged prompt and decisive action with regard to Mexico, for neither Britain nor France could "without incurring the odium of a war of unqualified aggression, interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico, while hostilities actually exist between her and the United States."⁸⁹

However, John Black, United States Consul in Mexico City, reported that many of the warmest partisans of monarchy were withdrawing their support. They felt too much had been said and the project too well known. In order to succeed, foreign intervention and secrecy were required.⁹⁰ Black was visited by an "Irish Priest," who had queried him on the United States' position on monarchy. Black informed him that the United States would not interfere as long as this was the free choice of Mexico, but that imposition by force would not be tolerated.⁹¹ Manuel Posada y Garduno, the Archbishop of Mexico, and Black were on good terms, and the Consul observed that the Archbishop was disappointed that Britain had not taken a stand in support of a

88. Slidell to Buchanan, March 18, 1846, Ibid., p. 831.

89. Ibid.

90. Black to Buchanan, Mexico, March 19, 1846, Ibid., p. 833.

91. Black to Buchanan, Mexico, April 21, 1846, Ibid., p. 844.

monarchy, and, since she had not done so, he favored the establishment of a great federation stretching from Canada to Panama. Despite this, Black declared the Archbishop very much preferred a monarchy: "He pants for the splendor of a court--but he goes the whole for a Spanish Prince, and thinks any other would be tinctured with heresy."⁹² Black also reported that many in Mexico believed England was secretly behind the whole scheme.⁹³

Bermudez de Castro, Spanish Minister to Mexico, reported that ships of the United States Navy off Vera Cruz and California were instructed to attack the moment Slidell was given his passports. He believed Slidell had ordered all acts of hostility to cease because the United States' Minister feared that the monarchist movement might develop and grow in the event of a war.⁹⁴

As time went on, the position of the Paredes administration became increasingly difficult. It was caught, as it were, between two fires. Faced on the one hand with a threat of war and the necessity to

92. Ibid.

93. Black to Buchanan, May 23, 1846, Ibid., pp. 853-854.

94. Despacho #218, Bermúdez de Castro to First Secretary, March 29, 1846, in CM.

build up the army, and on the other accused of intending to set up a monarchy, its tenure of office seemed extremely precarious.⁹⁵

The opposition of the liberal republican press brought on restrictive measures and arrest which served to widen the breach.⁹⁶

Paredes was forced to proclaim he had no intention of establishing a monarchy,⁹⁷ and, on April 24, 1846, issued a manifesto wherein he promised to sustain a republican form of government until such time as the nation demanded otherwise.⁹⁸ Despite his protestations, many did not think him serious and believed he was buying time and awaiting a more favorable opportunity.⁹⁹ In Europe, King Louis Philippe of France considered with indifference not only the rumored desire of Paredes for a Spanish prince, but also the old project of placing a prince from this family on the throne of Mexico.¹⁰⁰

95. Slidell to Buchanan, February 17, 1846, U. S. Congress, House, 30th Cong. 1st Session, House Exec. Doc., No. 60, p. 61: Slidell to Buchanan March 18, 1846, Manning, Inter-American Affairs, VIII, p. 831.

96. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 296.

97. Slidell to Buchanan, March 27, 1846, U. S. Congress, House, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., House Exec. Doc., No. 60. p. 77.

98. Bancroft, Mexico, V., p. 296.

99. Black to Buchanan, June 13, 1846, in Manning, Inter-American Affairs VIII, p. 864. Black to Buchanan, June 27, 1846, Ibid.

100. William R. King, U.S. Minister to France to James Buchanan, Secy of State, Paris, June 1, 1846. Diplomatic Despatches, France, NA, RG 59.

While Paredes tried to secure badly needed financial aid and persuade the extraordinary congress to constitute a new government, some sections of Mexico, despite the imminent war, intrigued for the overthrow of his administration.¹⁰¹ Guadalajara became the revolutionary center and on May 20, 1846, a pronouncement was made by General José María Yañez. Santa Anna was proclaimed leader, and it was declared that none of the constitutions since 1824 had benefited the country; that some Mexicans had plotted the establishment of a monarchy; and that the convocation of the extraordinary congress was absurd.¹⁰²

The Congress did meet, however, and at its opening session, June 6, 1846, Paredes addressed the assembly, and once again reiterated his adherence to republican principles. The liberal republicans were not convinced and regarded the address merely an attempt to quiet their suspicions.¹⁰³ Although the Congress chose Paredes as President ad interim, with Nicolás Bravo as Vice President, the insurgents quickly gained more support, and by August had succeeded with their coup.¹⁰⁴ Guillermo Prieto who wrote of the event said: "The

101. Callcott, Church and State, pp. 139-140.

102. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 297.

103. Despacho #30, Bermúdez de Castro to French Minister, Mexico, June 28, 1846, in CM.

104. Bancroft, Mexico, V, pp. 299-300.

pronunciamiento of Ciudadela made evident the importance of the appeals of the monarchy: the actors of that badly rehearsed drama appeared as punchinellos surprised outside the salon where the carnival was celebrated."¹⁰⁵

Did Paredes really seek the establishment of a monarchy? It is impossible to give an answer to this question with any degree of certitude from information presently available.¹⁰⁶ It is possible the entire affair was concocted of rumors in order to discredit his administration and to cover up other schemes.

This was the opinion the Spanish Minister to Mexico, Salvador Bermudez de Castro, had expressed in a report he submitted to the French Foreign Office (at the time he was acting as Chargé d'Affaires for France).¹⁰⁷ He declared that Santa Anna "with the proverbial duplicity of his character," had sent agents to Paredes with an offer of his services to establish a strong government and put an end to the federalists. At the same time Santa Anna had written to the governor

105. Guillermo Prieto, Memorias de mis tiempos (México: Ed. Patria, 1948), II, p. 131; Reyes Heróles, II, p. 350.

106. Possible answers might be found in the personal files of Paredes in the Archives of the Minister of War or Secretary of Foreign Relations, which were not available at the time of this writing.

107. Despacho #21 del Ministro de España en México S. B. de Castro, al Ministro de Negocios de Extranjeros de France, Mexico, April 28, 1846, in CM.

of Yucatan and requested his neutrality in the struggle which he was about to undertake with Paredes to re-establish the federal constitution of 1824. When he received no reply from Paredes, "who knew his character," Santa Anna engaged in an active correspondence with army officials. He assured the officers that Paredes intended to form a monarchy with a foreign prince, and that this prince would disband the army. Bermúdez de Castro reported that José Ignacio Basadre and Manuel C. Rejón were directors of this scheme.¹⁰⁸

Manuel Crescencio Rejón, for a time Minister of Foreign Relations under the new government, revealed to Bermúdez de Castro that one of his first acts was to replace Señor Valdivielso, who had held the ministerial posts in Paris and Madrid. He declared that Valdivielso was a royalist whom Paredes had entrusted to make proposals to those governments for the establishment of a monarchy.¹⁰⁹ Although Valdivielso, by family, education, and long residence in Europe, was suited to his role, Bermúdez de Castro believed the

108. Ibid., Basadre had joined the Trigaranté army in 1821. He was Secretary to Santa Anna in 1832 and in 1833 Minister to Prussia. He was Minister of War in 1844. Rejón is noted primarily for having created the Juicio Amparo.

109. Despacho #50 Bermúdez de Castro to French Minister, Mexico, September 28, 1846, p. 841, in CM.

accusation was but a pretext to cover some old jealousies of Almonte and the hatred of the ultra-democratic party.¹¹⁰

Rejón, Basadre, Almonte, and Haro had accompanied Santa Anna on his return to Mexico from Cuba. Upon his arrival at Vera Cruz, August 16, 1846, Santa Anna made an address to his countrymen in which he accused Paredes of trying to create a monarchy, and announced he had "come to aid you to save our country from such a stain." He denied the internal supports a monarchy required still existed in Mexico.

That which was, has disappeared. Habits of of passive obedience no longer exist; and if there remains a sentiment of religion time has undermined the political power of the directors of consciences. An influential aristocracy, so necessary for the permanence of monarchies, such as exists in old Europe, the only proper place for institutions of that class, is not to be found, nor can it ever be organized here.¹¹¹

Santa Anna branded Paredes a traitor who purposely had permitted the United States to enter Mexican territory:

110. Ibid.

111. Address of General Antonio López de Santa Anna to his countrymen, upon the subject of the plan proclaimed for the real regeneration of the republic, Vera Cruz, August 16, 1846 in U.S. Congress, House, 30th Cong. 1st. Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 60, pp. 777-785.

In order to propose to us, in the midst of the conflicts of war, as the only means of safety, the subjection of the republic to servitude, the ignominy of the country--the revival of the Plan of Iguala--in fine, the return to the government of the viceroys.¹¹²

While the war between Mexico and the United States gained momentum, Mexico's Minister to England, José María Luis Mora, had written to Gómez Farias that the Mexican legations in Europe were "sold completely to monarchical intrigues."¹¹³ The Mexican government, already concerned by the rumors of intervention, had made arrangements to obtain more information. On October 20, 1846, Juan Nepomuceno de Pereda was entrusted with an important secret mission which concerned arrangements to be made to use foreign merchant ships as armed privateers against the United States.¹¹⁴ Paragraph eleven of his instructions charged him to investigate whatever plans or schemes might transpire on the part of the maritime powers to intervene in Mexican affairs.¹¹⁵

112. Ibid.

113. Mora to Farias, October 31, 1846, quoted in Robert F. Florstedt, "The liberal role of José María Luis Mora in the early history of independent Mexico" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Texas, 1950), p. 496.

114. Instrucciones que da a Dn. Juan N. Pereda el Ministerio de relaciones interiores y exteriores para el desempeño de la comisión que se le confia. José María Ortiz Monasterio al Sr. D. Juan Nep. Pereda, October 20, 1846, in AHDM, 2nd Series, XIX, pp. 262-264.

115. Ibid.

Mora had reported that Mexican exiles, "to satisfy their vengeance, and under the name of a monarch seize the power which has escaped from their hands," had solicited European intervention. He declared the centre of the intrigues was one Manuel Escandon and noted prophetically "this impending danger very easily can be converted into a Conference of London which will plan to shape the destiny of Mexico." ¹¹⁶

Some of Mexico's concern was centered in the activities of Paredes, who, after his overthrow was exiled October 2, 1846, and had gone to Europe. In a confidential letter, Fernando Mangino, Mexican Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, was cautioned to watch over the conduct of Paredes, for it was believed he was in France to interest King Louis Phillippe in the monarchical project. ¹¹⁷ Mangino informed his government that Paredes had not even presented himself at the Mexican legation. ¹¹⁸ A month went by without an appearance by Paredes. However, Mangino was able to report on his activities, specifically a meeting Paredes had with the French Premier, Guizot. ¹¹⁹ Paredes finally did

116. Mora to Farias, November 24, 1846, quoted in Florstedt, p. 496.

117. Jorge Flores D., Pereda y su misión, p. 151.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

call, and Mangino informed his government that the General had been received by Louis Philippe, whom Mangino maintained was interested in monarchical projects at that time.¹²⁰

Paredes' activities abroad and his return to Mexico late in 1847 brought an order to Mora from his government to investigate Paredes' plans. Mora was able to forward little positive information. He noted public opinion considered Paredes a partisan of the principle of monarchy. Moreover, he was received in flattering fashion by the King of France and the Queen of Spain. Mora observed that while it was natural to assume Paredes took advantage of every opportunity to press his opinions, it was quite another matter to ascertain what might have passed between him and those with whom he had contact. "General Paredes, in his plan to establish the monarchical principle in Mexico, will be a man of action, but that which can be arranged here will be promoted by others."¹²¹

Meanwhile, Juan N. Pereda had completed his mission and, in accord with his instructions, proceeded to Belgium to take charge of the Mexican legation.¹²² From Brussels, Pereda corresponded with

120. Ibid.

121. Mora to Minister, London, January 31, 1848 in Luis Chavez Orozco (Ed.), La Gestión diplomática de Doctor Mora (Mexico: SRE, 1931), AHDM, 1st Series, XXXV, Mexico: SRE, 1931, pp. 53-54.

122. Monasterio to Pereda, October 20, 1849, Ibid., pp. 262-264.

Mora in London relative to monarchist intrigues, the investigation of which, he maintained, was hampered by lack of funds.¹²³ It occurred to him that through an intermediary he could bring these intrigues to the attention of the United States Minister to Belgium, who was openly opposed to the idea of monarchy. The United States Minister would then begin an immediate investigation, whose results would benefit Mexico. Pereda further observed that, as his instructions ordered him to investigate any plans of European intervention, he would stir up the various Mexican legations to help. The legations of Mexico's sister republics might also be used to advantage, noted Pereda. He apologized to Mora for his persistence for "this business of a monarchy disturbs me, but it is something with which I can't agree, and will combat as long as I am able." He also observed that an English official had revealed to a confidant of his that there was a decided sympathy in England for Mexico, and against the United States.¹²⁴

On June 30, 1847, Pereda informed the Minister of Foreign Relations that he had been investigating a combination, which he had been assured existed in France, seeking to form a monarchy in

123. Pereda to Mora, Brussels, June 25, 1847, in García, Documentos, VI, pp. 95-96.

124. Ibid.

Mexico.¹²⁵ Mora concurred with Pereda, but had no idea who was involved. He understood, or suspected, that this combination had tried to smooth over United States resistance to such a project.¹²⁶ Pereda did not believe it possible to contain United States opposition, and, although he lacked positive information, he felt the monarchists themselves were not deluded in this respect. However, he did not doubt that there was a serious effort being made to erect a monarchy in Mexico, and that this intrigue was conducted in the official court circles of Louis Philippe.¹²⁷ In all this he had worked closely with one Vincent Pazos, a native of Bolivia, whom he sent to Paris to continue the investigation. Pazos' efforts had not succeeded in penetrating the combination, but they did reveal that there were projects which worked zealously to determine in what manner a monarchy might be established not only in Mexico, but in the other states of South America.¹²⁸

By the time another month had passed, Pereda was able to confirm to his government that there was no combination to establish

125. Pereda to Minister, Brussels, June 30, 1847, in AHDM, 2nd Series, XIX, pp. 359-360.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. Pereda to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, July 30, 1847. Ibid., pp. 360-361.

monarchies through intervention.¹²⁹ Some individuals of various Hispanic-American states resident in Europe, who wanted to erect monarchies in America, had made it known, and, even to a certain extent, believed, that there was a considerable monarchist party composed of reputable men, which was the only element of order which existed in America.¹³⁰ In Paris, certain periodicals such as La Revue de Deux-Mondes and the Journal de Debats, supported the monarchist cause, and with their articles often stirred up efforts and projects to that end. Despite this, Pereda reported that no government had given direct support to the instigators.¹³¹ Moreover, royalists were divided; not only as to the means necessary to accomplish their end, but also as to the candidate to be selected. Certain European dynasties hoped to see monarchies proclaimed in Spanish-America, but only as a result of a spontaneous movement of public opinion, for then they could offer aid under the pretext of supporting the will of the people.¹³²

Pereda informed his government that Europe's internal situation was such that it precluded any coalition to intervene in Mexico, which

129. Pereda to Minister, Brussels, August 30, 1847. Ibid., pp. 361-362.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

in any event England would oppose. In spite of this, he warned, it was never prudent to forget that a monarchical group existed in the Americas ready to take advantage of any circumstance to reunite with other partisans of monarchy. He, therefore, recommended that an agreement be reached with other sister republics to bring about a meeting of a great alliance of American States.¹³³ Some time later, when he was Minister to Guatamala, Pereda again urged that steps be taken to form a great Hispanic-American Alliance.¹³⁴

Acting upon instructions from Mexico, Mora went to France at the beginning of October, 1847, to solicit French guarantees on the limits to which they might agree in a presumed Peace Treaty to end the war with the United States.¹³⁵ While there, Mora came to understand France had accepted as the principle of its Mexican policy either the creation of a monarchy or annexation to the United States. This principle, noted Mora, was born of the French desire for a more pronounced influence in Mexico than she now enjoyed. This could be satisfied by

133. Ibid.

134. Memoria reservada sobre la necesidad de un Congreso de Plenipotenciarios de los diversos Estados Hispano-Americanos, Guatamala, March 27, 1857, in Antonio de la Peña y Reyes (Ed.) El Congreso de Panama y otros proyectos de union Hispano-Americana, AHDM, 1st Series, XIX (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1926), pp. 161-189.

135. Mora to Minister, London November 30, 1847 in AHDM. 1st Series, XXXV, pp. 40-42.

forming a monarchy or, failing this, the strengthening of the United States by annexation of Mexico which would be a strong blow against English power.¹³⁶

During May, June, and July of 1847, a project was conceived to place the Duke and Duchess of Montpensier on the throne of Mexico, in order to remove the discord which the marriage had caused between France and England.¹³⁷ Mora stated that it was believed that England, in order to remove Montpensier from the line to the Spanish throne, would offer to establish him in Mexico. The project was circulated among the royalists in Mexico in order to gain their approval. Various letters from Mexico received in France indicated the plan was accepted; they also brought requests that it be consummated.¹³⁸ Mora did not know the details of what had transpired in France as a result of all the appeals from Mexico, but believed that within a month he would know at least a great part. Nevertheless, he was certain overtures had been made to Great Britain in connection with the project, for he had seen Palmerston's reply wherein the British Minister had stated that

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid., Montpensier was the son of Louis Philippe of France and brother-in-law of Queen Isabella II.

138. Ibid.

although Britain did not want to mix in the affair, yet it did not extend its approval.¹³⁹

A month later Mora was not yet able to furnish any further information. He had not had time to return to France and, as he thought it imprudent to deal with the subject by mail, was not able to consult those who might have been able to help him.¹⁴⁰ He reiterated that the only thing he did know for certain was the policy France had adopted with respect to Mexico. This policy was to support any elements which existed, or could exist, in Mexico in favor of monarchy and oppose all who might interfere. Were this to no avail France would then support annexation to the United States in order, by this means, to diminish English influence and power and supplant it with its own. Mora warned his government that France was essentially hostile to Mexico and that its conduct should be the object of constant attention.¹⁴¹

Mora claimed this French policy also prevailed in Spain. Salustiano Olozaga in the December 1, 1847, meeting of the Spanish Cortes, had accused the government and its Minister to Mexico of having promoted, through intrigue, the establishment of the monarchical

139. Ibid.

140. Mora to Minister, 30 December 1847, in AHDM, 1st Series, XXXV, pp. 42-47.

141. Ibid.

principle in Mexico.¹⁴² For Mora, the lack of denial by the Spanish Foreign Ministry was proof of its complicity. He advised his government to exercise close vigilance over the Spanish Minister in Mexico, because he had many opportunities to influence "the masses and notable people of the nation."¹⁴³

Luis de la Rosa, Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Relations during the first six months of 1848, had instructed Eduardo Goroztiza, Mexican Minister to Spain, to express the government's displeasure with this turn of events and ask for an explanation.¹⁴⁴ Goroztiza reminded the Duke of Montemayor, the Spanish Minister of State, that despite the fact that in recent years active participation was attributed to the government of Spain in the projects of Mexican monarchists, the Mexican legation had refrained from the slightest insinuation. However, inasmuch as the Spanish Minister to Mexico had been marked by public opinion as the one in charge of creating and developing a monarchical party in Mexico, and as Olozaga had accused his own government of interference, the Mexican government was disposed to ask for a

142. *Ibid.*, See also Luis de la Rosa to Eduardo Goroztiza, March 11, 1848, in AHDM, 2nd Series, XIX, p. 156.

143. Mora to Minister, December 30, 1847, in AHDM, 1st Series, XXXV, p. 47.

144. De la Rosa to Goroztiza, March 11, 1848, in AHDM, 2nd Series, XIX, p. 156.

friendly explanation. Goroztiza also advised the Minister to take care in his answer to Olozaga, since the affair was highly dangerous to Mexico's welfare and might serve as a banner for the monarchists.¹⁴⁵ The answer of the Duke of Montemayor demonstrated the interest Spain had in allaying all suspicion of any intervention in the monarchist project in Mexico. Despite newspaper speculation, he declared, Spain had abstained from participation in the affair. As for Bermudez de Castro, the Spanish Minister remarked that Mexican officials had made contrary observations about Bermudez during his tenure in Mexico. With regard to the accusations in the Cortes, Montemayor observed that if the Spanish government had suspected such accusations would have had any effect in Mexico, Spain would have declared solemnly its non-participation in any such projects, if these had existed. Also, the Spanish government had recognized Mexico's independence, continued to do so, and decidedly refused to take any part in her political affairs.¹⁴⁶

After his repeated warnings about France and her policy, Mora notified his government on February 29, 1848, of a complete policy reversal. The revolution in France had changed the situation, "the colossus which threatened us with its monarchical intervention exists

145. Ibid., p. 157.

146. Montemayor to Goroztiza, July 2, 1848, quoted in AHDM, 2nd Series, XIX, pp. 157-158.

no more."¹⁴⁷ The republican victory seemed to have ended, for a time, monarchist activity in France.

Fernando Mangino, Minister to France, had complained to Luis de la Rosa, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, about listening to information from other legations in Europe concerning intentions attributed to the French government to constitute a monarchy in Mexico, and maintained no such project existed. He believed it would be more advantageous mutually to communicate all the information with respect to Mexico which they acquired in their respective legations; and then investigate the origin, basis, and similarity of incidents before notifying the government, so that it would not be alarmed without reason.¹⁴⁸ For example, the idea of sending the Duke of Montpensier to be king was one of those "vulgar pieces of news which circulate in the cafes or among the gossips of the Bolsa," destitute of any basis, and such nonsense that Mangino wondered at the stupidity of some Mexican diplomats who had advised their country it was worthy of attention.¹⁴⁹ After this veiled reference to Mora and Pereda, Mangino proceeded to demonstrate the patent absurdity and improbability of the idea that Louis

147. Mora to Minister, London, February 29, 1848, in AHDM, 1st Series, XXXV, pp. 54-55.

148. Mangino to Minister, March 1, 1848, AHDM, 2nd Series, VI, pp. 21-24.

149. Ibid.

Philippe would try to elevate Montpensier to the throne of Mexico, especially since the Duke was heir presumptive to the throne of Spain, in the event Isabella II were to die without direct succession. What of the United States and Britain?, Mangino asked. Surely they would not sit idly by and allow this to happen. Besides, who was to pay the expenses, since the treasuries of France and Spain were already on the verge of bankruptcy?¹⁵⁰

Before Mangino's note reached him, Luis de la Rosa had addressed one to Mangino which announced that the government had learned, from the Mexican legation in London, of a plot to establish a monarchy. Louis Philippe was said to be sympathetic and would be pleased to see his son Montpensier on the throne. Rosa expressed surprise that Mangino had mentioned nothing of this in his dispatches and instructed him to make an immediate and detailed investigation and report the results to Mora in London. Because he had received information that Valdivielso and Loperena were involved in the affair, Rosa recommended they be watched.¹⁵¹ Mangino also was to indicate what influence Louis Philippe had in Spanish policy, especially with regard to the establishment of a monarchy, for in any agreement between the two

150. Ibid.

151. Luis de la Rosa to Mangino, March 11, 1848, in AHDM, 2nd Series, VI, pp. 25-26.

powers there was reason to believe France would dominate, and this was prejudicial to Mexican interests.¹⁵²

Mangino was less than pleased to have to report to Mora, whom he did not like, and reminded Rosa that "the Mexican legation in France, while the supreme government does not dispose otherwise, is not subordinate to that residing in London, as Señor Mora seems to pretend . . . I fear that Señor Mora is trying for personal ends, to discredit me with the supreme Mexican Government."¹⁵³

The Mexican chargé d'affaires in Rome had received similar instructions from Rosa to "explore the dispositions which the government of His Holiness has toward this affair and with scrupulosity and exactitude communicate them to Señor Mora our Minister in London."¹⁵⁴

José María Montoya reported to Rosa from Rome May 18, 1848, that any plans to put Montpensier on the throne of Mexico would be difficult to realize, particularly since Louis Philippe had been dethroned. As for the Pope, he had so many troubles of his own with the Pontifical States,

152. Ibid.

153. Quoted in Florstedt, Mora, P. 521.

154. Luis de la Rosa to S. Encargado de Negocios en Roma, Queretaro, March 11, 1848, in Joaquín Ramírez Cabans, Las Relaciones entre México y el Vaticano, AHDM, 1st Series, XXVII (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1938), pp. 206-207.

Montoya believed there was little probability that he would concern himself with plans to establish a monarchy in Mexico and noted that "only in Madrid could agents have such ideas."¹⁵⁵

Mora concurred in this last observation. He observed that "the principal monarchist projects exist in Spain, and having the interests of the Queen Mother as incentive, . . . projects which could be salutary to them will not be abandoned." He mentioned that the Duke and Duchess of Montpensier now resided in Spain, where neither General Cruz nor Queen Christina, whom he believed behind the entire intrigue, were disposed to abandon projects which had cost the Queen millions of pesos.¹⁵⁶

Mora insisted the Montpensier project, which Mangino had dismissed as idle gossip, definitely existed. First, he had seen a letter signed by prominent Englishmen which solicited support to establish Montpensier and his wife as the sovereigns of Mexico. Secondly, he knew positively that they had made overtures to Palmerston for support or at least non-opposition. Thirdly, he had heard Palmerston say that England would not mix in the affairs. "These facts are certain,"

155. J. M. Montoya a Sr. Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y de Gobernación de la Republica. Roma, 18 de Mayo, 1848, Ibid., XXVII, pp. 206-207.

156. Mora to Rosa, London, May 29, 1848, in AHDM, 1st Series, XXXV, pp. 66-70.

asserted Mora. The project was French in origin and, after the February 1848 revolt, had transferred operations to Spain where it existed with the same determination if not with equal means to realize its objectives.¹⁵⁷

In Mexico, although monarchists were rarely heard from, because of the war monarchy was still used as an issue, this time by the United States as a sort of justification--to make Mexico safe for democracy. A proclamation furnished General Taylor and addressed to the people of Mexico announced:

Your government is in the hands of tyrants and usurpers. . . . it is your military rulers who have reduced you to this deplorable condition. It is these tyrants, and their corrupt and cruel satelites, gorged with the peoples treasure, by whom you are oppressed and impoverished, some of whom boldly advocated a monarchical government and would place a European prince on the throne of Mexico. We come to obtain reparation for repeated wrongs and injuries. . . . already they have abolished the liberty of the press, as the first step towards the introduction of that monarchy which it is their real purpose to proclaim and to establish.¹⁵⁸

On May 11, 1847, General Winfield Scott issued a proclamation at Jalapa wherein he explained that one cause of the war was the desire to put a stop to monarchical plans.

157. Mora to Minister, London, August 31, 1848, Ibid., XXXV, pp. 93-94.

158. U.S. Congress, House, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., House Exec. Doc., No. 60, p. 166.

Your new government disregarded your national interests as well as those of continental America, and yielded, moreover, to foreign influences the most opposed to those interests--the most fatal to the future of Mexican liberty, and of that republican system which the United States holds it a duty to preserve and to protect. Duty, honor, and dignity, placed us under the necessity of not losing a season, of which the monarchical party was fast taking advantage. As not a moment was to be lost, we acted with a promptness and decision suited to the urgency of the case, in order to avoid a complication of interests which might render our relations more difficult and involved.¹⁵⁹

This brought no little consternation to the State Department and President Polk. Secretary of War, William L. Marcy, in a note to Scott said:

I have received and laid before the President the copy of your proclamation to the Mexican nation of the 11th day of May. The considerations you have presented to the people of Mexico as inducements to them to wish for peace, and to concur on measures for the accomplishment of that desirable object, are well selected and ably enforced. As it would not have been your design to enter into a full discussion of the causes which led to the war, it is not to be taken as an authoritative exposition of the views of the executive in this respect, but he regards it as a document containing 'topics and sentiments the most likely to find a response in the bosoms of the Mexicans, and to promote the cause of justice, moderation, and peace.'¹⁶⁰

159. Proclamation of General Winfield Scott, Jalapa, May 11, 1847, Ibid., p. 972.

160. Marcy to Scott, June 15, 1847, Ibid., p. 275. (Italics Mine).

The proclamation was originally written in Spanish under the direction of General Scott. He was induced to write it by "persons of very high standing and influence, some of them of the church, who suggested topics and sentiments the most likely to find a response in the bosoms of the Mexicans, and to promote the cause of justice, moderation and peace."¹⁶¹ These very same words were used when General Scott transmitted the proclamation to Marcy and so perhaps it is not strange Marcy used them in his reply.

The North American, a newspaper sustained by officers of the invading United States Army and which advocated annexation to the United States, said the proclamation had revealed "the secret motives which actuated the government of the United States to make war on Mexico."¹⁶² The proclamation had its faults, but there was no doubt, declared the editorialist, that it expressed the wishes of the American people to see Mexico constitute itself on pure republican principles.

We should abandon our colonial beliefs, and . . . the policy of this continent should be the mutual support of its republic and not to permit the European monarchies to exercise any influence in our affairs--an old and favorite idea of Mexico, which was attempted to be verified at the Congress of Panama and afterwards at Tacubaya.¹⁶³

161. Scott to Marcy, Jalapa, May 20, 1847, Ibid., p. 964 (Italics by author).

162. The North American, October 22, 1847; Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 530, note 24.

163. The North American, October 22, 1847.

Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, Spanish Minister to Mexico, insisted that the proclamation "indicated the principle preoccupation of the United States was the destruction of European influence on the American continent." He also reported that United States officials were so very much occupied with the question of monarchy that they interrogated all travelers from the capital as to whether the monarchical proposals of Santa Anna were certain or not.¹⁶⁴

The return of Paredes to Mexico was the occasion of a resurgence of rumors, gossip, and speculation. Nicolas P. Trist, United States Commissioner to Mexico, believed the alarm which Paredes' return caused among republicans was entirely unfounded as far as any supposed connection between his return and the introduction of a monarchy headed by Montpensier was concerned.¹⁶⁵ One rumor which surrounded his reappearance was that a paper was being circulated for signatures by 3,000 landholders as one of the conditions for French

164. S. Bermúdez de Castro to First Secretary, Mexico, May 29, 1847. Despacho #489, in CM. Bermúdez de Castro had little admiration for Scott's tactical ability: "So few forces must guard a line seventy leagues long and occupy such important cities as Puebla, Perote, Jalapa, and Vera Cruz. If there were a sign of resistance in this nation, a few hours would suffice to exterminate an army so poor and disseminated. But its chiefs trust in the indifference, and apathy of the country, in the ineptitude and venality of its directors."

165. Trist to Buchanan, Mexico, October 25, 1847, in Manning, Inter-American Affairs, VIII, pp. 958-964.

intervention. "No such promise has been made," declared Trist, who considered the whole thing sheer invention.¹⁶⁶ Although Paredes, had been flattered and feted by France and England, neither country had anything to do with his project:

Although one of the honestest and bravest men they have ever had, he is a fool and a drunkard; certainly not the sort of person who would be selected by the European courts, to carry on an intrigue of this kind, or play any part whatever in such a game, unless it were that of a marplot, set to work on a false plan, in order that his absurdities might draw off attention from the real intrigue: it has occurred to me that this might possibly be the case in the present instance, although the supposition is certainly a very farfetched one.¹⁶⁷

Despite the fact that he did not believe any promise of intervention was made, Trist nevertheless observed an increase not only in the monarchical party, but also in the belief that monarchy was the best recourse against anarchy. If nothing else this increase might offer "the strongest temptation to kingly ambition on the other side of the Atlantic, and to give to its indulgence the air of being in conformity with the national wish."¹⁶⁸

When questioned as to the policy the United States would follow in the event an attempt was made to erect a monarchy, Trist replied

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid.

168. Ibid.

that even though the United States would not permit this to take place by means of foreign intervention and would prefer it not take place at all, the fundamental principle of United States' policy was to leave the form of government to be determined by every nation for itself.¹⁶⁹

The American Star, originally published in Puebla, and which was abusive toward Mexicans in general and toward Santa Anna and Mexican troops in particular,¹⁷⁰ devoted an entire editorial to the return of Paredes. It quoted an article from El Monitor Republicano which stated Paredes had met with Father Jarauta and his guerillas at Tulancingo and resolved to call for European intervention. Albeit the American Star doubted this, it noted Paredes was "known as the leader of the royal party in Mexico and he is determined to take advantage of the present distracted state of the Republic to gain the ascendance."¹⁷¹ It stated that although republicans clung to the idea that the one great object of his visit to Europe was to further his monarchist notions, this was not necessarily true, especially in view of a manifesto Paredes issued which "contains the purest and most patriotic motives on the part of Paredes in visiting Europe."¹⁷²

169. Ibid.

170. Bancroft, Mexico, V, p. 530, Note 24.

171. The American Star, December 11, 1847.

172. The American Star, December 25, 1847.

The North American had published an extract from a United States' newspaper, Delta, which gave an account of a plan of Paredes, said to be endorsed by the king of France, to place Montpensier on the throne of Mexico if 3,000 landholders pledged their support.¹⁷³ The editor of the New York Herald declared he had seen Paredes frequently in Paris and understood he was intriguing there to get the King of France to send Montpensier to Mexico backed by a French army and fleet.¹⁷⁴

However, these accounts were little more than repetitions of the rumors which had already made the rounds of the courts and salons of Europe. The puros used them to "wave the bloody shirt," as it were. The monarchists, among whom were many good men who had the welfare of their country at heart, had little strength. Trist observed that although they carried on intrigues of one kind or another, these "excite no apprehension whatever that they can result in anything favorable to their object, they are incapable in themselves of producing even a transient effect upon the stability of the government or to effect it in any manner."¹⁷⁵

173. The North American, January 15, 1848.

174. Ibid.

175. Trist to Buchanan, January 25, 1848, in Diplomatic Despatches, Mexico, 1823-1906, NA, RG 59.

Nevertheless, since Paredes had sat out the war in Europe, and as he was reputed to have monarchist learnings, he remained a favorite liberal whipping boy. Editor John H. Peoples of the American Star devoted another lengthy article on March 11, 1848, to a review of Paredes' career from the time of the San Luis Potosi pronouncement, and dragged out the monarchist threat all over again.¹⁷⁶

A new newspaper appeared on the scene in Mexico City November 16, 1848, named El Universal. It generally followed the same line as had El Tiempo two years before. It ridiculed the federal system, the French revolution, and always strove to demonstrate that a republic was unsuited to Mexico. Just as its predecessor, it too had its opponents--in this case particularly El Siglo XIX--with which it carried on a lively polemic. Perhaps in reaction to the outcome of the war, it stressed the notion of an equilibrium of power to resist the preponderance of North America, and was much more cautious than El Tiempo in the exposition of the notion of monarchy.¹⁷⁷ However, José María Lacunza, Secretary of Foreign Relations, in a letter to Mora, noted that while El Universal had not clearly said it wanted a king, "it speaks so much of unitary government, satirizing in such a

176. The American Star, March 11, 1848.

177. Reyes Heróles, Liberalismo Mexicano, II, p. 350.

manner the present one, and exaggerating so advantageously the good things of the old regime, that it only lacks the name of monarchy, and absolute monarchy. " 178

The titular head of the party which El Universal represented was Lucas Alamán. Although the conservative position gained new adherents each day, Lacunza noted that if the day ever came when Alamán "will take off the mask and openly proclaim monarchy, I doubt very much that a quarter of its members will remain faithful since among them there are many wholehearted republicans. " However, Lacunza believed it was impossible, because of internal and external obstacles, to erect a monarchy in Mexico. 179

Mariano Otero compared the reception given El Universal as similar to that given the pamphlet of Gutiérrez de Estrada in 1840, or that produced by El Tiempo during the Paredes administration, although he considered it as an "organ of ideas still more retrograde and absolutistic." 180

178. Lacunza to Mora, Mexico, November 12, 1849., in García, Documentos, VI, pp. 149-150. A director and one of the editors of El Universal was Rafael y Villa, later implicated in monarchist intrigues.

179. Ibid.

180. Otero to Mora, May 13, 1849, García, Documentos, VI, pp. 138-143. Otero was Secretary of Foreign Relations from June to November, 1848.

El Universal, supported by distinguished Mexicans, skillfully developed conservative doctrine and historical interpretation. The conservative party was depicted as the party of order, which would conserve as sacred; tradition, religion, property, family, authority, and rational liberty--the fundamental essentials of a well-organized society.¹⁸¹

El Universal repeated the historical interpretation of El Tiempo: September 10, 1810 was not the first day of Mexico's political existence nor of her independence; Iturbide, not Hidalgo, had consummated independence.¹⁸²

The appearance of the editorial setting forth this interpretation on September 16, 1849, the anniversary of the grito de dolores, although probably not accidental, was inopportune. It caused a sensation in the capital and no end of republican indignation, not only for the manner in which it depicted the Hidalgo revolt, but also for the attack on the oratory which Don Francisco de Olaguíbel pronounced on that national holiday.¹⁸³ El Monitor Republicano termed the attacks by El Universal

181. El Universal, October 13, 1849, quoted in Reyes Heróles, Liberalismo Mexicano, II, pp. 351-352.

182. El Universal, September 16, 1849.

183. Zamacois, XIII, 295. Olaguíbel, a liberal writer, became Minister to France in 1855.

against Hidalgo, Morelos and other liberals of the revolution of 1810 as a "crime without example."¹⁸⁴

El Universal published a series of articles, clarifying what it had said on September 16, with the title "Vindication of the history and independence of Mexico," wherein the editors attested:

Our editorial published September 16 last, had no other object than to vindicate our history of the injury, which to our point of view, has been made to it, relating among its most glorious events the cry of Dolores and the insurrection which was its consequence; and it was in our mind to erase from the independence of Mexico the stigma of its name and glory having had such a low origin.¹⁸⁵

In congress, several deputies, among them Guillermo Prieto, made a motion which in effect would have amounted to a denunciation of El Universal---but the motion was defeated 39 to 22.¹⁸⁶ This, plus the refusal of a leading republican newspaper, El Monitor Republicano, to discuss the historical points involved, because it might "create doubts and perhaps produce incredulity," gave the position held by El Universal a certain degree of authority which the conservative party used to advantage.¹⁸⁷ Although El Monitor Republicano and other papers

184. Ibid.

185. Quoted in Reyes Heróles, Liberalismo Mexicano, II, 352.

186. Zamacois, XIII, 297.

187. Ibid., pp. 297-298.

refrained from entering the lists against El Universal, a group of individual republicans did not--notable among them the ubiquitous José María Tornel.¹⁸⁸

The war had a tremendous impact on the intellectual community in Mexico--both liberal and conservative.¹⁸⁹ The humiliation of so disastrous a defeat; the loss of perhaps half the nation's territory; and the occupation of the country by the troops of a victorious conqueror, brought liberal and conservative to an examination of solutions which might bring salvation to Mexico. Much as fifty years later Spain was to have her "generation of 98," this was Mexico's "generation of 48," borne of a decade of dreary revolutions, mediocrity, war, and disaster. Both liberal annexationists and conservative monarchists agreed on one thing--the inability of Mexico to govern herself.¹⁹⁰

In spite of a sizeable moderate party, factions became more sharply divided than ever before, and liberal and conservative alike appealed to traditional programs for solutions to the crisis which

188. Ibid., p. 298.

189. For a fine review of this impact see: Charles A. Hale, The Problem of Independence in Mexican Thought, 1821-1853 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1957) and Charles A. Hale, "The War with the United States and the Crisis in Mexican Thought," The Americas, XIV (October, 1957), pp. 153-173.

190. Otero to Mora, Mexico, October 14, 1848, in García, Documentos, VI, p. 120.

confronted Mexico, and presaged the great conflict to come.¹⁹¹

Liberals reached back to 1833 for their traditional solutions; Mexico had to be reformed; she had to be freed of the 'colonial mentality' which blocked her progress; and society had to be changed to fit republican institutions.¹⁹²

Conservatives, on the other hand, thought this was futile and insisted institutions must be adapted to fit society. Thus, the church and the army, as bulwarks of society, must not be tampered with. The Conservative appeal also included a return to the conditions of 1821 and a constitutional monarchy backed by principles which would assure its success.¹⁹³

Another factor which had a great impact, especially on conservative thinking, was the February 1848 revolt in France.¹⁹⁴ The outcome of the war had left such a profound impression on Mexico that some liberals were convinced the monarchy would have been constituted but for the revolution in France.¹⁹⁵ Liberals in Mexico feared

191. Hale, The Problem of Independence in Mexican Thought, 1821-1853, p. 242.

192. Ibid., p. 267.

193. Ibid., p. 307.

194. This aspect has not been sufficiently examined by scholars. Hale does not mention it at all.

195. Otero to Mora, October 14, 1848, in García, Documentos, VI, p. 120.

that the revolution which had destroyed the monarchy and threatened property in France and had brought on a reaction there, would cause a similar reaction in Mexico, for they noted a stirring of the monarchist party.¹⁹⁶

It is quite possible this renewed monarchist activity was also the effect of an announcement that the Mexican government would not apply funds received from the indemnity provided by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to indemnify English bondholders. The British Consul General in Mexico founded a newspaper, El Herald, which supported the bondholders' position and also appeared to have given some close support to the monarchist position.¹⁹⁷

The rumors which came from Europe concerning monarchist intrigue, and which contributed to renewed monarchist activity in Mexico, conceivably had some foundation. However, lack of available documentation, particularly from Spanish sources, precludes any definite statement. Furthermore, the issue of monarchy, despite allegations raised in the press, seemed to have little real substance in Mexico during this period.¹⁹⁸

196. Ibid.

197. Ibid., cf. also Florstedt, Mora, pp. 529-530.

198. This, perhaps, may best be borne out by Santa Anna, whose policies shifted with the prevalent current of opinion. In 1846 he insisted monarchies were not for America. (See below, Chapter VI, note 161.)

FINAL ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A MONARCHY

Only a fool could maintain that only my words were those which animated those great powers.

Hidalgo

I should be glad to do it, but how is it to be done?

Napoleon III

In September 1852, Juan Antonio y Zayas, Spanish Minister to Mexico, recommended to the Captain General of Cuba that if, as he had been assured, Santa Anna came to Cuba on his way to Mexico, he be received with distinction and be encouraged to accept the nomination to the presidency which had been offered him.

Two considerations move me to this, the first, that he was always very partial and inclined to the interests which Spain had here and the second, that in spite of his defects, he is the only man. . . whose rule can stop the dissolution of this republic into tiny independent republics, a conclusion which the lack of energy on the part of the government of Mexico and the action of the federal institutions, makes more possible each day.¹

Six months later, March 16, 1853, Santa Anna was declared president. On March 23 Lucas Alamán sent Santa Anna a letter, which presented the position of the conservatives; it was delivered to him as he arrived

1. D. Juan Antonio y Zayas to Captain General of the Island of Cuba, Mexico, September 10, 1852, in CM.

at Vera Cruz.² Antonio Haro Y Tamariz was to give Santa Anna the conservative view, that of "the men of property, the clergy and all those who seek the welfare of their country."³ First of all, they desired to preserve the Catholic religion "because we believe in it. . .we consider it as the only common bond which ties all Mexicans, . . .when all the rest have been broken and as the only one capable of maintaining the Hispanic-American race."⁴ They also wanted a responsible government, strong enough to fulfill its duties, but decidedly not a federal system. Moreover, this government should have sufficient armed force for the nation's requirements such as the security of roads, persecution of barbarous Indians, and so on. To realize these ideas it was necessary to rely on public opinion, "which is decidedly in favor of them," and the moral force of the clergy, men of property, and the sensible people, all of whom supported this position. Santa Anna was urged not to indulge in his customary retreats to Manga de Clavo, "leaving the country in hands which make a mockery of authority."⁵ These, declared Alamán, were the conditions and support offered by

2. Arrangoiz, Méjico, II, p. 340, pp. 334-335.

3. Lucas Alamán to Santa Anna, March 23, 1853 in Arrangoiz, Méjico, II, pp. 335-340.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

the conservatives; if they were not acceptable, it would be better to burn the letter and forget the whole thing.⁶

From the beginning of his administration, Santa Anna sought to strengthen his position with a series of offensive and defensive alliances with European powers.⁷ To bolster his regime, the new ministers to Spain, France, and Great Britain were instructed to seek aid.⁸ Alamán, now Secretary of Foreign Relations, sought support from France and in a conference with its Minister, Andre Levasseur, stated:

The President will be grateful for all that you do in order to aid him in tightening as much as possible the bonds of friendship between France and Mexico. . . it is your illustrious sovereign in whom we base all our future hopes. We wish to trace our political institutions from those of France, including we would be pleased to be able to follow his example to the end, establishing here an hereditary monarchy. . . which is impossible, I know it; and although Santa Anna lacks the title of emperor, because he cannot adopt it, we would wish he had such authority and force or power. But in order to obtain this result we need the sympathy of Europe in general and the support of France in particular; and when we have realized our work of regeneration, we still will require the support of our friends in order to preserve it, since we suffer the constant threat of invasion from our neighbors to the north;

6. Ibid.

7. Rivera to First Secretary, Mexico, June 4, 1853, in CM.

8. R. A. Johnson, "Santa Anna's Last Dictatorship, 1853," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 41-4 (April, 1938), pp. 281-311; R. A. Johnson, The Mexican Revolution at Ayutla, 1854-1855 (Rock Island, Ill., Augustana College Library, 1939), p. 32.

while we grow they will become more jealous of us and covet our rich territory. . . . The general and I are convinced that if the Emperor Napoleon wishes to save us he can do it; he can guarantee our independence and contribute to the development of our potential, which will be converted into a counterweight to the United States. Then there will be an American equilibrium as there is one in Europe. . . . Having destroyed the anarchy which threatened Europe, and having created for France a strong and stable situation, the Emperor has merited the gratitude and respect of all the sovereigns; his influence over them should be great; a word then will be enough to make England and Spain to decide together with France, to unite in a pact which would assure the realization of a work which will be advantageous to them.⁹

The same day that Levasseur forwarded this information, the Marques de la Rivera, Spanish Minister to Mexico, advised his government concerning the new administration of Santa Anna. He observed that the party least hostile to Spain was the party of order, stability, and ideas of good government, which was composed of "the clergy, repentant of their infidelity to Spain, the rich proprietors and the greater part of the old nobility, fearful of the despoliation of their fortunes."¹⁰ Rivera noted the conservatives had chosen Santa Anna, "the anchor of salvation, as the only Mexican capable of raising his country from the mortal prostration into which it has fallen."¹¹ However, he believed

9. Andre Levasseur to Minister, Mexico, April 30, 1853, in Diaz, I, pp. 40-45. (*Italics by author.*)

10. Juan Jiménez de Sandoval, Marques de la Rivera to First Secretary, April 30, 1853, in CM.

11. Ibid.

Santa Anna's boasts of love for Spain had a political end. Moreover, certain expressions Santa Anna had used in a discussion with him made Rivera suspect Santa Anna harbored monarchical tendencies. Furthermore, he had heard more than once that Santa Anna intended to follow the example of Iturbide.¹² Rivera did not believe this; it seemed to him the Conde de Montemolin (son of Don Carlos de Bourbon) would be an obvious choice; his consent would be easy to obtain and his election most suitable to Mexico--and at the same time would solve the problem of the Spanish succession.¹³

To give added strength to his position, Santa Anna also sought to obtain the enlistment of Prussian troops for the army, and had sent General José López Uruga to Berlin for that purpose. Baron Emilio de Richthofen, Prussian Minister to Mexico, declared he could not in conscience cooperate in that request because of Mexico's financial status, the small likelihood that enlistment promises would be fulfilled, and the humiliation and envy which would be aroused among the native troops.¹⁴

The French Minister to Mexico was opposed to any similar recruitment in France because some who had previously enlisted "were starving of hunger here without ever having been occupied in the object

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Despatch No. 14, Marques de la Rivera to First Secretary, Mexico, May 27, 1853, in CM.

for which they were destined nor having obtained any of the brilliant proposals which were made to them at the time of their enlistment."¹⁵ Rivera observed that, since French and Prussian aid were not possible, Spain was left "as the only power which could offer Mexico efficacious aid at the present time."¹⁶ He noted that monarchical tendencies were imputed to Santa Anna and the existence of those, such as the ten thousand Spaniards resident in Mexico, who would support such designs. Although Rivera did not believe Santa Anna would attempt to resurrect the Plan of Iguala, still he recognized it as a possibility and thought Spain should be prepared, lest, through her second refusal, the throne be offered to some other royal house.¹⁷ In any event, Rivera did not believe Spain should commit herself to support Santa Anna, "until we see what advantages are indicated for Spain and how they reckon the probabilities for success."¹⁸

Having failed to obtain treaties of alliance or support from European powers, Santa Anna now resolved to ask Europe to establish a monarchy in Mexico and confided this delicate mission to Gutiérrez

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Despatch No. 20, Rivera to First Secretary, Mexico, June 4, 1853, in CM.

Estrada.¹⁹ Ever since the publication of his sensational pamphlet in 1840, Gutiérrez, with stubborn singlemindedness, had pursued his attempts to form a monarchy in Mexico. In 1842 he had approached the British and French governments with his ideas,²⁰ and in 1847 he had written a pamphlet²¹ addressed to the British government and to King Louis Philippe of France wherein he had advocated a conference by France and England to constitute a monarchy in Mexico as an effective counterbalance to United States' pretensions. In 1846 he had first approached Lord Aberdeen, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, and then turned to Prince Metternich of Austria, who dismissed him with a request that he be sent a memorandum on the subject.²² This did not disturb Gutiérrez; accordingly, he sent the memorandum and noted that with the advent of the Paredes' administration the time had arrived to bring the monarchical sentiments of the Mexican people to bloom.²³ He observed that Metternich at one time had mentioned he would be

19. Hidalgo, Proyectos, p. 39; Hidalgo to Francisco de Paula Arrangoiz, April 18, 1862 in Hidalgo, Cartas, pp. 36-37.

20. Corti, I, p. 29.

21. See above, Chapter IV.

22. Corti, I, p. 30.

23. Ibid.

favorable to the idea--were an Austrian prince chosen.²⁴ Metternich's answer was unsatisfactory to Gutiérrez, who by now had settled in Rome. But the Mexican monarchist was persistent, and in another letter referred to the threat of United States expansion and the consequent spread of Republican principles, and appealed to Europe to right the balance of power in her own economic and commercial interests.²⁵ The Chancellor replied to Gutiérrez in general terms and did not pursue the subject further--European problems were more pressing.²⁶ In January 1848, Gutiérrez wrote yet another pamphlet addressed to the necessity for a balance of power to save Mexico.²⁷ However, despite all his pamphletting and letter writing, he had not been able to win much support.

With the coming of the Santa Anna administration, prospects brightened for Gutiérrez and his proposals. Santa Anna, who knew of his activities, now declared his "confidence in the patriotism, the merits, and the devotion" of Gutiérrez Estrada, and commissioned him to enter into negotiations with the courts of Paris, Vienna, London, and Madrid "for the establishment of a monarchy derived from one of the

24. Ibid.

25. Corti, I, p. 31.

26. Corti, I, p. 32.

27. See above, Chapter IV.

dynastic houses of these powers."²⁸ Gutiérrez now had official credentials and was no longer simply one of many mexican émigrés and exiles

28. Quoted in Bock, p. 28: There is a problem of the date of Gutiérrez Estrada's commission. Bock notes that Gutiérrez produced a copy dated July 1, 1854, during a conversation with Nassau-Senior, April 27, 1863, that Corti also uses this date but that Dexter Perkins dates it July 1, 1853 as does Christian Schefer (cf. Bock, p. 601, note 37). However the weight of evidence seems to favor the 1854 date. Hidalgo in his letter to Francisco de Paula de Arrangoiz, April 18, 1862, stated: "General Santa Anna finding himself in the fulness of his powers in 1854, as he had just been authorized by the nation to give it the form of government which he believed most suitable, resolved to ask of Europe the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico, with a prince of royal lineage. He confided this delicate mission to José María Gutiérrez Estrada, who so valiently had initiated this redeeming thought in 1840," Hidalgo to Arrangoiz, April 18, 1862 in Hidalgo, Cartas, p. 37, also Bock, Appendix U, p. 572.

A copy of the letter may be found in Emmanuel Domenech. Histoire du Mexique. . . (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1868), II, pp. 268-269. It is dated July 1, 1854.

Arrangoiz gives the Santa Anna administration rather short shrift in his Mexico from 1808 to 1867 and does not mention the letter. He mentions instructions given by Diez de Bonilla (Secretary of Foreign Relations after the death of Alamán, June 2, 1853) to Gutiérrez Estrada and Hidalgo to solicit intervention, but that the fall of the Ministry of the Conde de San Luis in Madrid put an end to official negotiations for a time. These negotiations were kept secret from the rest of the cabinet. Arrangoiz points out that while Diez de Bonilla denied he had written anything about monarchy he (Arrangoiz) had seen a letter of Bonilla's dated August 1, 1853, containing instructions on the affair to Hidalgo. (Arrangoiz, II, pp. 341-342.) Zamacois in his Historia de México states that Alamán had sent instructions to Gutiérrez and Hidalgo and that when Bonilla became Secretary he sent new instructions to both of them to continue working to get the three powers to agree to send a Spanish prince. (Zamacois, Historia, XIII, pp. 672-73.)

who sought refuge--and revenge--in the capitals of Europe. It was during his sojourn in Rome that he became acquainted with another Mexican expatriate, José Manuel Hidalgo y Esnaurrizar.²⁹ Hidalgo was born in Mexico. His father was Spanish consul, a friend and secretary to Iturbide. His mother "was a saint, as Archbishop Labastida has certified."³⁰ In 1847 he was a member of the National Guard, and Secretary to Manuel Eduardo de Goroztiza, who commanded a battalion called the Bravos at the battle of Churubusco, August 20, 1847. Hidalgo was taken prisoner, and later when freed under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, was appointed Attaché to the Mexican legation at London.³¹ He was in this position but two months when Valdivielso, Mexican Minister to the Papal Court, had him appointed to his staff.³² In 1853 he was transferred to the legation in London, but within a year was named Secretary at Washington upon the orders of General Juan Almonte. As he was

29. Bock, pp. 27-28. Bock, citing Dawson, places this meeting in 1850. This seems quite likely as Hidalgo, who was appointed Second Secretary at the Papal Court through the instrumentality of Valdivielso, Mexican Minister to the Court. They came to Rome in March, 1850 with the other members of the Diplomatic Corps when Pius IX returned to Rome from Naples. (José Manuel Hidalgo y Esnaurrizar, Apuntes para la Historia del Imperio de Maximiliano, in Cartas, pp. 15-124; pp. 65, 68.

30. Hidalgo, Apuntes, in Cartas, pp. 63-64; cf. also Arrangoiz, Méjico, II, pp. 414-416.

31. Arrangoiz, Méjico, II, pp. 414-415.

32. Hidalgo, Apuntes, in Cartas, p. 65.

about to leave for his new post, he received yet another appointment-- First Secretary at Madrid.³³ The latter change was made at the behest of Gutiérrez Estrada, who had received the secret commission to negotiate the candidature of a Spanish prince.³⁴ Hidalgo was particularly suited to the role; his elegant appearance and charming manner made him very popular, especially with women.³⁵ His appointment and arrival in Spain brought him to remark:

I am in Spain, land of my father. He died on spanish soil and I know that before dying he had said: "Do not forget my sons that you have spanish blood in your veins." . . . I was in the prime of life. . . I had fixed political convictions, somewhat more suspected by others than known: but my discretion was well known and to it was confided a Secret and Official Mission. . . which I carried to Madrid to aid the projects which were submitted to the Court with the intention that a Spanish prince will be seated on the throne of Moctezuma and thus tighten the bonds between both countries.³⁶

While in Rome, Hidalgo participated in the brilliant social life and met many influential people; the Dorias, Luis I and II of Bavaria, and Princess Carlotta Bonaparte. He became particularly well acquainted with

33. Arrangoiz, Méjico, II, pp. 414-415. Another indication that Gutiérrez's commission came in 1854.

34. Hidalgo to Arrangoiz, April 18, 1862, in Bock, Appendix U, p. 572; Hidalgo, Apuntes, in Cartas, p. 80.

35. Corti, I. p. 33.

36. Hidalgo, Apuntes, in Cartas, p. 80.

Pius IX who called him his "companion from Gaeta."³⁷ These connections served him in good stead at Madrid, which was especially important, for the candidate under consideration at the time was Don Juan of Bourbon.³⁸ Gutiérrez Estrada, in Madrid, sought to convince the Queen and her Prime Minister, the Conde de Luis, of his plan. According to Gutiérrez, the conservative Spanish ministry had promised support, but a revolution, which broke out in Spain in July 1854, ended the Conde de Luis ministry, and with it negotiations with Madrid.³⁹

When Santa Anna was overthrown in 1855 by the Plan of Ayutla, the legitimate basis for the Gutiérrez and Hidalgo negotiations ended, and Hidalgo lost his post at Madrid. However, both continued the negotiations in secret until the outbreak of the Crimean War broke them off

37. Hidalgo, Ibid., p. 69. Pius IX, before returning to Rome, had spent some time at the fortress of Gaeta in Naples and in April 1849, moved to the Portici Palace a few miles from Naples at the foot of Mount Vesuvius. It was at Gaeta that Hidalgo first met Pius IX. (Hidalgo, Apuntes, in Cartas, pp. 65-66.

38. Corti, I, p. 34.

39. Corti, I, p. 34. Gutiérrez had a friend at court in Angel Calderón de la Barca, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Conde de Luis cabinet. It is entirely possible the young Countess of Teba, who became Empress Eugenie in 1853, might have acquired some of her information about Mexico from the Calderóns. When the revolt overthrew the government, the Calderóns fled to Neuilly, outside Paris, to remain until 1856. Again, it is possible they had access to the French court during this time.

completely.⁴⁰

The rupture of relations between Spain and Mexico in 1857 threatened war between them. Gutiérrez and Hidalgo worked to prevent a war of vengeance. "We desired to make it profitable, asking France also to interfere, in order that both nations being agreed, the nationality of Mexico might be saved."⁴¹ Gutiérrez, in Paris, had met with Napoleon in June 1857, but the content of the interview was secret.⁴² Hidalgo, in Madrid, kept Gutiérrez informed of affairs at the Spanish court. He met several times with the Marques de Pidal, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who listened to the proposals, and Hidalgo also reached an understanding with Marshall Narvaez, President of the Council of Ministers.⁴³ The entire affair remained a secret between them, the Queen, and Cueto, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs. José María LaFragua was appointed to negotiate differences with Spain, but, as he had little success, soon left. In his stead Comonfort appointed Hidalgo

40. Corti, I, pp. 34-35. cf. also, Hidalgo, Proyectos, p. 39, and Hidalgo to Arrangoiz, April 18, 1862, in Appendix U, in Bock, Prelude, p. 572; Gutiérrez Estrada, Paris, November 28, 1861 in Diaz, II, pp. 343-344.

41. Hidalgo to Arrangoiz, Paris, April 18, 1862, in Bock, Appendix U, p. 572.

42. Gutiérrez Estrada to Vincente Benedetti, Director of Political Affairs of the French Minister of Foreign Relations, Paris, June 25, 1857, in Diaz, I, pp. 420-421.

43. Corti, I, p. 35.

as Secretary of the Legation, in the hope that his connections might prove advantageous. But this too was of no avail, and the Legation retired to Paris in 1857.⁴⁴

However, while in Madrid, Hidalgo had made a number of other important connections which proved most beneficial to his purposes. He had been treated as one of the family at the homes of the rich widow Countess of Montijo and the Duchess of Alba, respectively mother and sister of the Empress Eugenie.⁴⁵

Contrary to Corti and all historians who have used his account, Sofia Vera de Bernal, editor of Un Hambre de mundo escribe sus impresiones, Cartas de José Manuel Hidalgo y Esnaurrizar, maintains Hidalgo never knew the younger daughter of Countess de Montijo before the famous meeting at Bayonne in 1857. She bases her opinion on a letter of July 22, 1892, wherein Hidalgo related the essence of a conversation with the Princess Carlota Bonaparte. Carlota had told Hidalgo her cousin Louis Napoleon was going to marry a Spaniard, Senorita Montijo, Countess of Teba.⁴⁶ In his letter Hidalgo stated:

Not having had the honor of knowing either of the two,
I received the information about the marriage of the
French Emperor with the natural serenity of one

44. Arrangoiz, II, p. 352.

45. Hidalgo, Cartas, p. 81, note 40.

46. Ibid.

who lives removed from these events. Who would have told me that a little while later I would be received in the intimacy of these sovereigns.⁴⁷

When the meeting took place in Bayonne, according to Bernal, it was either the Countess of Montijo or the Duchess of Alba who recognized Hidalgo and introduced him to the Empress.⁴⁸ Hidalgo was invited by the Empress to spend the following day on a sea excursion she had arranged. On the holiday, without losing any time, Hidalgo expounded on the sad state of Mexico, and projects to establish a monarchy in order to save the Catholic religion and the Latin race.⁴⁹ His descriptions were so enthusiastic that Eugenie promised to speak of the affair with Napoleon III.⁵⁰

In Mexico, rumors and counterrumors of plans and proposals continued to circulate. Alexis de Gabriac, the French Minister to Mexico from 1854 to 1860, faithfully informed his government of these. During 1856 he was approached by a Mr. A. de Radepont, who sought an audience with the Emperor in order to present a plan to 'regenerate' Mexico by means of a constitutional monarchy.⁵¹ Radepont, formerly

47. Hidalgo, July 22, 1892, Ibid., p. 200.

48. Hidalgo, Cartas, p. 81, note 40.

49. Ibid.,

50. Ibid., p. 82.

51. Nota sobre un proyecto de A. de Radepont. Sin Fecha, Mexico, in Diaz, I, pp. 328-329.

with the Chief of Staff of the French African Army, had been appointed Military Attaché of the French legation at Washington in 1846 to observe the United States Army in Mexico.⁵² Upon completion of his tour of duty in 1848, he had remained in Mexico to manage a large hacienda owned by foreign interests.⁵³ There are indications that Radepont was in collusion with Gabriac and even acted as his agent to present Memorias to the French Emperor. Certainly he maintained very close relations with the French legation in Mexico; his nephew, A. de la Londe, was attached to the diplomatic mission there.⁵⁴

Surprised at hearing eminent Mexicans espouse foreign intervention as the only salvation for Mexico, Radepont had undertaken to study how this might be realized without offense to Mexican national pride.⁵⁵ He came to the conclusion that Mexico should call for a foreign prince, to be designated by Napoleon III, who would establish a constitutional

52. Ibid., cf. also A. De la Londe to Minister, Mexico, December, 1858, in Diaz, II, pp. 53-58.

53. Nota sobre un proyecto de A. de Radepont. Sin Fecha, Mexico, in Diaz, I, pp. 328-329.

54. Nota para el ministro acerca de Radepont, y las reclamaciones francesa a México, Paris, March, 1860, in Diaz, II, p. 143. Christian Schefer in his Los Origenes de la Intervención Francesa en México believes there was a plot involving Luis de la Rosa, Gabriac and others, and that Radepont was their agent, but has provided no documentation to support this contention.

55. Proyecto para la regeneración de México presentado por A. de Radepont, September, 1856, in Diaz, I, pp. 330-342.

monarchy in Mexico.⁵⁶ Radepont did not attempt to publicize his plans in Mexico, for fear the United States might intervene. He had, however, informed a wealthy Mexican from whom he received the necessary finances, to seek moral approval, not material support, in London and Paris. After he had obtained backing, and a prince was selected, he would organize support in Mexico.⁵⁷ He planned to ask France for a number of officials and agents of various civil departments to aid the new prince with the reorganization of the country, as well as five or six hundred French soldiers to serve as a cadre for the new army. A Franco-British naval escort would prevent attack from any other powers.⁵⁸ Throughout the memorial Radepont repeatedly stressed the necessity to contain the United States, and several times used the analogy of Russia to illustrate his point. That is, Europe's motives for containment of the United States were the same as those she had in halting the Russian advance; as Europe had used the Ottoman Empire as a barrier against Russia, so too she needed Mexico as a barrier against the expansion of the United States.⁵⁹ Moreover, declared Radepont, the implementation of the law which decreed the sale of clerical property

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

would result in a third of the property of Mexico passing into the hands of the United States, which, he stated, already had formed companies to buy these properties.⁶⁰ The Latin race in the New World, observed Radepont, had recognized for some time that their only enemy was the United States:

They know the destiny which awaits them is similar to that of the North American Indians: first they will lose their nationality and they will end by being absorbed by the anglo-saxon race.⁶¹

Radepont depicted the consequences of United States' expansion on the commerce and industry of Europe, the threat to Europe's Caribbean possessions, and, in a special appeal to Napoleon III's dream of a canal, the danger of United States' mastery of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and Panama.⁶² In closing, Radepont reiterated that Mexico asked "not one soldier, not one dime, we ask no more than its [Europe's] moral support, its tacit consent toward the day that we will attain the unanimous expression of the national will."⁶³

Radepont arrived in Paris in October, 1856, and was received by Alejandro, Conde Colonna-Walewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. He

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

gave Walewski the memorial wherein the project was outlined and declared he was authorized to raise the issue with the Duke d'Aumale.⁶⁴ Again he pleaded for an audience with the Emperor, for he had to report to his Mexican backers before the end of October; if his efforts were not successful, he would have to return to Mexico.⁶⁵ As the court had gone to Compiègne, Radepont gave up hope of the interview and left for England to present his case there.⁶⁶

While Radepont attempted to secure an audience with Napoleon III, Gabriac continued to press for intervention "or efficacious support to restore monarchy."⁶⁷ Apart from the necessity of maintaining equilibrium in America, France, observed Gabriac, should be considerably interested in preserving Catholicism in Mexico.⁶⁸ This was a point which Luis de la Rosa, President of the Supreme Court, had discussed with Gabriac before his death.⁶⁹ President Ignacio Comonfort told

64. Christian Schefer, Los Orígenes de la Intervención Francesa, trans. Xavier Ortiz Monasterio (Mexico: Editorial 1963), Porrúa, p. 36.

65. Radepont, Paris, October 11, 1856, in Diaz, I, p. 345.

66. Radepont, Paris, October 21, 1856, in Diaz, I, pp. 349-350.

67. Gabriac to Minister, Mexico, October 7, 1856, in Diaz, I, pp. 342-345.

68. Ibid.

69. Gabriac to Minister, Mexico, September 5, 1856, in Diaz, I, p. 323.

Gabriac that if de la Rosa had lived, "I would have been able to go to combat the rebels of the provinces without fear; today that is not possible."⁷⁰ De la Rosa, declared Gabriac, had lost all faith in the republican government and often had told him that Mexico was not made for a republic "since all its instincts, all its tastes and all its sympathies were in favor of a monarchy."⁷¹ Comonfort also had informed Gabriac of a conspiracy in Europe on the part of Santa Anna to restore his dictatorship, with the promise that he would immediately surrender the country to a Spanish prince, and that General Domingo Cortés was the agent employed to this end at Madrid. Gabriac likewise noted that Comonfort believed the Pope was influenced by Antonio Pelagio Labastida y Davalos, the exiled Bishop of Puebla, and by Gutiérrez, Manuel Larrainzar and Haro y Tamariz.⁷² Over a year later some light was shed on this revelation by Comonfort of a conspiracy in Europe on behalf of Santa Anna. The April 8, 1858 issue of El Siglo XIX published a letter of Juan José de la Garza, dated April 1, 1858, wherein de la

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Gabriac to Minister, February 9, 1857, in Diaz, I, p. 394. A biography of Labastida written by an M. Maury, an agent sent by Napoleon III to organize the police of Maximilian, claims that Labastida remitted sums of money, under the title Peter's Pence, to secret agents who worked to implant a monarchy in Mexico. Biografía de Monseñor Labastida, dirigida a su magestad El Emperador (México: Febrero 28 de 1866), p. 55.

Garza stated that the day before, troops under his command had apprehended sixteen reactionaries at Tampico from the ship Dees, among them Francisco Pacheco, Manuel F. de Jaurégui, and Rafael Rafael y Villa. A large amount of correspondence was found in their possession, and de la Garza ordered copies made of some of the more interesting.⁷³ The letters were printed in pamphlet form "by various liberals in order to extend their circulation."⁷⁴ One, a letter of a J. F. Meir y Rada, November 12, 1857, stated that "work undertaken in Europe to realize that which was thought of in 1854" was going slowly. The author of the letter declared the difficulty was not in the founding of a monarchy, but whether a Spanish prince would be well received, "because for many this would have the air of reconquest."⁷⁵ However, the affair was no longer secret, for General Cortes had told LaFragua, who in turn had given minute details to the government.⁷⁶

73. Documentos interceptados en la barra de Tampico a los prisioneros Santanistas que cayeron en poder de las tropas del E. S. D. Juan José de la Garza, con los que se prueba La Alta Traición del bando reaccionario cuyos principales corifeos desempeñan hoy los ministerios del llamado gobierno de Méjico (Reimpresos por varios liberales, para estender sus circulacion.) (Vera Cruz: Imprenta de Rafael de Zayas, Agosto de 1858), #352 LAF-BNM.

74. Ibid. De la Garza was a Brigadier General on the side of liberal forces during the War of the Reform. He later became Governor of Tamaulipas.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

Another letter, taken from Rafael Rafael y Villa, who tried to destroy it when taken prisoner, maintained it was the intention of Santa Anna to go to Mexico at all costs to recover his properties. After several months he would leave Antonio Corona in his place and go back to Turbaco never again to return to Mexico. Apparently, it was Santa Anna's idea to go along with the plan just long enough to regain some of his wealth and then leave. The author of the letter, however, observed, "we have the advantage in that, already knowing it, we will know how to conduct ourselves."⁷⁷ José María LaFragua noted the existence of documents which related the treachery of Santa Anna who "had offered to March to Mexico if they gave him 20,000 men, and to cooperate in the establishment of a monarchy." Moreover, he also commented on the existence of several juntas in Mexico, Havana, and Madrid. He remarked that, according to Domingo Cortes, among the members of the latter were Alejandro Bellange, Teodosio Lares, and Bishop Labastida. The agents in Mexico for this intrigue were Rafael Rafael, who had concluded a loan of half a million, and Manuel Lozada, who brought a memorandum which had been accepted by the Spanish government.⁷⁸ If the documents

77. Ibid.

78. José María LaFragua Mss., Mexico, April 20, 1862, in #352, LAF-BNM. La Fragua noted all this in a memorandum appended to the pamphlet in the La Fragua Collection of the Biblioteca Nacional de Mexico. He was an author and prominent member of the liberal party, and in 1846 was Secretary of Foreign Relations for two months. He held the same post from 1872 to 1875.

are authentic, they are an indication that what Comonfort had told Gab-riac, in February of 1857, had some foundation, and that there was an attempt by Santa Anna, or by others to use Santa Anna to try to gain control in order to establish a monarchy.

Radepont, meanwhile, was unsuccessful in London, where Lord Clarendon bluntly refused support for the plan.⁷⁹ He returned to Paris and in November 1856 managed to obtain his long awaited audience with Napoleon III. The little that is known of what transpired during the meeting came from some vague confidences the Emperor made to the British Ambassador, Lord Cowley.⁸⁰ Napoleon III told Cowley he was sympathetic and that if the Duke D'Aumale wanted to take a chance, he had no objections, and gave Radepont permission to say as much to the Duke.⁸¹ Radepont travelled to Spain to visit D'Aumale and received assurances which "led him to believe the Duke would not refuse to become King of Mexico if the throne was [sic] offered to him by the country."⁸² Radepont then returned to Mexico to await the outcome of his efforts. By the end of 1858, since he still had heard nothing from

79. Schefer, p. 38.

80. Ibid.

81. Cowley to Clarendon, February 5, 1857, cited in Bock, p. 31.

82. Ibid.

D'Aumale, Radepont addressed another letter to Napoleon III.⁸³ Again he spoke of the necessity to save Mexico from anarchy, and again he pointed to the threat posed by the United States. He appealed once more to the Emperor's dream of a canal by declaring that unless the Comonfort government was ousted, a treaty would be concluded by which the Isthmus of Tehuantepec would be sold to the United States.⁸⁴

Radepont thought one of the difficulties which might delay the beginning of intervention was the notion that Mexico's finances were in desperate straits. To dispel this notion, he offered to show the Emperor a letter from Alexander Bellange, Director of the Mexican Mint and brother of an illustrious French artist.⁸⁵

Mexico, declared Radepont, was an eminently Catholic and monarchical country which required the prestige of a prince:

Whose exceptional position will incontestably dominate the rivalries created by the forty years of civil war and anarchy. Consequently a combination of such stature ought not to be subject to personal consideration. France is the only country whose intervention Mexico would accept and its emperor is the only sovereign whose wisdom would be capable of putting its affairs in order. In the event of a refusal on the part of the prince (D'Aumale), one of the numerous celebrities

83. A. de Radepont to Napoleon III, Mexico, February 25, 1858, in Diaz II, pp. 6-8.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

who surround the throne of His Majesty, designated by him, will be accepted with enthusiasm, and the moral support of the emperor would be sufficient to smooth over all difficulties.⁸⁶

Perhaps Radepont was the last to know, but at Compiègne in the fall of 1858, Napoleon had told Hidalgo that the Duke D'Aumale had rejected Radepont's offer.⁸⁷

Since his 1857 meeting with the Empress Eugenie at Bayonne, Hidalgo had become an intimate in the royal household, particularly of Eugenie, and he never lost an opportunity to discourse on his favorite subject. He continued to stress the need to erect a monarchy in order to save Catholicism and the Latin race.⁸⁸ This appealed to the Empress both as a Catholic and as a Spaniard, and, in a conversation with Hidalgo at Biarritz in 1857, she said, "the establishment of a throne in Mexico had been necessary for a long time."⁸⁹

In the meantime, Gutiérrez Estrada had not been idle. In April 1857 he had approached Count Walewski in Paris to ascertain what the attitude of France might be in the event an attempt was made to form a monarchy in Mexico.⁹⁰ He was told France would not enter into any

86. Ibid.

87. Corti, I, p. 79.

88. Corti, I, p. 75, pp. 93-94.

89. Quoted in Bock, p. 44.

90. Bock, p. 31.

engagement concerning Mexico without discussing it with other powers, especially Great Britain. Thereupon Gutiérrez went to London and met with Clarendon, from whom he received no more encouragement than had Radepon.⁹¹ Gutiérrez saw Napoleon III in June 1857, and left with him a long memorandum stating the necessity for European intervention in Mexico to establish a monarchy.⁹² Although Napoleon III was sympathetic, he told Gutiérrez and others he had no pretext for intervention and that his policy with regard to America was closely bound with that of England:

Several years ago some important persons of this country came to me, described their unfortunate state, and asked my support, saying that only a monarchy could reestablish order in a country torn apart by factions, I think they also appealed to England, but at that time I could only indulge in barren hopes. In spite of my sympathy, I answered then that I did not have any pretext to intervene in Mexico, that especially in American affairs my policy was closely bound to that of England, that I believed it would be difficult to reach an agreement with the Cabinet of St. James for the objective they proposed, that we would risk a falling out with the United States and therefore it was necessary to wait for better days.⁹³

Gutiérrez's endeavors in 1857 disappointed him: "All the efforts which have aroused my zeal, were exhausted for the moment, and since the

91. Ibid.

92. Bock, p. 31.

93. Napoleon III to Count Flahault, Palais de Compiègne, October 9, 1861, in Bock, Appendix F, p. 495, cited in Bock, p. 31.

separation from my family has no object, I am disposed to return to Rome."⁹⁴

In the fall of 1858 Hidalgo was invited to Compiègne, and on the very first day of his visit was approached by the Emperor who inquired as to the news from Mexico.⁹⁵ Hidalgo replied "The news is very bad, and the country will be ruined unless Your Majesty comes to its aid."⁹⁶ He then entered into conversation with Napoleon on the subject of erecting a monarchy in Mexico but was told nothing could be done without England. The Emperor remarked to Hidalgo that he had spoken to Palmerston about the matter some weeks before. "We told him that an army and millions would be required for the purpose, and, what is more, a prince."⁹⁷ Hidalgo mentioned the candidacy of Don Juan and the Emperor replied "We thought of the Duc d'Aumale but he refuses."⁹⁸ This undoubtedly surprised Hidalgo, for he was not aware, apparently, of Radepon't's overtures on behalf of the Duke. At any rate, the Emperor had thought about the prospects of a throne for Mexico, and this encouraged Hidalgo to redouble his efforts, and speak of the great danger

94. Gutiérrez Estrada to Vincente Benedetti, Director of Political Affairs of the French Minister of Foreign Relations, Paris, July 2, 1857, in Diaz, I, p. 423.

95. Corti, I, p. 78.

96. Quoted in Corti, p. 78.

97. Quoted in Corti, p. 79.

98. Ibid.

to Mexico and the threat to all Latin influence in America, of the United States' expansion policies.⁹⁹

Napoleon III was reminded of the threat of a United States intervention several times during 1859. On January 1, Gabriac forwarded a communication from the Mexican Conservative Party which requested Napoleon's help and protection "against the ruin and downfall of their country at the hands of the United States."¹⁰⁰ The communication was written by Ignacio Aguilar, former Interior Minister under Santa Anna, who headed a Commission which counted among its members the Conde de Valle de Orizaba, the family of Hernán Cortes, Manuel Jauréqui, Francisco Miranda and others.¹⁰¹

The conservatives gave a lengthy description of the deplorable state of Mexico and the evils which plagued it. At fault were, among other things, the 1857 Constitution and the "ominous sect"---the liberal party---which had gone so far as to seek annexation to the United States.¹⁰² To save race and religion, the conservatives sought external aid to "carry out the work of freeing us from the imminent danger

99. Corti, I, p. 79.

100. Gabriac to Minister, Mexico, January 1, 1859, in Diaz, II, pp. 58-60.

101. Ibid.

102. Comunicación del partido conservador Mexicano a Napoleón III, Mexico, December 15, 1858, in Diaz II, pp. 61-64.

our existence runs and the horrible anarchy which already threatens to devour and consume us."¹⁰³

On April 27, 1859, the Conservative Party addressed another letter to Napoleon III. It was written in response to a new development "which discouraged even more our already almost dead hopes and which we have no doubt also will cause a profound impression on the cabinets of Europe themselves as soon as they receive the information."¹⁰⁴ This "new development" was the recognition, by Robert Maclane, the new United States Minister to Mexico, of the Juarez government at Vera Cruz.¹⁰⁵ The previous Minister, John Forsyth, was an ardent advocate of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny:

Whether Mexico maintains her nationality, or falls to pieces, we have a deep interest in her future, and should secure an influence in her counsels. If she cannot stand without the aid of some friendly power. . . what power is it that should occupy the commanding position of benefactor and friend? If the United States refuse, some other must. What if it comes in the form of a French Prince, supported by ten thousand bayonets? Or of British gold, effecting that floating mortgage on her territories which we decline? Believe me Sir, we cannot play the "dog in the manger" with our Monroe Doctrine. Mexico cannot afford to perish for the want of a Medical interventor, because we choose not to be the Physician. She must lean on some power, shall it

103. Ibid.

104. Carta del Partido Conservador Mexicano a Napoleon III, Mexico, April 27, 1859, in Diaz, II, pp. 79-82.

105. Ibid.

be Europe or the United States? I answer unhesitatingly the United States, by every consideration of humanity, good neighborhood, and sound policy. For if it be Europe, I can see a multitude of contingencies that will make Mexico the battle ground for the maintenance of American supremacy in America; the theatre for the practical illustration of the value and virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, I am of course a believer in what in the political nomenclature of the day is termed 'Manifest Destiny.' In other words I believe in the teachings of experience and history, and that our race, I hope our institutions, --are to spread over this continent and that the hybrid races of the West, must succumb to and fade away before the superior energies of the white man. Our chief danger is, that the national temperament will hurry us too rapidly in the path of destiny, and that the inherited passion for land, will break over the barriers of national honor and national safety.¹⁰⁶

On his own recognizance he had broken off diplomatic relations with Mexico in May, 1858.¹⁰⁷

The Conservative Party, in its letter of April 1859, declared Mexico had as much grievance to break off relations as had Forsyth. He had hidden silver, which had been stolen from the Cathedral of Morelia, in his home and had dared to propose to Zuloaga the sale of Mexican territory.¹⁰⁸ As if his recognition policy were not enough Maclane had brought with him as secretary of the United States legation,

106. Forsyth to Cass, Mexico City, April 4, 1857, in Manning, Inter-American Affairs, IX, pp. 907-908, quoted in Bock, pp. 32-33.

107. Bock, p. 34.

108. Carta Del Partido Conservador Mexicano a Napoleon III, Mexico, April 27, 1859, in Diaz, II, p. 80.

a Mr. Frasher, one of the chief filibusters who had invaded Cuba.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, there was in the works a "secret treaty" by which extensive portions of Mexican national territory would be absorbed by the United States.¹¹⁰

Although each time the Conservative Party requested intervention to establish a stable government and institutions and to negate the power of the United States, it should be noted that in these communications nothing was said about a monarchy per se.

The "secret treaty" referred to by the Conservatives was the MacLane-Ocampo Treaty signed on December 14, 1859. In the eyes of Europe, the treaty seemed to bear out what the conservatives had said about the intentions of the United States. The treaty granted the United States perpetual right of transit across Mexico by three routes; the right to protect its citizens by force of arms within Mexican territory under certain conditions; and it also contained another clause, wherein Mexico expressed its willingness to accept the protectorate of the United States under specific conditions.¹¹¹

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid. The Conservative Party sent the same letters to Spain and England.

111. Bancroft, V, pp. 774, and note 24; Bock pp. 36, 39.

When the news of the treaty reached Europe, the reaction and indignation was widespread.¹¹² The London Times declared that ratification of the treaty would bring Mexico under the virtual dominion of the United States.¹¹³ The Daily Picayune of New Orleans, in its December 21, 1859 issue, expressed surprise at the magnitude of the concessions made by Mexico for the amount of money involved.¹¹⁴ Spanish newspapers suggested opposition against the "ambitious projects of the United States" to protect "the Latin race in America against absorption by their Anglo-Saxon neighbors."¹¹⁵ Hidalgo, in a conversation with Antonio Eduardo Thouvenel, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared the treaty menaced "the independence and nationality of Mexico . . . adversely affects European commerce and threatens the political equilibrium in America."¹¹⁶ Calderón Collantes, Spanish Secretary of State noted: "This treaty if ratified, will produce complications which will affect not only Spain but all the commercial nations."¹¹⁷ The

112. Bock, p. 39.

113. Alejandro Villaseñor y Villaseñor, El Tratado de MacLane-Ocampo (Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1962), p. 216.

114. Ibid.

115. Buchanan to Russell, March 14, 1860, quoted in Bock, p. 39.

116. Thouvenel-Hidalgo Conversation, Paris, March 22, 1860, quoted by Bock, p. 46.

117. Calderón Collantes to Spanish Ambassadors in Paris and London, Madrid, May 4, 1860, quoted by Bock, p. 56.

possibility that the United States might gain commercially at European expense, and the threat to Mexican independence, concerned the Foreign Offices of Great Britain, Spain, and France.¹¹⁸ For the Mexican exiles in Europe, the MacLane-Ocampo Treaty had great propaganda value and they used it to point out the need for direct intervention.

Since the French legation in Mexico had looked after Prussian affairs for four years, Gabriac, in January 1860, received the newly appointed Prussian Minister, Henry Wagner. Among other things, he discussed with Wagner the state of affairs in Mexico, particularly after the MacLane-Ocampo Treaty.¹¹⁹ Wagner's remarks so impressed Gabriac and corroborated his own views that he reproduced them in extenso for his government. Wagner declared that all he had seen and heard in the five or six weeks he had been in Mexico confirmed his belief that "it is very important that Europe take it as the center of their policy the establishment of an equilibrium in the Americas whose necessity grows more urgent each day."¹²⁰ He had come to Mexico via the United States and what he had seen there disillusioned him:

. . . All is cunning, corruption, disorder, vulgarity
in customs and things. There is neither government

118. Bock, p. 39.

119. Gabriac to Minister, Mexico, January 27, 1860, in Diaz, II, pp. 128-131.

120. Ibid.

nor nation; neither patriotism nor civic virtue; it is the decaying fever of the dollar; in a word, it is the most repugnant country in the world. . . it is a center which radiates social dissolution everywhere; it is an agglomeration of men without scruples, whose unlimited ambition dreams of attaining, by any means, the usurpation of the Americas and the material emancipation of Europe in order to obtain the Domination of Asia through the Pacific.¹²¹

While in Vera Cruz, Wagner was present at a dinner during which MacLane had said in a loud voice that the only way to pacify and civilize Mexico was "to destroy or reduce to slavery all the colored race, native or african." But, continued Wagner, MacLane promised that he would make one exception for having been President and having signed a treaty with the United States. Of the obvious reference to Juarez, Wagner stated: "It seems incredible, but it is not less certain."¹²² Wagner declared that Buchanan, in order to placate the South, sought to extend slavery territory by conquest of Mexico. Wagner continued with an examination of the consequences of the MacLane-Ocampo treaty:

In the first place it would entail for Mexico the loss of the Isthmus and of Yucatan, and in the second, the loss of the Gulf. The advantages which they would concede to North American commerce are so ruinous for Europe, that from Vera Cruz I wrote to Berlin to urge the government of the King to send representatives to Washington to seriously protest against some stipulations. . . . For France and England the situation is

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

very grave, since their Atlantic Merchant Marine will be ruined. I am certain this treaty will not be approved in Paris. But England is actually in a position so humiliating with respect to the United States that if she does not support you, it can do nothing. Only by means of a legal agreement with you, with Spain, with us, could--and should--England shake off the yoke of the United States. It has occurred to me, since I began my voyage to this rich Mexico, that the only way of saving it would be that the Emperor Napoleon--whose counsels are so powerful and whose grandeur of design so well known--would agree with all the courts of Europe, after compelling the United States to take part in this agreement, to establish a monarchy here with the person of one of the princes of the family of Orleans. The Yankees would begin to scream, but would go no further, since they have neither army nor navy, and their impotence would be evident before a European concert. This nation does not appear to me to be better made for a republic than the Chinese. . . .[to]want to assimilate the Yankee form of government violates their traditions and customs. Thus I am not in agreement with our colleague from England, [George W.] Mathew. I will tell you confidentially that his conduct makes him seem to me an intriguer. He maintains an active correspondence with MacLane; he sends him an infinity of false information about Mexico. He is a diplomat to the taste of the Yankees and English, so that we already know what he is.¹²³

One obstacle to European intervention was Great Britain, which would not deviate from her policy of non-interference in Mexico's internal affairs. Napoleon had declared he had no pretext for intervention; that his policy with regard to the Americas was closely bound to that of

123. Ibid.

England; and that he did not want to risk a falling out with the United States.¹²⁴

Mr. Loftus C. Otway, British Minister to Mexico during the fall of 1858 and spring of 1859, had reported it was his conviction that the Mexicans were unable to rule themselves, and that intervention would be a relatively simple matter.¹²⁵ England, he believed, had a perfectly good pretext for such intervention, as about half the public debt of Mexico was owed to her. Despite his arguments along these lines, Otway did not succeed in convincing his government, and was told Britain would not interfere in Mexico's internal affairs, except in the event of complete disintegration, and then only in concert with other powers.¹²⁶

In mid-1859 a new cabinet was formed in Britain under Lord Palmerston, with Lord Russell as the new Foreign Secretary. Otway was relieved and replaced by George Mathew whose views on the parties in Mexico were just the opposite of Otway's. Mathew blamed all the troubles of Mexico on the conservatives, particularly the clergy.¹²⁷

Britain instituted a more active policy toward Mexico in 1860, not because of French or Spanish pressure, but because she wanted to

124. Napoleon III to Count Flahault, Palais de Compiègne, October 9, 1861, in Bock, Appendix F, p. 496.

125. Bock, pp. 48-52.

126. Ibid.

127. Bock, pp. 53-54.

see an end to the Civil War in Mexico, which had hurt her commercial interests.¹²⁸ Lord Russell tried to arrange an armistice between Juarez and Miramon during which time he proposed a national assembly be held to determine the future government.¹²⁹ In February 1860, the British government delivered a note to this effect to the French. In reply Vicente Fialon, Conde de Persigny, was entrusted to inform London that France was inclined to agree with this effort, but that it seemed difficult to realize without the United States, which, by its actions and official language, was disposed to support the government of Juarez and oppose any intervention--aside from its own--in the internal affairs of the American continent.¹³⁰ To this the British replied that it was preferable, before doing anything, to await the ratification of the MacLane-Ocampo Treaty. If the treaty were not ratified it would then be possible for France and Great Britain to invite the United States to associate with them in the effort to effect an arrangement between the two parties. If the United States declined, France and England then could adopt whatever measures might be necessary--exclusive of the use of force.¹³¹ When the Spanish government learned of the understanding

128. Bock, p. 40.

129. Bock, p. 54.

130. Note for the Minister concerning affairs of Mexico (Paris), April 1860, in Diaz II, pp. 153-157.

131. Ibid.

between France and England, it manifested a desire to associate itself with their efforts.¹³² Calderón Collantes declared Britain and France should act to intervene without the United States, especially in view of the MacLane-Ocampo Treaty--to which Spain could never consent.¹³³

When the MacLane-Ocampo Treaty was rejected by the United States Senate May 31, 1860, Britain, France, and Spain jointly requested the United States to join in the mediation proposal.¹³⁴

The United States declined, for she already had recognized the Juarez government and did not want to discredit it by joining in the proposal.¹³⁵ Convinced she could not obtain satisfaction for her claims from the Miramón government, Britain, in August 1860, broke relations. The British blamed Miramón and the French blamed Juarez for the grievances visited upon their subjects.¹³⁶

Jean Pierre Elizidore Alphonse Dubois de Saligny, appointed to succeed Gabriac in May 1860, finally arrived in Vera Cruz November 16, 1860, aboard the Spanish warship Pizarro from Havana.¹³⁷ His

132. Instructions to Dubois de Saligny, Paris, May 30, 1860, in Diaz II, pp. 164-169.

133. Bock, pp. 54-55.

134. Bock, p. 57.

135. Ibid.

136. Bock, pp. 57-58.

137. Dubois de Saligny to Minister, Vera Cruz, November 26, 1860, in Diaz, II, pp. 193-197.

instructions noted the existence of the two governments in Mexico "whose legality is almost equally disputable and whose impotence to establish a definitive administration is the same for one side as for the other."¹³⁸

The interest we long for as all other powers of the world, is that Mexico not lose its independence and for that reason we direct our sympathy toward the government which General Miramón presently heads, since it shows itself more interested in preserving national integrity.¹³⁹

Saligny was instructed to consider, together with the British representative, the renewal of efforts to bring about an armistice and the election of a national assembly.¹⁴⁰ However, shortly after Saligny arrived the Mexican picture had changed; Liberal forces under Jesús Gonzalez Ortega defeated the conservatives under Miramón at San Miguel Calpulapan, December 22, 1860 and ended the three years war. On January 11, 1861 Juarez entered Mexico City¹⁴¹ mediation was no longer necessary and shortly thereafter Britain recognized the Juarez government.

138. Instructions to Dubois de Saligny, Paris, May 30, 1860, in Diaz, II, pp. 164-169.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. Bancroft, Mexico, V. p. 795.

Early in 1861 Mathew was replaced by Sir Charles Wyke, a confirmed advocate of monarchy for South and Central America, where he had served for some time, and whose views were more in conformity with those of Palmerston than those of Mathew.¹⁴² Before he left for Mexico in April 1861, Wyke was sent by Palmerston to see Napoleon III. The emperor told Wyke that if Juárez did not recognize the just claims of Britain, Spain, and France, war would be declared, and the way cleared for a monarchy. Apparently even then the candidacy of Maximilian was under consideration.¹⁴³

Wyke's instructions declared Britain's policy was one of non-intervention, but at the same time, as a last resort, authorized him to threaten, but not to use, force to satisfy British claims. After his arrival, Wyke informed his government that there was little chance of satisfying British claims without the use of force.¹⁴⁴ He did not believe the Juarez government could be relied upon to keep its promises and blamed the liberals for all the troubles. His previous experience in Guatemala had convinced him:

That nothing reasonable or good can be expected from Spanish American Liberals and therefore I am hardly surprised at what has taken place here since

142. Bock, p. 68.

143. Bock, pp. 126-127.

144. Bock, pp. 70, 73.

that party has been in power but still these Mexican liberals have out Heroded Herod.¹⁴⁵

Wyke did not believe the conservatives were much better and hoped a moderate party might arise if supported by foreign intervention.¹⁴⁶

When Mexico suspended payments to London bondholders and foreign conventions in July 1861, Wyke suspended relations. This and other events in July, such as the murder of a British subject and the robbery of British miners by Leonardo Márquez, brought Wyke to remark:

This is only a solitary instance of the many acts of cruelty and injustice of which these people have been guilty, whilst constantly talking of liberty, toleration and the blessings of a constitutional system. I know nothing more detestable than this species of tyranny under the guise of freedom; it is like a Prostitute boasting of her virtue. Their idea of political economy seems to consist in putting their hands into other people's pockets whenever they are in want of money, whilst they take very good care never to make the least sacrifice themselves. They have squandered or pocketed all the resources of the Republic, and now make us pay for the continuance of the civil war by violating the conventions. . . . If Her Majesty's Government overlooks this last outrage no Englishman's property is safe here, and they will be subjected to all sorts of exactions and annoyances.¹⁴⁷

In October Wyke again advised that improvement could be made only

145. Wyke to Russell, Mexico City, June 29, 1861, cited in Bock, p. 77.

146. Bock, p. 77.

147. Wyke to Russell, Mexico City, July 29, 1861, cited by Bock, pp. 80-81.

under a moderate government with external support.¹⁴⁸ He believed England should proceed alone,¹⁴⁹ but by then the London Convention was signed and France, Spain, and Great Britain had agreed to intervene.¹⁵⁰

The position of the United States relative to intervention had been made clear several times during 1860. Gabriel Tassara, Spanish Minister to the United States, reported the substance of a conference he had with Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, in September of 1860. Cass told Tassara the United States would not permit armed intervention of any power to control the political destinies of Mexico, or to take permanent possession of the country, or any part of it, and that such intervention would be resisted by force. Nonetheless, the United States recognized the right of Spain or any other power to make war on Mexico for the purposes of reparation for injuries or damages. Consequently, the United States would not oppose the landing of troops for a temporary occupation.¹⁵¹

148. Bock, p. 85.

149. Ibid. p. 86.

150. The London Convention of October 21, 1861, was an agreement reached among these powers to dispatch a combined naval and military force to Mexico to protect the persons and properties of their nationals, and to demand that Mexico fulfill its contractual obligations. The signatories agreed not to seek any territorial gains or advantages, and not to interfere with respect to the form of government.

151. Tassara, Memorandum attached to Dispatch No. 12, Washington September 8, 1860, in CM.

Tassara was shown a dispatch Cass had received from Charles J. Faulkner, the United States Minister to Paris. Faulkner reported that Antoine-Edouard Thouvenel, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, had declared that the intervention considered by France, England, and Spain, was purely moral. However, any nation had the right to use force and temporary occupation to support its interests.¹⁵²

On December 20, 1860, Henry Roy de la Reintre, Special Agent of the United States Legation in Mexico, in a note to José Ramon Pacheco, Spanish Ambassador to Mexico, stated:

The Government of the United States does not deny to the European Powers the right to wage honorable warfare for a sufficient cause, anywhere or against any nation, nor does it deny their right to demand redress for injuries inflicted on their respective subjects, and if need be, to enforce such demands, but, it does deny them the right to intervene directly or indirectly with the political independence of the Republic of Mexico, and it will, to the extent of its power, defend the nationality and independence of said Republic.¹⁵³

After the London Convention had been signed, Matias Romero, Mexican Minister to the United States, observed that:

If the United States, while Mr. Seward is in the Department of State, takes part in our difficulties with European nations, it is only to extract at our cost whatever benefit they can from them, and not

152. Tassara, Washington, September 3, 1860, in CM.

153. Reintre to Pacheco, San Angel (Near Mexico), December 20, 1860, in CM.

because they have the slightest desire to help us with good faith to support our nationality and our liberties.¹⁵⁴

In 1861 Romero reported on several conferences he had with William H. Seward, United States' Secretary of State.¹⁵⁵ He told Seward that he had certain knowledge that the Cabinet at Madrid planned to organize a party in Mexico to proclaim a monarchy and request a prince from the Spanish royal family. Romero averred that the candidate already had been selected, and that he was Don Sebastian, uncle of Queen Isabel II. Romero suspected Seward was already aware of this, as he possibly was, for Carl Schurz, the United States Minister to Spain, had sent similar information in a dispatch dated September 27, 1861.¹⁵⁶ Seward suggested agents be sent to Mexico to frustrate the Spanish plans, but Romero said the people of Mexico did not require encouragement

154. Romero to Minister of Foreign Relations, Washington, November 23, 1861, in Matias Romero (ed.), Correspondencia de la legación mexicana en Washington durante la intervención extranjera, 1860-1868. Colección de Documentos para formar la historia de la intervención. (México: Imprenta del Gobierno, en Palacio, 1870-1892), I, pp. 603-605. (Cited hereafter as Romero, Correspondencia).

155. Romero to the Minister of Foreign Relations, Washington, November 8, 1861, in Romero, Correspondencia, I, p. 585.

156. Schurz to Seward, San Lorenzo (Escorial), September 27, 1861, in Diplomatic Dispatches, Spain, NA, RG 59. Schurz noted that Don Juan de Bourbon, son of Don Carlos, connected with the affair by English newspapers, "is considered an idiot and incapable of doing anything that requires sense and force of character."

"to defend their independence and their liberties."¹⁵⁷ "I believe,"

continued Romero:

There will be some persons who work in favor of monarchy, since its establishment has been for some years the gilded dream of a half dozen deluded Mexicans: there also will be in the interior of the country Spanish leaders, who even have arms in hand, who would proclaim not only the monarchy, but the reconquest of Mexico; but neither one nor the other are numerous enough to form a faction much less a party.¹⁵⁸

To thwart European designs, Romero even proposed to Seward that the United States join the intervention. It was his conviction that the United States might be able to create discord among the interventors; at least in this way the liberals would have the same number of votes as the reactionaries, that is, the United States and Great Britain versus France and Spain.¹⁵⁹ In reply, Seward observed that it would be "very hard to have to declare war on a good friend in order to help in that way to save it."¹⁶⁰

From his Virgin Island retreat, the hardy perennial, Santa Anna, was also bestirred to comment on the European plans for intervention.

157. Romero to Minister, Nov. 8, 1861, in loc. cit.

158. Ibid.

159. Romero to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Washington, November 23, 1861; Romero to Minister, Washington, November 27, 1861, in Romero, Correspondencia, I, pp. 603-605, 613-615.

160. Romero to Minister, Washington, November 30, 1861, in Romero, Correspondencia, I, pp. 613-615.

In a letter to Gutiérrez Estrada he announced:

Above all make them [intervening powers] know that Mexico will not have lasting peace unless the evil be radically cured, and that the remedy ought to limit itself to replacing this buffonery called a republic, with a constitutional emperor. . . . Make them know that today more than ever I am resolved to carry out this idea, and that I will work without retiring to attain its realization. . . . I have decided to be the avenger of all the sacrilegious outrages, counting on Divine Providence to give me the strength necessary to execute this resolution.¹⁶¹

In protest against the intervention, Juan Antonio de la Fuente, Mexican Minister Plenipotentiary to France, wrote to Thouvenel, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, requesting his passports and broke diplomatic relations, declaring impassionately:

The revolutions of Mexico are cast in the teeth of the government. . . . With our revolutions we have achieved the national independence; the liberty of slaves; the destruction of our clerical military oligarchy, which multiplied seditions and menaced incessantly the existence of the republic; the liberty of conscience; civil marriage; the amelioration of the civil condition of foreigners, who have been placed on an equality with

161. Santa Anna to Gutiérrez Estrada, n.d. (October 15, 1861), in Diaz, II, pp. 346-347. Contrast this with the statement he made in Vera Cruz, August 16, 1846. "My blood boils on seeing the contempt with which we are thus treated by men who either do not know us well, or who, interested in transplanting among us the fruits of their old social systems, and of times in which they originated, consider America in the same state in which it was during the 16th century. . . . Where are the internal supports on which the monarchy presented as the means of our salvation, can be found? That which was, has disappeared." Address of General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. . ., in U. S. Congress, House, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., House Executive Doc. No. 25, pp. 11. See also Chapter V, note 111, above.

Mexicans; civil and political liberty; the elevation and fraternization of races which had long been kept in a state of abject degradation and even in perpetual antagonism by the Spanish government. And, since it is a question of intervention and of importing into Mexico a foreign monarchy, it is certainly not improper to add that we reckon among the benefits derived from our revolutions the establishment of republican institutions. Mexico loves them as dearly as France can love her empire, and to maintain the republic we have made and are prepared to make every kind of sacrifice. . . . It was necessary to suppress history, to disregard proofs innumerable, and belie daily relations, to arrive at the conclusion that the government of Mexico is an unscrupulous government, and the country "barbarous," and yet this is done in some of your official documents. It was necessary; for in what other manner could the enormous outrage be justified which is about to be committed upon us in open violation of the great principle of non-intervention which was regarded as one of the most precious conquests of the new law of nations? . . . Mexico who would not even have her liberator for a king. . . will never accept, at any price, a foreign monarchy. This monarchy will be very difficult to create; still more difficult to maintain. . . . Mexico is weak, without doubt, in comparison with the powers that are invading her soil, but she possesses the consciousness of her outraged rights, the patriotism which will multiply her efforts, and the high convictions that in acquitting herself with honor in this perilous struggle, it will be given to her to preserve the beautiful continent of Christopher Columbus from the cataclysm with which it is threatened.¹⁶²

162. De la Fuente to Thouvenel, Paris, March 7, 1862, in Correspondence relative to the Present Condition of Mexico, Communicated to the House of Representatives by the Department of State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1862), pp. 178-184; cf. U. S. Congress, House, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Executive Document No. 100. (Italics by author.)

In the meantime, Hidalgo and Gutiérrez had continued their exertions on behalf of a monarchy. Acting as interim Chargé d'Affaires for Mexico, Hidalgo addressed a note to the French Foreign Minister, May 12, 1860, which stressed the threat from the United States:

The civil war which is presently rending the country cannot be considered as a battle between two parties disputing power: it has a much more crucial character. On the one hand there exists a party which insists on fighting for the defense of demagogic ideas and which, in order to come to power, does not hesitate in making a treaty with the United States, in detriment to the honor and independence of Mexico. On the other side is a party zealous for the conservation of the territorial integrity and independence of Mexico: it relies on the aid of public opinion at home and abroad. The demagogic party relies on nothing more than the sympathies of the United States whose race, by education and by political system, is the invincible enemy of the latin race and catholicism which the latter professes.¹⁶³

Having maintained his friendship and ready access with Napoleon and Eugenie, Hidalgo continued to press the Mexican project, and almost invariably was answered by Napoleon, "I should be glad to do it, but how is it to be done?".¹⁶⁴ Hidalgo was particularly close to the Empress. When her sister, the Duchess of Alba died in Paris, Eugenie and he accompanied the body aboard a special train to Marseilles in January, 1861. The Empress asked him to accompany the body to Madrid because

163. Hidalgo to Minister, Paris, May 12, 1860, in Diaz, II, pp. 160-163.

164. Quoted in Corti, I, p. 94.

"Paca does not like new faces, and would like to have a friendly face nearby, even after death."¹⁶⁵

In 1860 Hidalgo discussed with the Empress the possibility of giving command of a Mexican army, to be formed by the monarchists, to the Spanish General Elio and sounding out Francis, the Duke of Modena as a candidate for the throne.¹⁶⁶ Gutiérrez agreed with the plan:

The Duke of Modena would suit me more than any other candidate for Mexico, on account of his eminently Catholic and monarchical principles and because he can count on a small army of honest fidelity with enough means of his own to sustain them, and even to aid the extinct Mexican treasury.¹⁶⁷

However, he noted, more than moral support was required, and without the prospect of French aid there was little point in going to Vienna to pursue the question.¹⁶⁸ Gutiérrez had organized a committee composed of himself, Almonte, Hidalgo, Tomás Murphy and other conservatives, who had left Mexico after the Juarez victory to aid in the conversion of

165. Hidalgo, Paris, May 7, 1893, in Hidalgo, Cartas, pp. 257-263; Corti, I, p. 94.

166. Corti, I, p. 96.

167. Gutiérrez Estrada to Hidalgo, August 19, 1861, quoted in Hidalgo, Apuntes, in Cartas, p. 15; Corti, I, pp. 96-97.

168. Ibid.; Corti, I, p. 97.

Mexico into a monarchy.¹⁶⁹ On July 4, 1861, Gutiérrez met with Prince Richard Metternich, Austrian Ambassador at Paris, who had been notified of the plan by Eugenie.¹⁷⁰ Gutiérrez spoke of the desire of a "majority" of Mexicans for a monarchy headed by a prince of a European Roman Catholic dynasty. The committee approached Metternich, declared Gutiérrez, because a Hapsburg Prince would be most acceptable.¹⁷¹ He left a written statement with Metternich wherein he noted the internal problems of the United States made the time propitious for establishment of a monarchy.¹⁷² Metternich forwarded the information to the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Rechberg-Rothenlöwen, and noted the idea "didn't lack grandeur, but was deplorably and discouragingly impracticable."¹⁷³

In his reply to Metternich, the Austrian Minister noted that, although the establishment of the monarchical principle in the New World would be to Austria's advantage, the plan was not practical because the active support of Great Britain and France was required and "M. Gutiérrez does not appear to be in a position to give any kind of guarantee

169. Bock, pp. 125-126.

170. Corti, I, p. 96.

171. Bock, p. 130.

172. Ibid.

173. Quoted in Bock, p. 130.

that the Mexican nation really desires a king, and unless such a desire really exists there can be no hope of success."¹⁷⁴ Rechberg continued with the observation that whereas Austria had no desire to discourage Gutiérrez, "the general political situation and the particular difficulties of our own position do not at present allow us to take part in an enterprise which might require the aid of foreign troops, and which could be successful only in times more favorable than the present."¹⁷⁵

Carl Bock, in his analysis of the Rechberg letter and Daniel Dawson's reactions to it in The Mexican Adventure,¹⁷⁶ states, "it is less remarkable than Dawson believes."¹⁷⁷ Bock notes that:

While one may agree with Dawson that it is remarkable that Rechberg even stated the conditions for the candidacy of an Austrian Prince, it is also true that the door was even shut on further "unofficial" negotiations until the French and British Governments and the Mexican people made their intentions known.¹⁷⁸

However, it should be observed that even before the last condition was fulfilled, negotiations did take place.

While in Biarritz with the Court during September 1861. Hidalgo had received letters from Mexico telling him France and England had

174. Quoted in Bock, pp. 130-131.

175. Quoted in Bock, p. 131.

176. Daniel Dawson, The Mexican Adventure (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. 1935).

177. Bock, p. 131.

178. Bock, p. 132.

broken relations with Juarez and that their representatives had requested forces be sent to protect their interests.¹⁷⁹ Hidalgo told Eugenie of the information he had received from Mexico and she immediately brought him to the Emperor, to whom Hidalgo said:

Sir, it is long since I lost all hope of seeing those ideas realized about which I had the honor of speaking to Your Majesty four years ago; but England, together with France and Spain, is now irritated by Juarez's policy, and they are all going to order warships to our ports. And so, Your Majesty, we have what we needed: English intervention. France will not be acting alone, which was what Your Majesty always wished to avoid. Spain has long been prepared; General Concha told me not long ago that he had left six thousand men in Havana, ready to land at Vera Cruz, but that the Cabinet of Madrid prefers to proceed hand in hand with France, and, if possible, England. And so French, English and Spanish naval squadrons might be dispatched to Vera Cruz and land these six thousand Spaniards. In view of the three combined flags, Mexico would recognize the full strength and superiority of the alliance, and the overwhelming majority in the country could rely on the support of the intervening powers, annihilate the demagogues, and proclaim a monarchy, which alone can save the country. The United States are in the throes of war; they will not move. Besides they would never oppose the three united powers together. Let the allied flag once show itself, sir, and I can assure Your Majesty that the country will rise as one man and rally to the support of this beneficent intervention.¹⁸⁰

179. Hidalgo, Apuntes, in Cartas, pp. 16-17.

180. Quoted in Corti, I, p. 100.

All conditions which Napoleon III sought were fulfilled: he had the pretext, the United States was busy with a civil war, and England stood ready to intervene--all he needed was a candidate for the throne.

Hidalgo had also heard from Gutiérrez Estrada from Le Havre on September 1, 1861. Gutiérrez had come to France from Rome to attend the marriage of his son. "So great was the joy of Gutiérrez upon learning what had happened from my letters there is no point in overrating it." On September 9, Gutiérrez wrote to Hidalgo and suggested the immediate establishment of a transitional dictatorship under Zuloaga with Miranda as Minister.¹⁸¹ Hidalgo told Gutiérrez that Almonte was the logical choice to go to Mexico to set things in order, for Napoleon had much faith in him, but Gutiérrez replied that Almonte, unfortunately, was in Europe and insisted Zuloaga was in a better position.¹⁸² From the exchanges between the two, it is possible the decision to proceed with the intervention and to accept Maximilian took place at Biarritz sometime before September 9, and after September 1.

According to Hidalgo, Napoleon III never had a preference for any candidate and left the choice up to the Mexicans.¹⁸³ It is not known who first proposed the Archduke Maximilian, but with time and further negotiations he became the Second Emperor of Mexico--and also the last.

181. Hidalgo, Apuntes in Cartas, p. 19.

182. Ibid.

183. Ibid.

CONCLUSION

But, Mon Cher, I believe such thoughts are impossible to realize. . . for the decisive and conclusive reason that there are no monarchists in Mexico.

Prim

The great error. . . is that they obstinately persist in the conviction that because Mexico is at the present moment in a state of anarchy, therefore Mexicans must be and are anxious to terminate such a state of things by returning to the Spanish dominion. . . which all the information that I have been able to collect satisfies me is utterly erroneous.

H. U. Addington, British
Minister to Spain

After the Iturbide episode, the indispensable ingredient needed to erect a monarchy in Mexico was the intervention and support of a European power, or concert of powers. One important factor in attempts to gain such aid was the constant affirmation, by Mexican and European monarchists alike, of the existence of strong and widespread monarchist sentiment in Mexico. The testimony of diplomats, travelers, Mexican expatriates, and expelled Spaniards tended to corroborate this assertion. For the most part, these observers had arrived in

Mexico with a preconceived bias in favor of monarchy; they left with the same prejudices. Their views are reflected, for example, in the Consultas of the Spanish Council of Ministers and in the instructions provided French and Spanish Ministers to Mexico. Unquestionably, the conservatives in Mexico had a good deal of support; they were able to gain control of the government several times after the demise of Iturbide's empire, as well as conduct a three year civil war against the government of Juárez. It is yet another thing, however, to equate conservatism in Mexico with monarchy. That is to say, whereas all monarchists were conservatives, it did not hold true that all conservatives were monarchists. It is true that the core of the conservative party was composed of those interests, such as the church, leading landowners, and military, who, in their attempt to either maintain or gain control of the government, at times sought outside aid. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily true that the external support they sought took the form of a "legitimate monarchy." As an example, the conservative organ El Sol, in 1829 when the arrival of the Barradas expedition was imminent, declared:

Since then (independence) until now one cannot doubt that the immense majority of the nation has been opposed in ideas and sentiments, to a Bourbon monarchy in this country. . . . Where is, then, that great mass of opinion in favor of the Infante d. Francisco de Paula on which the

expeditionaries of Havana and the Spanish cabinet count?¹

Its editors urged Mexicans to forget partisanship and unite to resist the invasion.²

Even though these groups desired to create or to sustain a status quo, they were reluctant to endanger their control and sought support to maintain themselves in power. "In 1861 Mexico had neither a large or small monarchical party. . . Monarchy was not the aspiration of the great majority of the conservative party but a sacrifice imposed on their ambitions."³ Francisco Javier Miranda, an arch-conservative, in a letter to Gutiérrez Estrada on November 18, 1861, remarked that "a considerable number of conservatives distrust the intervention, fearing that it will result in the ratification of the iniquitous acquisitions made by foreigners of clerical property."⁴

Jesús García Gutiérrez, in his Iglesia Mexicana en el Segundo Imperio,⁵ maintained that many conservatives were of a contrary

1. El Sol, July 10, 1829.

2. El Sol, July 20, 1829.

3. Bulnes, El verdadero Juárez, p. 16.

4. Miranda to Gutiérrez Estrada, New York, November 6, 1861, in Díaz, II, p. 345-346.

5. (Mexico: Editorial Campeador, 1955), quoted in Arellano-Belloc, "Los Monarquistas Mexicanos," p. 75.

opinion with regard to monarchy:

Miramón was of the opinion that there was no monarchical party in Mexico; and Señor Labastida . . . who lived exiled in Rome and had a great interest in the regeneration of Mexico, did not conceal that all was reduced to a change of regime and that it was very difficult to establish a lasting authority; but Hidalgo took good care that the Archduke would come to learn none of this.⁶

Matías Romero, Mexican Minister to the United States, received declarations from Felix Zuloaga, Conservative leader, dated Havana, August 1, 1862, and from José M. Cobos, Conservative General, dated St. Thomas, July 20, 1862, wherein both, speaking in the name of the conservative party, rejected French intervention and, in bitter terms, censured Juan N. Almonte and Leonardo Márquez.⁷ A year later, in December, 1863, General Juan Prim, Commander of the Spanish Expeditionary Forces, in a speech before the Spanish Senate, noted this incongruous situation:

Zuloaga, who is without dispute the genuine representative of the reactionary conservative party of Mexico, counselled his fellow countrymen to lay aside family quarrels and reunite to combat the french. Well then: if we know the liberal

6. Ibid.

7. Romero to SRE, August 31, 1862, in Matías Romero, (ed.) Correspondencia de la legacion mexicana en Washington durante la intervención extranjera, 1860-1869. Colección de Documentos para formar la historia de la intervención (México: Imprenta del Gobierno, en Palacio, 1870-1892), II, p. 366.

party is not monarchical, and if the reactionary party wants to fight the french who intend to come to their country with the flag of monarchy, who remains in Mexico with monarchical ideas?⁸

In a letter to William H. Seward, United States' Secretary of State, Romero declared he considered the manifestations of Zuloaga and Cobos proof of the non-complicity of the conservative party in the French intervention.⁹ Cobos, in his declaration, had made the point that the conservative party did not want a monarchy. Moreover, he attested that Zuloaga had insisted that Almonte, "above all formulate his political program in a conservative sense, without mixing with foreign monarchy, of which no one thinks."¹⁰ A few months later, in a lengthy letter, on the intervention, to Seward, Romero stated:

The conduct and desires of Spain have a simple explanation. Seeing the events of Mexico through the prism under which M. Saligny used to present them; deceived with respect to the situation of the Republic by inexact reports of some of its diplomatic agents in Mexico, where unfortunately they have embraced the cause of a party with more ardor than the Mexicans themselves; confused by the labors of the Mexican expatriates, resident in Europe, with respect to which the present government was given a so-called anarchic and oppressive character, which they supposed had a profound hatred of all that was

8. Genaro Estrada, (ed.) Don Juan Prim y su labor diplomática en México, AHDM, 1st Series, XXV, p. 225.

9. Romero to Seward, August 31, 1862, in Romero, Correspondencia, II, 367-369.

10. Ibid.

Spanish, while they represented the party of reaction as the party of the majority and the Spanish party of Mexico, it is not strange that the downfall of a government whose existence was considered a calamity for Mexico would be desired, and would like to see it substituted by another, animated with good disposition toward Spain.¹¹

In an obvious allusion to Hidalgo, Gutiérrez Estrada, and Almonte, the Mexican Minister asserted that the Mexicans resident in Paris "do not in any manner represent their country, and some of them, established there for a long time, are not even informed of the radical change the last revolution produced."¹² Those who had manifested the desire of establishing a monarchy, continued Romero, were "expatriates, whom the Mexican people just had driven from the power they had usurped and who desired to return again aided by foreign powers, because they know that in no other way would it be possible to obtain it."¹³ Moreover, noted Romero, they never would have considered a monarchy "if they had not received, directly or indirectly, the indication of proposing it from the French government."¹⁴ Hence, Romero concluded:

11. Romero to Seward, October 2, 1862, in Romero, Correspondencia, II, p. 418. cf. also Notes from Foreign Legations, Mexico, NA, RG 59.

12. Ibid., p. 422.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

The French government has been and is, then, the true and only author of the project to establish a monarchy in Mexico, which can only be conceived as theory, by persons who did not know the present situation of the republic and the ideas and tendencies of its people, or who believe the Mexican nation is an automaton with which one may do as one pleases.¹⁵

In December, 1863, General Juan Prim, during the course of a defense of his actions in Mexico before the Spanish Senate, commented on the strength of the monarchical party in Mexico. "Another error Sr. Bermudez de Castro has committed, and which many other politicians have committed, is that of believing, as his Lordship still goes on believing, that there is a great monarchical party in Mexico."¹⁶ Previous attempts to create a monarchy had failed, Prim submitted: "because there were no monarchists. . . . His Lordship does not believe this, he believes there are and because of this, reasons on this basis; but I assure your Lordship that there are none."¹⁷ As for monarchy itself, Prim was a true believer:

I believe it is the best system; on that account I am a follower and for that reason I have defended it

15. Ibid.

16. Discurso pronunciado por el Conde de Reus en el Senado durante las sesiones del 10, 11 y 12 del corriente mes y año, defendiendo sus actos como general en jefe del cuerpo ejercito expedicionario a México y como Ministro Plenipotenciario cerca dicha República, in Romero, Correspondencia, III, p. 70.

17. Ibid.

since the first days of my life and will support it until the last moments of my existence. But when I saw that no monarchists existed, had I to create them from cannon shot? That is what the French Commissioners want to do, but they will not succeed.¹⁸

Again and again Prim repeated this conviction.¹⁹ In a letter to Napoleon III he observed:

I have the profound conviction. . . that there are few men in this country with monarchical sentiments. . . if logic is not enough, the fact that in the two months during which the allied flags have waved in Veracruz. . . neither monarchists nor conservatives, have made even the slightest demonstration in order to convince the allies that such partisans existed, would be enough to demonstrate it.²⁰

There was no effective monarchist support in Mexico between the Empire of Iturbide and the Empire of Maximilian. Some conservatives did insist, from time to time, that a monarchy was the only form of government capable of solving Mexico's problems. However, when Gutiérrez Estrada had proposed such a course to the conservative government of Bustamante in 1840, not only was it not accepted, but the subsequent reaction forced him to flee the country. Many times the monarchist proposals were little more than private intrigues, lacking

18. Ibid.

19. See previous chapter.

20. Carta de Prim al Emperador al las Francesas, Orizaba, March 17, 1862, in CM; cf. also AHDM, I-25, pp. 107-110.

any real support; at other times rumors of such intrigues were used by liberals to attack their opposition, by an appeal to the fear of intervention, or the restoration of Spanish dominion. Nevertheless, the question was kept open by the European representatives, particularly those of France and Spain; in Mexico, through their intrigues; and in Europe, through reports they submitted to their governments. For example, the Memorias submitted by Radepont to Napoleon III were little more than resúmenes of the reports transmitted by the French legation in Mexico, with which Radepont maintained close relations.²¹

The role played by the Mexican expatriates, especially Gutiérrez Estrada and Hidalgo, has been exaggerated; for example, in Corti's study of Maximilian. Even though important, certainly their contributions to the cause of monarchy were no greater than the cumulative effects of reports relayed over the years by the representatives of France and Spain, or by the accounts published by travellers who had visited Mexico. Margarita Helguera, in her article Posibles Antecedentes de la Intervención Francesa, stated: "it is difficult to admit that a group of foreign expatriates had such force of conviction that the French government believed them. Without a doubt the maneuvers of this group of conservatives were not those which hatched the intervention

21. Nota para el ministro, acerca de Radepont y de las reclamaciones francesas a México, Paris, March 1860, in Díaz, II, pp. 142-144.

idea in France."²²

One might raise the question of the relative importance of Gutiérrez Estrada as compared with Hidalgo. Hidalgo was a relative newcomer to the monarchist cause. Indeed, it was Gutiérrez who brought him into the fold. Even their motives and modus operandi were different. Both were sincere, but Gutiérrez had no personal interest and thought of nothing more than the salvation of his country. Hidalgo, on the other hand, considered his own personal ambition and glory. Gutiérrez only sought a suitable monarch, convinced that, from this, all else would follow as a matter of course. Hidalgo realized the support of the great powers was indispensable to the erection of a throne in Mexico and, therefore, first sought support and then the candidate.²³

The importance of these two figures in the history of monarchist proposals for Mexico is, perhaps, best summed up in the words of Hidalgo:

Those who triumph write history, and afterwards they find it easy to ridicule the vanquished, without remembering that the thousands of circumstances which favored them, most of the time were only forces of 'destiny'. . . . Who would believe that England and France would have embarked on an enterprise with

22. Historia Mexicana, XV-1 (July-September 1865), p. 4.

23. Schefer, p. 40.

their ships and their prestige in the way they did, without having studied the question thoroughly beforehand? And who would believe that they did not make the most serious explorations? Only a fool could maintain that simply my words were those which animated those great powers, which were not small countries without experience.²⁴

24. Hidalgo, Territet, Switzerland, September 18, 1890, in Cartas, pp. 150-154.

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